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This thesis examines the notion of State aid, encompassed in Article 107(1) 
TFEU, as it applies to fiscal cases. This analysis is important, as the notion of fiscal 
aid is, due to its fiscal subject matter, different from the notion of aid as it applies to 
non-fiscal cases, and due to the political sensitivity of taxation as an area of exclusive 
Member State competence. Furthermore, the examination of the notion of fiscal aid 
and its limits allows for a critical analysis of the Commission’s investigations into 
aggressive tax planning via tax rulings. The tax ruling Decisions have several 
problematic elements, which can only be fully appraised in the context of the notion 
of fiscal aid, as it emerges from the CJEU’s case law.  
Part I of the thesis examines the individual criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU that 
make up the notion of aid, as well as the compatibility regime applicable to fiscal 
State aid. That regime is the first to be examined, and it is shown that fiscal aid 
measures have to overcome more hurdles to be deemed compatible with the 
internal market when compared with non-fiscal ones. With the limited compatibility 
of fiscal aids established, the thesis moves on to examine the conditions of fiscal aid. 
This analysis starts with the notion of selectivity, which is generally considered to be 
the most relevant one in fiscal cases. The analysis of the notion and of the test 
employed, showcases a consistent widening of fiscal selectivity, which can lead to 
general measures falling within the scope of the State aid prohibition. The problems 
stemming from the determination of the reference framework and the 
comparability exercise are discussed in this context. Then, the notion of advantage 
as it applies to fiscal cases is discussed. It is shown that the MEOP cannot be readily 
applied to fiscal cases due to its internal logic, reducing the advantage analysis in 
fiscal cases to a bare-bones version of the selectivity analysis. However, the 
evidential burden attached to the notion of advantage also demonstrates the 
importance of the fiscal context in which a measure is to be assessed. The following 
Chapter discusses the remaining three criteria, namely the granting of aid through 
State resources, and the quasi-jurisdictional criteria of effect on trade and distortion 
of competition. It is shown that due to the State resources criterion’s inherent logic 
its relevance is limited in fiscal cases, while it is also demonstrated that the two quasi-
jurisdictional criteria are almost always satisfied, especially in fiscal cases. Thus, Part 
I of this thesis demonstrates that selectivity is the crux of the fiscal aid analysis, 
despite the practical importance of advantage, and that the widening of fiscal 
selectivity in effect translates into a widening of the notion of fiscal aid.  
Based on the findings of Part I, Part II discusses the State aid tax ruling 
Decisions. The relevant fiscal concepts, in particular tax rulings, transfer pricing, and 
the arm’s length principle (ALP) are discussed, alongside the factual patterns and 
basic reasoning of the Decisions. This allows for a critical analysis of the Decisions 
in their fiscal context, through which it is demonstrated that the invention of an EU 
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ALP is problematic on multiple fronts, from the creation of legal uncertainty to the 
limitation of Member States’ fiscal sovereignty. It is also shown that the definition of 
the reference framework, and the combination of selectivity and advantage criteria 
are equally problematic. It is also shown that the problems in the reasoning of the 
tax ruling Decisions can to an extent be traced back to the problems that exist in the 
notion of fiscal aid. Based on Parts I and II, the thesis concludes that the core 
problem with the notion of fiscal State aid is the definition of selectivity and its limits, 
as it is in effect the only analytically substantive criterion. It is shown that its excessive 
widening can limit fiscal sovereignty, and can lead to radically novel concepts, like 
the EU ALP. As a result, the adoption of a more fiscal outlook is advocated for the 






















Being part of EU Competition law, State aid law is focused on ensuring fair 
and equal market conditions. State aid law deals with subsidies, understood in a 
broad manner, offered by Member States, and prohibits their being granted unless 
they meet certain criteria that ensure that the market is not distorted. The State aid 
prohibition, being part of the EU Treaties, applies to all aspects of a Member State’s 
economy and to all measures they adopt. This means that it necessarily applies to 
taxation as well. Aid that takes the form of tax benefits and is granted through the 
tax system is known as fiscal State aid, and is the focus of this thesis. Fiscal aid 
effectively is a prohibition of measures that selectively grant, through State 
resources, a fiscal advantage that affects trade and distorts competition. In this 
sense, it can be broadly understood as a prohibition on discriminatory taxation. 
Fiscal State aid rules, due to their subject matter, can limit Member States’ powers 
to use their tax system to pursue varied policy objectives, as national tax rules must 
be in line with the State aid prohibition. This can be demonstrated by the European 
Commission’s recent investigations and Decisions, under the lens of State aid, into 
tax deals, known as tax rulings, struck between Member States and multinational 
enterprises like Apple or Starbucks. Thus, fiscal State aid is a sensitive topic, as 
under EU law Member States generally have the power to design their tax systems 
as they see fit. As a result of the importance of fiscal State aid, and its uneasy 
relationship with the powers of Member States, this thesis examines the five 
conditions that make up the notion of State aid as they apply to fiscal cases, as those 
conditions define the scope of the fiscal State aid prohibition.  
The thesis discusses and analyses the notion of fiscal aid, and identifies the 
main problems with it. In this context, it examines the scope of the State aid 
prohibition, and demonstrates why its increasing width is far from ideal. Following 
from this, the thesis analyses the reasoning of the tax ruling Decisions, and aims to 
explain how the reasoning behind those Decisions came to be. Part I of this thesis 
examines each of the five conditions, through the case law of the European Union’s 
Court of Justice, in order to define the notion of fiscal State aid. The analysis of the 
conditions of fiscal aid shows that due to either the conditions’ internal logic or to 
the peculiarities of taxation, the only truly relevant conditions for fiscal aid are 
selectivity and advantage. This Part illustrates the difference between fiscal and non-
fiscal aid, and demonstrates that the scope of fiscal aid has been considerably 
widened, as a result of a wide concept of selectivity. Part I therefore shows that the 
notion of fiscal aid is problematic, and its width is such as to threaten Member States’ 
powers to define and implement their own tax systems. Thereafter, Part II examines 
the tax ruling Decisions. It starts by analysing principles of tax law that inform the 
fiscal context of the Decisions and the concepts with which they deal, such as tax 
rulings and the arm’s length principle (ALP), before discussing and critiquing the 
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reasoning employed in the Decisions. The analysis illustrates that the reasoning is 
flawed, implying the existence of an EU-wide ALP, and potentially creating new 
limitations to the powers of Member States to create and manage their own tax 
regimes. Additionally, it is demonstrated that the problems stemming from the 
width of the notion of selectivity and fiscal aid in general can lead to the novel 
reasoning employed by the Commission in the tax ruling Decisions. Part II therefore 
identifies the problems with the notion of fiscal aid through some high-profile cases 
which are very innovative in their reasoning and can help lay bare those problems. 
Overall, the thesis illustrates the problems that exist in relation to the notion and 
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This thesis will examine the notion of fiscal State aid, and, based on that 
analysis, will discuss and critically evaluate the Commission’s tax ruling State aid 
Decisions. The main focus of Part I is the notion of fiscal aid and by extension the 
scope of the State aid prohibition as applied to fiscal cases. Due to the differences 
between fiscal and non-fiscal aid, the scope will be shown to be wider in relation to 
the former. The problems caused by this wide formulation and the overall lack of 
clarity which permeates the notion of fiscal aid (as well as its application) will be 
demonstrated in Part II via the tax ruling Decisions. Placed in their fiscal context, 
those Decisions and their rationale will be analysed, and it will be shown that they 
represent at the same time both a new type of threat to fiscal sovereignty, and a 
logical extension of the (problematic) notion of fiscal aid.  
The scope, as well the very notion of fiscal aid, are effectively defined by the 
five cumulative criteria of aid,1 and their application to fiscal cases. Part I of this thesis 
will analyse each of the five conditions: selectivity, advantage, the use of State 
resources, the distortion of competition, and the measure’s effect on trade. Through 
this analysis, focusing primarily on the interpretation of the individual conditions as 
it emerges from the CJEU’s case law, this thesis will set out the notion of fiscal aid, 
and examine its scope. Additionally, it will be shown that fiscal State aid is different 
from non-fiscal aid, due to the inherent logic of some of the conditions, and as a 
result of the peculiarities of taxation itself. This can be further evidenced by the 
compatibility regime, which will also be discussed in Part I. The combined reading 
of the notion of fiscal aid and its scope on the one hand, and of the compatibility of 
fiscal aid on the other, will allow for an actual appraisal of the flexibility afforded to 
Member States to pursue policy aims through their tax systems. This is because, in 
effect, the notion and scope of State aid inform the limits of State aid control, i.e. 
what measures are prohibited, while the compatibility regime reflects State aid 
policy, by demonstrating to what extent a prohibited measure can be allowed to 
exist within the internal market. This Part of the thesis will set off with a brief overview 
of the compatibility regime, in order to demonstrate some of the differences 
between “standard” and fiscal aid, and in order to contextualise the importance of 
the scope of the aid prohibition. Following this, the thesis will aim to demonstrate 
the central role that the notion of selectivity has traditionally played, and still plays, 
in the analysis of fiscal State aid. In this context, the increasing width and evolution 
of this criterion will be examined, as the scope of fiscal aid depends primarily on the 
interpretation of fiscal selectivity. At the same time, the evolution of the notion of 
advantage into an increasingly substantive concept will be discussed. Finally, the 
other three criteria will be examined, and it will be shown that while they can be 
 
1 Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92, and C-280/92 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1994:325, para 
20; Case C-482/99 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:294, para 68 
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situationally very relevant in fiscal cases, in general they tend to be almost 
automatically satisfied.  
Following the analysis of the notion of fiscal aid and its scope in Part I, Part II 
of the thesis will move on to examine the recent tax ruling Decisions adopted by the 
Commission. The Commission decided to use its substantial investigatory powers 
in relation to State aid to examine a number of tax rulings issued by the tax 
authorities of Member States to (large) MNEs. In effect, the Commission was not 
convinced that the arrangements endorsed in those rulings reflected market 
conditions, which in relation to advanced pricing agreements (APAs) practically 
means that the arrangements were not in line with the arm’s length principle (ALP). 
It becomes clear that those Decisions revolve around complicated elements of 
international taxation, such as tax rulings, mismatches, and most importantly 
transfer pricing (TP) and the ALP. Thus, Part II will first contextualise the analysis of 
those Decisions by discussing the relevant elements of the international tax regime. 
Then, very briefly, the factual patterns of the cases and the rationale employed by 
the Commission will be outlined. Building on those two aspects of the Decisions 
and their context, it will be possible to critically evaluate the problematic elements 
that stem from the rationale of those Decisions. It is clear that the Commission’s 
reasoning is rather innovative,2 while at the same time it endorses and jumps off 
from some general problematic elements of the notion of fiscal aid. In effect, the 
Commission’s bold foray into new territory suffers from wholly novel problems, 
which to an extent can be traced back to the notion of fiscal selectivity. At the same 
time, some long existing analytical problems, such as the width of the reference 
framework employed for the selectivity analysis, are also part of the reasoning of the 
Decisions. As such, the critical analysis of the tax ruling Decisions can serve to 
showcase, inter alia, the potential negative effects of an excessively wide conception 
of fiscal selectivity, especially in relation to the concept of fiscal sovereignty. The 
Decisions can serve both as an example and as a cautionary tale. In brief, Part II will 
start by examining the elements of the international tax regime that inform the 
Decisions, alongside the facts and reasoning that gave rise to those Decisions. 
Following from this, it will aim to demonstrate the issues that follow from the 
Commission’s and the General Court’s rationale, focusing on the truly innovative 
elements and tying them back to the general discussion of Part I. 
State aid relating to taxation, or fiscal State aid, has always been a somewhat 
contentious political issue.3 The rules on State aid are contained in Articles 107 to 
109 TFEU. As such, they are part of Chapter 1 of Title VII, on the rules on 
 
2 See for example: Saturnina Moreno Gonzalez, ‘State Aid and Tax Competition: Comments on the 
European Commission's Decisions on Transfer Pricing Rulings’ (2016) 15 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 556, 558-563 
3 See for example: Cees Peters, ‘Tax Policy Convergence and EU Fiscal State Aid Control: In search 
of Rationality’ (2019) 28 EC Tax Review 6 
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competition. The State aid prohibition, contained in Article 107(1) TFEU, prohibits 
the granting of, widely construed, subsidies by Member States to undertakings, 
while Articles 107(2) and (3) contain exemptions rendering aid compatible with the 
internal market. Article 108 and 109 contain the rules that make up the 
implementation regime of State aid, from the Commission’s powers and 
obligations, to mechanisms enabling the adoption of regulations.  
Fiscal aid can be a contentious issue because, in principle, Member States 
enjoy exclusive competence when it comes to direct taxation, as a result of the 
principle of conferral,4 and the allocation of competences that follows from it. At the 
same time, the Commission has the dual role of promoting the interests of the EU 
while also overseeing the application of the Treaties and of Union law in general.5 
In the field of competition law, the Union (and by extension the Commission) has 
exclusive competence.6 This creates an obvious tension, as due to the effects-based 
conception of State aid and the fact that it is wider as a concept than a direct subsidy, 
the rules on State aid, which form part of the competition law apparatus, can apply 
to fiscal cases.7 This results on the one hand from the fact that State aid is part of 
competition law, and on the other from the fact that the Member States’ fiscal 
sovereignty is not absolute. Rather, they have the competence to design their own 
direct tax system as they please as long as they consistently exercise that 
competence in line with Union law,8 which of course includes the provisions on State 
aid. However, in relation to State aid, the legal extensions of this position are not 
necessarily clear.9 In short, the Commission is charged with implementing the (fiscal) 
State aid regime, while also having a degree of control over State aid policy,10 and 
being involved with (positive) tax harmonisation.11 Even in its role as the guardian of 
the State aid prohibition and its associated compatibility analysis, the Commission 
 
4 Treaty on European Union (TEU), Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2) 
5 Giorgio Monti, ‘Independence, Interdependence, and Legitimacy’ in D Ritleng (ed) Independence 
and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union (OUP 2016), 190 
6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 3(1)(b) 
7 Case 30/59 De gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority ECLI:EU:C:1961:2, p 
19; Case 173/73 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1974:71, para 13 
8 Case C-279/93 Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker ECLI:EU:C:1995:31, para 21; Case 
C-157/10 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA v Administración General del Estado 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:813, para 28;Case C-287/10 Tankreederei I SA v Directeur de l’administration des 
contributions directes ECLI:EU:C:2010:827, para 14  
9 See for example: Case C-449/14 P DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:848, paras 65, 83; H Brokelmann and M Ganino, ‘DTS v Commission: When is a Tax 
Measure State Aid?’ (2017) 8 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 102, 103 
10 Michael Blauberger, ‘Of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Subsidies: European State Aid Control through Soft and 
Hard Law’ (2009) 32 West European Politics 719, 720-725 
11 See for example: Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base {SWD(2016) 
341}{SWD(2016) 342}, COM(2016) 683 final, 2016/0336 (CNS) 25.10.2016, p. 2; Proposal for a 
Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base {SWD(2016) 341}{SWD(2016) 342}, COM(2016) 
685 final, 2016/0337 (CNS) 25.10.2016, p. 2. See also: Christiana HJI Panayi, European Union 
Corporate Tax Law (Cambridge University Press 2013), 3-30, especially parts 1.2.1 – 1.3.4 
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has arguably the power to influence the scope of the notion of aid.12 Thus, despite 
the fiscal sovereignty of Member States, it is clear that fiscal convergence can be 
achieved through State aid.13 It is equally clear that fiscal sovereignty only goes so 
far, as it must constantly and consistently be exercised in line with the Member 
States’ obligations under EU law. Given that the Commission has a monopoly on the 
assessment of State aid and the enforcement of State aid rules and needs to ensure 
its effectiveness,14 the conflict with direct taxation requires a careful and delicate 
balancing act.15 In this context, the Commission initiated a series of investigations 
into the tax arrangements of a number of high-profile MNEs, examining those 
arrangements under the lens of State aid law.  
Given the uneasy relationship at the meeting point of two conflicting 
exclusive competences, it is important to examine the scope of fiscal State aid, and 
its effect on Member States’ fiscal powers. This thesis overall will demonstrate that 
the notion of fiscal selectivity, when read in conjunction with the compatibility 
regime, shows that Member States have very limited room to manoeuvre when it 
comes to pursuing policy objectives through their tax systems. This is not per se 
problematic, but the scope of the State aid prohibition matters in this context. That 
scope can only become apparent based on the interpretation of the constituent 
elements of the notion of aid, which in effect describe it and endow it with content. 
This is especially true as the conception of the conditions in fiscal cases is somewhat 
different when compared to non-fiscal aid. From this platform, it becomes possible 
to critically evaluate the tax ruling Decisions, and their “test case” character.16 This 
combined discussion, looking at the notion of fiscal aid and its application to the tax 
ruling cases, can help illuminate the limits of the notion of fiscal aid. Additionally, it 
will show that the innovative, and controversial,17 elements of the tax ruling 
Decisions were made possible primarily as a result of the problems with the notion 
of fiscal aid. Thus, the discussion of the notion of fiscal aid, and that of the tax ruling 
cases come together to demonstrate the problematic elements within the notion of 
fiscal aid, and the extent to which those elements can alter the scope of fiscal aid, 
and potentially curtail the fiscal sovereignty of Member States. 
This thesis states the law as at 1 October 2020. 
 
12 Philipp Werner, ‘Article 108 TFEU’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck 
Hart Nomos 2016), para 42 
13 Peters (n 3), 9 
14 See for example: Francisco De Cecco, State Aid and the European Economic Constitution (Hart 
Publishing 2013), 96 
15 Thomas J Doleys, ‘Managing the Dilemma of Discretion: The European Commission and the 
Development of EU State Aid Policy’ (2013) 13 Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 23, 24 
16 Thomas Jaeger, ‘Tax Concessions for Multinationals: In or Out of the Reach of State Aid Law?’ 
(2017) 8 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 221, 228-229 
17 Peter J Wattel, ‘Stateless Income, State Aid and the (Which?) Arm’s Length Principle’ (2016) 44 








This Part sets out the differences between fiscal State aid and non-fiscal aid. 
First, it deals with the compatibility of fiscal aids with the Internal Market and on 
that basis addresses the notion of fiscal aid. Each of the five cumulative criteria of 
aid are analysed in respect of fiscal cases. The notion of selectivity and the 
approach of the Court of Justice toward the concept of advantage will be 
especially considered. This Part will illustrate the fundamental problems with the 
notion of fiscal aid, focusing on the very wide (and ever-expanding) notion of 
selectivity and therefore fiscal aid. This, combined with the compatibility regime 
which makes fiscal aid very unlikely to be deemed compatible, and with the 
relative lack of influence of the remaining criteria on the scope of fiscal aid, 




Compatibility of Fiscal State aid with the Internal Market 
I. Introduction 
The focus of this thesis is Article 107(1) TFEU, which contains the general 
State aid prohibition, based on the cumulative1 criteria which will be analysed in the 
following Chapters. However, before analysing the notion of fiscal aid, it is 
necessary to briefly consider the State aid compatibility regime. The prohibition of 
State aid is not absolute, and therefore the possibility exists for fiscal policy which 
infringes the prohibition to be deemed compatible with the internal market. The 
Commission enjoys a central role in the compatibility regime, and is endowed with 
a wide array of powers. This Chapter will focus on the compatibility regime as it 
applies to fiscal aids, which as will be shown, is different to the one applicable to 
non-fiscal aids. This Chapter does not aim to offer a comprehensive account or 
critique of the compatibility regime and the State aid policy that informs it, but rather 
it will showcase the hurdles that fiscal aid has to overcome to be deemed 
compatible. This discussion’s purpose is to contextualise the discussion in the 
following Chapters as it relates to the limitations on fiscal sovereignty that stem from 
the fiscal aid regime, and to the practical problems stemming from the wide scope 
of the fiscal aid prohibition.  
II. The Compatibility Regime 
a. General Principles 
Article 107(1) states that State aid shall be incompatible with the internal 
market and therefore prohibited “save as otherwise provided in the Treaties”. Based 
on the scheme of Article 107, the State aid prohibition is neither absolute nor 
unconditional.2 Nonetheless, the concept of State aid cannot be altered or affected 
by the Commission or the Council.3 The aid character of a measure is thus not 
negated by its compatibility.4 All derogations from a general rule need to be 
construed narrowly, which naturally applies to the derogations applicable to Article 
 
1 Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:125, para 25; Joined cases C-278/92, C-
279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1994:325, para 20; Case C-280/00 Altmark 
Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, and 
Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht ECLI:EU:C:2003:415, para 74 
2 Case 78/76 Steinke und Weinlig v Germany ECLI:EU:C:1977:52, para 8; Case C-39/94 SFEI and 
others v La Poste and others ECLI:EU:C:1996:285, para 36 
3 Case C-71/04 Administración del Estado v Xunta de Galicia ECLI:EU:C:2005:493, para 37 
4 Case 248/84 Germany v Commission Opinion of AG Darmon ECLI:EU:C:1986:487, para 4 
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107(1) TFEU.5 Therefore, as a general rule, once a measure is classified as aid it is 
necessary to establish if any exemption applies to the aid in question.6  
The second and third paragraphs of Article 107 TFEU contain two sets of 
legal exemptions. Each of those sub-paragraphs contains conditions, that, if met, 
can make the contested aid compatible with the internal market. Additionally, under 
Article 108(2) TFEU the Council can, in exceptional circumstances,7 and subject to 
certain conditions,8 decide that aid which does not benefit from any of the existing 
derogations, is compatible with the internal market. Beyond the exemptions 
provided for in the Treaty, under Article 108(4) the Commission can adopt 
regulations that remove the notification obligation under Article 108(3) for the 
certain categories of aid, essentially, treating the aid as compatible with the internal 
market.9 The current Enabling Regulation, Council Regulation No 1588/2015,10 as 
amended by Council Regulation 2018/1911,11 confers on the Commission a 
considerable array of powers,12 allowing the Commission to adopt Block Exemption 
Regulations. The purpose of the GBER is to declare individual aid or aid schemes 
compatible with the internal market, as long as the conditions, both general and 
specific, laid down in the Regulation are met.13 Additionally, the Commission has 
 
5 Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:467, para 49; Case C-334/99 Germany v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:55, para 117; Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:238, para 20; Case C-278/00 Greece v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:239, para 81; 
Case C-73/03 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:711, para 36; Joined Cases C-346/03 and C-
529/03 Giuseppe Atzeni and Others and, Marco Scalas and Renato Lilliu v Regione autonoma della 
Sardegna ECLI:EU:C:2006:130, para 79 
6 Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1980:209, para 18 
7 Case C-110/02 Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:2004:395, para 30 
8 Case C-122/94 Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:1996:68, paras 19-21; Case C-111/10 
Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:2013:785, para 98; Case C-122/94 Commission v Council Opinion 
of AG Cosmas ECLI:EU:C:1995:395, para 64. See also: Case 253/84 Groupement agricole 
d'exploitation en commun (GAEC) de la Ségaude v Council and Commission ECLI:EU:C:1987:9; 
Christoph Arhold, Viktor Kreuschitz, Franz Jürgen Säcker, Ulrich Soltesz, Michael Shuette, Andreas 
Schwab, ‘Article 107 TFEU’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck Hart 
Nomos 2016), para 549; Conor Quigley, European State Aid Law and Policy (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 
2015), 218 
9 Ramona Ianus ‘Aid Exempted from Notification to the Commission: The General Block Exemption 
Regulation (GBER)’ in H Hofmann and C Micheau (eds) State Aid Law of the European Union (OUP 
2016), 325 
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 1588/2015 of 13 July 2015 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of horizontal State Aid 
[2015] OJ L 248/1 
11 Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1911 of 26 November 2018 amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 
on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to certain categories of horizontal State Aid [2018] OJ L 311/8 
12 Herwig Hoffman, ‘The Legal Framework to Subsidies and State Aid Review’ in H Hofmann and C 
Micheau (eds) State Aid Law of the European Union (OUP 2016), 48 
13 See in general: Commission Regulation (EU) N°651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain 
categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty [2014] OJ L 187/1, , as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 




through the years adopted several De minimis regulations to deal with small 
quantities of aid.14  
Beyond the conditions found in the derogations contained in Article 107, a 
requirement of necessity, which is often analysed as “incentive effect”,15 also needs 
to be examined by the Commission.16 Necessity in this context means that aid can 
be compatible with the internal market to the extent that it is necessary for the 
attainment of the objective specified in the derogation.17 This also follows from the 
wording and structure of Article 107. As such, aid which is not necessary to meet 
one of the compatibility objectives cannot itself be compatible with the internal 
market.18 This concept, simple as it may appear, to an extent requires an 
examination of the recipient’s subjective state of mind. To facilitate this analysis, a 
condition, substantive rather than formalistic,19 that the aid application be made 
before works on the project begin has been used;20 if such work has begun, then 
the aid lacks incentive effect. However, other criteria can apply to establish the 
existence of an incentive effect,21 depending on the circumstances of the case. 
Nonetheless, aid which simply improves the financial situation of the recipient 
cannot be allowed.22 Additionally, where an undertaking is obliged to carry out an 
activity, aid to it in relation to that activity lacks incentive effect.23  
 
thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and for aid for sport and multifunctional 
recreational infrastructures, and regional operating aid schemes for outermost regions and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 as regards the calculation of eligible costs [2017] OJ L 
156/1. 
14 De minimis aid escapes State Aid control not by being compatible with the internal market, but by 
being deemed to not affect trade and to not distort or threaten to distort competition, and thus not 
qualifying as aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
15 The two terms are interchangeable. See: Phedon Nicolaides, ‘Incentive Effect: Is State Aid 
Necessary When Investment Is Unnecessary’ (2008) 7 European State Aid Law Quarterly 230, 231. 
16 Case C-390/06 Nuova Agricast Srl v Ministero delle Attività Produttive ECLI:EU:C:2008:224, para 
68; Case C-129/12 Magdeburger Mühlenwerke GmbH v Finanzamt Magdeburg 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:200, para 45; Case C-544/09 P Germany v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:584, para 
68 
17 Philip Morris (n 6), paras 16-17; Case 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi SpA v Ditta Paolo Meroni 
ECLI:EU:C:1977:51, para 15 
18 Nuova Agricast (n 16), para 68; Case C-459/10 P Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:515, para 36; Joined Cases C-630/11 P, C-631/11 P, C-632/11 P, and 
C-633/11 P HGA Srl and Others, Regione autonoma della Sardegna, Timsas srl, and Grand Hotel Abi 
d’Oru SpA v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2013:387, para 104 
19 Case C-349/17 Eesti Pagar AS v Ettevõtluse Arendamise Sihtasutus and Majandus- ja 
Kommunikatsiooniministeerium Opinion of AG Wathelet ECLI:EU:C:2018:768, paras 83, 89, 91, 101 
20 Nuova Agricast (n 16), para 69; Case C-349/17 Eesti Pagar AS v Ettevõtluse Arendamise Sihtasutus 
and Majandus- ja Kommunikatsiooniministeerium ECLI:EU:C:2019:172, paras 62-64, 72; HGA (n 18), 
para 106 
21 HGA (n 18), paras 106-110 
22 Ibidem, para 104 
23 Nicolaides (n 15), 235 
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In relation to Article 107(3), proportionality also needs to be analysed.24 It is 
worth noting that conceptually the notion of incentive effect is closely linked to 
proportionality, as the amount of aid that is appropriate and therefore proportional 
will be deemed to correspond precisely to the amount necessary to create an 
incentive effect.25 As such, appropriateness and necessity are not always easy to 
separate. Another condition applicable to all compatibility analyses is that the aid 
measure cannot violate other Treaty provisions,26 especially if the parts of the 
measure violating other Treaty provisions are “indissolubly” linked to the objective 
of the aid.27 An authorised State aid measure can under no circumstances produce 
results contrary to specific provisions of the Treaties.28 The legal exemptions 
contained in Article 107, and the definitions of the relevant terms within the 
derogations, must be interpreted restrictively.29 Finally, the aid in question has to 
have a sufficiently close link to the objective of the derogation.30 
Based on the logic of the concept of necessity, operating aid cannot in 
principle have an incentive effect, since it comes with no conditions attached to it,31 
and simply covers operating expenses,32 as opposed to investments. Thus, 
operating aid cannot in general be allowed under the exemptions contained in 
Article 107.33 This is particularly relevant for fiscal aid, as most fiscal measures tend 
to grant operating aid.34 However, under the General Block Exemption Regulation 
(GBER) operating aid can be allowed in certain instances,35 for example in relation 
to cultural and heritage conservation, or aid to SMEs. It is worth noting in this context 
that the requirements laid out in the GBER for the granting of fiscal aid are 
 
24 Joined cases T-126/96 and T-127/96 Breda Fucine Meridionali SpA (BFM) and Ente partecipazioni 
e finanziamento industria manifatturiera (EFIM) v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1998:207, para 101 
25 Case C-654/17 P Bayerische Motoren Werke AG and Freistaat Sachsen v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:634, para 88 
26 Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (n 5), para 78; Case C-204/97 Portugal v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:233, para 41 
27 Case C-225/91 Matra SA v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:239, para 41 
28 Case 73/79 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1980:129, para 11 
29 See for example: Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (n 5), para 52; Case T-8/06 FAB 
Fernsehen aus Berlin GmbH v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:386, paras 87-89 
30 C-71/09 P, C-73/09 P and C-76/09 P Comitato «Venezia vuole vivere», Hotel Cipriani Srl, and 
Società Italiana per il gas SpA (Italgas) v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:368, para 170 
31 Case C-86/89 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:373, para 18 
32 Case C-278/95 P Siemens SA v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1997:240, para 37; Case C-458/09 P Italy 
v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:769, para 63 
33 Joined Cases 62/87 and 72/87 Exécutif Régional Wallon and SA Glaverbel v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:132, para 29; Italy v Commission (n 31), para 18; Case C-288/96 Germany v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:537, para 90; Freistaat Sachsen (n 18), paras 33-34. See also: 
Commission Decision 2003/81/EC of 22 August 2002 on the aid scheme implemented by Spain in 
favour of coordination centres in Vizcaya C 48/2001 (ex NN 43/2000) [2003] OJ L31/26, recital 39. 
See however: Case 323/82 Intermills v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:345, para 39 
34 Thomas Jaeger, ‘Tax Measures’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck 
Hart Nomos 2016), para 93 




somewhat different to those applicable to “normal” State aid.36 This creates a 
different burden (and framework) for the granting of fiscal aid, even in the context 
of the instances where operating aid is permissible. Outside those instances, even 
under the GBER, fiscal aid needs to have an incentive effect. Specifically, under 
Article 6(4), the incentive effect of fiscal aid can be established if the measure is 
based on objective criteria which leave no discretion to the authorities of the 
granting State, and if the measure comes into force before work on the aided 
project or activity starts.37 The ex ante nature of the GBER also makes the granting 
of fiscal aid more complex, both in terms of meeting the conditions, and in terms of 
administering and monitoring the aid regime. 
It is clear therefore that when it comes to the general principles of 
compatibility, fiscal aid is somewhat different than non-fiscal aid. Even though it is 
not impossible for (operating) fiscal aid to be deemed compatible with the internal 
market, the need for an incentive effect to exist under all available derogations can 
be problematic for such aid.38 The compatibility issues that fiscal aid faces, when 
read in conjunction with the fiscal aid regime under Article 107(1) TFEU, show that 
Member States can effectively make very limited use of their fiscal powers for policy 
purposes, as if they step outside the narrow prescriptions of the compatibility 
regime, it is likely that a fiscal measure will be deemed to be aid incompatible with 
the internal market. 
b. The Commission’s Role and Powers 
At this point, it is necessary to briefly set out the Commission’s role in the 
compatibility analysis, as it informs the structure of the entire system. The first 
sentence of Article 108(3) TFEU provides for a notification obligation, which means 
that a Member State wishing to grant new aid or alter an existing aid measure has 
to inform the Commission, so it can investigate its compatibility with the internal 
market.39 This obligation has direct effect, and can be enforced by national courts.40 
Additionally, there is a standstill obligation, meaning that Member States shall not 
go forward with the notified aid until the Commission has reached a final decision.41 
 
36 See: Ibidem, Articles 5(2)(f), 6(4), 9(2), 12(2) 
37 Ibidem, Article 6(4) 
38 See also in this context: Case C-301/87 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:67, para 44; Case 
C-172/03 Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck ECLI:EU:C:2005:130, para 55; Case C-496/06 P 
Commission v Italy and Wam SpA ECLI:EU:C:2009:272, para 54 
39 Joined cases C-442/03 P and C-471/03 P P & O European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA and Diputación 
Foral de Vizcaya v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:356, paras 103-105 
40 Joined cases C-261/01 and C-262/01 Belgische Staat v Eugène van Calster and Felix Cleeren and 
Openbaar Slachthuis NV ECLI:EU:C:2003:571, para 53; Case C-354/90 Fédération Nationale du 
Commerce Extérieur des Produits Alimentaires and Syndicat National des Négociants et 
Transformateurs de Saumon v France ECLI:EU:C:1991:440, para 12; Case C-17/91 Georges Lornoy 
en Zonen NV and others v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:1992:514, para 30 
41 TFEU, Article 108(3); Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed 
rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2015] 
OJ L 248/9, Articles 2, 3 
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These notification and standstill obligations only apply to measures that are actually 
aid.42 The Member State concerned should refer to a specific exemption when 
notifying aid to the Commission, as the Commission has to refer specifically to the 
exemption employed in its Decisions.43 However, aid measures that fall within the 
scope of the De minimis or Block Exemption Regulations do not need to be notified 
to the Commission.44 Aid granted in contravention of Article 108(3) is deemed to be 
unlawful aid.45 Even when aid is granted pursuant to Council authorisation under a 
Council Directive, it still needs to be notified.46 The Commission’s central role, and 
by extension the notification and standstill obligation result from the fact that not 
notifying aid is deemed as preventing the Commission from exercising its exclusive 
competence.47 
The Commission initiates a “preliminary examination”, where it can conclude 
that the measure notified is not actually aid,48 that the measure is aid but it is 
compatible with the internal market,49 or that there are doubts as to the 
compatibility of the measure with the internal market, necessitating a formal 
investigation procedure.50 In the preliminary examination the Commission cannot 
adopt a negative decision. The formal investigation procedure is based on Article 
108(2), and can also be applied to proposed aid measures that have not yet been 
introduced, in line with the standstill obligation. Under Article 6(1) of the Procedural 
Regulation the Commission must issue a Decision to initiate the formal 
investigation, known as an opening decision. The Commission can reach a Decision 
that the measure is not aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. If the measure 
is indeed aid, the Commission can reach a positive Decision, finding the measure 
compatible with the internal market, a conditional Decision, or a negative Decision 
finding the measure incompatible.51 The same process applies to unlawful aid. 
When the Commission reaches its final Decision, said Decision must comply with 
 
42 Case C-345/02 Pearle BV, Hans Prijs Optiek Franchise BV and Rinck Opticiëns BV v 
Hoofdbedrijfschap Ambachten ECLI:EU:C:2004:448, para 31 
43 Council Regulation 2015/1589 (n 41), Articles 4(3) and 9(3)  
44 Council Regulation 2015/1588 (n 10) as amended by Council Regulation 2018/1911 (n 11), Articles 
1, 2. 
45 Council Regulation 2015/1589 (n 41), Article 1(f) 
46 Case C-272/12 P Commission v Ireland and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:812, paras 49-53  
47 Ibidem, para 49 
48 Council Regulation 2015/1589 (n 41), Article 4(2) 
49 Ibidem, Article 4(3). This is known as a “Decision not to raise objections”. See also in this context: 
Philipp Werner, ‘Article 108 TFEU’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck 
Hart Nomos 2016), para 42 
50 Council Regulation 2015/1589 (n 41), Article 4(4) 
51 Ibidem, Article 9(2), (3), (4), and (5) 
20 
 
the obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU,52 
separate from the merits of those reasons.53  
Thus, the Commission is clearly the most central and important actor in any 
compatibility analysis,54 and due to its enforcement monopoly, the central actor in 
the assessment of aid measures in general. Kreuschitz explains that the monitoring 
of the TFEU’s State aid provisions falls on the Commission, due to their common 
interests nature.55 However, the Commission does not have an obligation to initiate 
a compatibility analysis, rather the Member State concerned has to invoke the 
compatibility of the contested aid.56 This means that the burden of proof is on the 
Member States concerned, who have to provide the Commission with the relevant 
information.57 Thus, judicial review is limited to establishing that the procedural 
rules have been followed, to verifying the accuracy of the facts, and on examining 
errors of law and manifest errors of assessment in relation to the facts and misuse of 
powers.58 National courts have no jurisdiction to determine whether an aid measure 
is compatible with the internal market,59 meaning that the Commission’s 
competence is exclusive. 
c. The Commission’s Margin of Discretion 
The Commission’s discretion, and by extension its powers, differ depending 
on the derogation invoked. This is obvious from the language of Article 107 itself. 
In Article 107(2), the Treaty states that aid which falls within one of the sub-
paragraphs “shall be” considered compatible with the internal market, while Article 
107(3) uses the formulation “may be”. In relation to Article 107(3), the Commission’s 
 
52 Case C-367/95 P Commission v Chambre syndicale nationale des entreprises de transport de 
fonds et valeurs (Sytraval) and Brink's France SARL ECLI:EU:C:1998:154, para 63; Case C-56/93 
Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1996:64, para 86; Case C-301/96 Germany v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:509, para 65 
53 Case C-159/01 Netherlands v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:246, para 65 
54 Case C-234/99 Niels Nygård v Svineafgiftsfonden, and Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og 
Fiskeri ECLI:EU:C:2002:244, para 62; Commission v Council (n 7), para 29. See also: Fédération 
Nationale (n 40), para 9 
55 Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, (n 8), para 546 
56 Tim Maxian Rusche, ‘General Theory of Compatibility of State Aid’ in H Hofmann and C Micheau 
(eds) State Aid Law of the European Union (OUP 2016), 224 
57 Ibidem; Case C-364/90 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1993:157, para 20; Case T-68/03 Olympiaki 
Aeroporia Ypiresies AE v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2007:253, para 34; Case T-211/05 Italy v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:304, para 174; Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission 
Opinion of AG Capotorti ECLI:EU:C:1980:160, para 6; Germany v Commission Opinion of AG 
Darmon (n 4), para 8. See also: Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:234, paras 84-85 
58 Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission (n 57), para 83; Case C-351/98 Spain v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:530, para 74 
59 Fédération Nationale (n 40), para 14; La Poste (n 2), para 42; Case C-295/97 Industrie Aeronautiche 
e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio SpA v International Factors Italia SpA (Ifitalia), Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH 
and Ministero della Difesa ECLI:EU:C:1999:313, para 31; Case C-451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori 
Commercialisti Srl v Giuseppe Calafiori ECLI:EU:C:2006:208, para 71 
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discretion is therefore wider than in relation to 107(2).60 Judicial review of this 
discretion is limited,61 as the Court is not allowed to substitute the Commission’s 
analysis for its own.62 Following from the Union’s role in establishing the competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, per Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, 
the Commission has to weigh the “beneficial effects of aid against its adverse 
effects”,63 making the wide margin of discretion necessary. This is materially 
different from the discretion relating to Article 107(2),64 where the Commission’s 
role is limited to verifying that the conditions of the invoked sub-paragraph are 
met.65 Despite the width of Commission’s margin of discretion, it is not allowed to 
disregard essential facts in its compatibility analysis.66 
This wide margin of discretion extends to the block exemption regime. 
Through the GBER, the Commission is in essence exercising its wide discretion 
under Article 107(3) to establish the criteria, general and specific, that need to be 
met for aid to escape the notification process and be deemed compatible with the 
internal market.67 However, the existence of the GBER and the exemption regime in 
general cannot deprive the Commission of this discretion.68 It should be made clear 
that, as with the de minimis Regulation,69 the Commission is bound by the GBER as 
long as it is in force. 
The Commission also issues several soft law instruments. Through those, it 
essentially self-limits its wide discretion, by making the rules contained in those 
instruments part of its enforcement apparatus.70 The Commission is bound by those 
rules to the extent that they do not contravene any Treaty rules,71 and departing 
from those rules could result in the Commission breaching general principles of 
 
60 France v Commission (n 38), paras 15, 49. See also: Philip Morris (n 6), para 24; Case 310/85 Deufil 
GmbH & Co. KG v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1987:96, para 18 
61 Joined Cases C-75/05 P Kronofrance SA v Germany and Others and C-80/05 P Glunz and OSB 
Deutschland v Kronofrance ECLI:EU:C:2008:482, para 59 
62 Case C-456/00 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:753, para 41 
63 Joined cases T-371/94 and T-394/94 British Airways plc, Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-
Norway-Sweden, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV, Air UK Ltd, Euralair international, TAT 
European Airlines SA and British Midland Airways Ltd v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1998:140, para 283 
64 Philip Morris (n 6), para 17 
65 Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, Schwab (n 8), para 520; Leigh Hancher, Tom 
Ottervanger, and Piet Jan Slot (eds) EU State Aids (Sweet & Maxwell 2012), para 20-042 
66 Joined cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1985:113, para 26 
67 Ianus (n 9), 325 
68 Case T-357/02 RENV Freistaat Sachsen v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:376, para 44 
69 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 
107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to De minimis aid [2013] OJ L 
352/1 
70 Kronofrance (n 61), para 60; Germany v Commission (n 33), para 62 
71 Case C-91/01 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:244, para 91; Case C-409/00 Spain v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:92, para 95 
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Union law.72 The Courts make it clear that such departures are not allowed,73 and 
that observance of those rules is part of the judicial review process.74 Bouchiagar 
argues, based on the Commission’s exclusive competence, that, de facto, the soft 
law is also binding on Member States.75 Rusche points to the legal value of the soft 
law instruments, claiming that the criteria contained therein mirror those of Article 
107(2), meaning that the Commission’s discretion is limited.76 However, the ECJ has 
accepted that under exceptional circumstances, which should be understood as 
meaning circumstances different from those envisaged in the soft law instrument in 
question, the Commission may not be bound by said soft law.77 Thus, the 
Commission has to observe its own soft law, and effectively limits its own wide 
discretion by not being allowed to depart from it, except in exceptional 
circumstances. As such, soft law instruments create legal effects,78 and can thus be 
challenged.79 Despite the obvious value of soft law instruments dealing with 
compatibility, both practically and legally, Kreuschitz observes that their importance 
is decreasing, due to the increasing use of block exemptions.80 
d. Conclusion  
This section has set out the basic structure of the State aid compatibility 
regime and has outlined the procedure that will be employed. Beyond this, it has 
been established that the Commission generally has a wide margin of discretion 
when assessing the compatibility of an aid measure, as well as complete power of 
the compatibility assessment process. It is clear that the Commission is the central 
character in the compatibility analysis. Additionally, the hard and soft law 
instruments it enacts in this area practically, if not theoretically, limit its discretion. 
Finally, it has been shown that there are several avenues for an aid measure to be 
deemed to be compatible with the internal market, but conditions such as the 
 
72 Joined cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P, C-206/02 P, C-207/02 P, C-208/02 P, and C-
213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri A/S, Isoplus Fernwärmetechnik Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH and Others, 
KE KELIT Kunststoffwerk GmbH, LR af 1998 A/S, Brugg Rohrsysteme GmbH, LR af 1998 
(Deutschland) GmbH, and ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2005:408, para 211; 
Kronofrance (n 61), para 60 
73 Case C-464/09 P Holland Malt BV v Commission EU:C:2010:733, para 46; Case C-667/13 Estado 
português v Banco Privado Português SA and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português SA 
EU:C:2015:151, para 69 
74 Joined cases T-267/08 and T-279/08 Région Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Communauté 
d’agglomération du Douaisis v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2011:209, para 131; Case T-35/99 Keller SpA 
and Keller Meccanica SpA v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2002:19, para 77 
75 Antonios Bouchagiar, ‘The Binding Effects of Guidelines on the Compatibility of State Aid: How 
Hard is the Commission’s Soft Law?’ (2017) 8 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 157, 
164 
76 Rusche (n 56), 226 
77 Case C-431/14 P Greece v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2016:145, paras 70-72. See also: Bouchagiar 
(n 75), 160-163 
78 Dansk Rørindustri (n 72), para 223 
79 Case C-292/95 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1997:192, paras 33-35 
80 Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, Schwab (n 8), para 580 
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existence of an incentive effect show that those avenues can be limited when it 
comes to fiscal aid. In this context, it is necessary to briefly examine another 
condition, namely that compatible aid cannot contravene other provisions of EU 
law. 
III. State aid and other Treaty Provisions 
a. General Principles 
One of the conditions that all aid measures need to satisfy in order to be 
compatible with the internal market is that they cannot violate any other provision 
of EU law.81 The general rule is that an aid whose provisions contravene other 
provisions of the Treaty cannot be deemed to be compatible with the internal 
market.82 Thus State aid cannot be used to frustrate other Treaty rules.83 In this 
context, internal market rules are of particular interest, as they and State aid rules 
have a common objective, namely ensuring normal conditions of competition.84 It is 
established case law that the general principle of non-discrimination enshrined in 
Article 18 TFEU can only be applied to situations governed by Union law where the 
Treaty does not provide for a specific prohibition of discrimination.85 As such, the 
compatibility of aid measures that by necessity contain discriminatory elements (as 
by definition they favour certain undertakings or activities in a given geographical 
locale) with the internal market and by extension the Treaty, has to be examined in 
light of the specific provisions implementing the non-discrimination principle.86 In 
essence, the recognition that aid occasionally has the inevitable consequence of 
somewhat affecting trade cannot be extended to mean that all negative effects can 
be accepted. It is generally suggested that the Commission prefers to rely on free 
movement provisions wherever possible when a measure can be seen as being 
problematic under both free movement law and State aid law.87 
 
81 Matra (n 27), paras 42-43; Case T-359/04 British Aggregates Association and Others v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2010:366, paras 91-92 
82 Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (n 5), para 78; Portugal v Commission (n 26), para 41; Case 
C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v Unità sanitaria locale Nº 2 di Carrara 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:121, paras 17, 20; Italy v Commission (n 28), para 11 
83 Case 18/84 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1985:175, para 13 
84 Case 91/78 Hansen GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Flensburg ECLI:EU:C:1979:65, para 9; 
Commission v France (n 83), para 13 
85 Case C-10/90 Maria Masgio v Bundesknappschaft ECLI:EU:C:1991:107, para 12; Case C-179/90 
Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA ECLI:EU:C:1991:464, para 11; 
Case C-379/92 Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta ECLI:EU:C:1994:296, para 18. See also: 
Case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española Ciclismo ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, paras 6, 16; 
Case 13/76 Gaetano Donà v Mario Mantero ECLI:EU:C:1976:115, paras 6, 17-18 
86 Peralta (n 85), para 18; Case T-158/99 Thermenhotel Stoiser Franz Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and 
Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:2, paras 146-147 
87 Andrea Biondi and Martin Farley, ‘The Relationship Between State Aid and the Single Market’ in E 
Szyszczak (ed) Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011), 283; 
Quigley (n 8), 224  
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The ECJ has explained that the scope of Article 34 TFEU (and mutatis 
mutandis of Article 35) cannot be conceived as being so wide as to mean that any 
advantage granted has effects equivalent to quantitative restrictions, as such a 
reading of Article 34 would negate the telos of the State aid regime, disregarding 
the allocation of competences set out in the Treaties.88 Similarly, in the context of 
discrimination, an aid measure can by definition apply only in the territory for which 
the enacting authority is responsible, and thus cannot be criticised for not extending 
the benefit of the measure to undertakings outside its territory, since such 
undertakings are not in a comparable position as far as State aid is concerned.89 As 
such, the mere fact that the benefits of an aid measure are geographically restricted 
is not per se sufficient to make it discriminatory on the basis of nationality. However, 
partial tax exemptions or differential tax rates can actually be discriminatory in the 
context of free movement provisions, since they afford better treatment to at least 
some national undertakings, while also being problematic in the context of State 
aid.90  
Tax breaks aimed at certain types of investments, can also infringe the free 
movement of capital.91 However, free movement of capital is somewhat different 
from other free movement provisions, as a measure providing for tax breaks 
differentiating between resident and non-resident investments would make 
investing in other Member States less attractive if relief is provided only for 
investments in companies established in the granting State, and would thus violate 
the rules on the free movement of capital.92 Logically, if relief for a type of investment 
is granted in one Member State it must be extended to the same type of investment 
made by residents of that Member State in other Member States.93 Such a condition 
nullifies the value of such tax reliefs as aid measures with specific objectives.94 This 
is because even if the aid could meet the compatibility criteria it would either 
necessarily violate a Treaty provision, rendering the aid incompatible, or it would 
have to be extended to a degree where it would no longer actually be selective, 
 
88 Iannelli & Volpi (n 17), paras 11-12, 15 
89 Spain v Commission (n 58), para 57 
90 See for example: Case C-169/08 Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v Regione Sardegna 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:709, paras 7, 34-50, 61-64; Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (n 5), paras 8-9, 
84-87; Case C-164/15 P Commission v Aer Lingus Ltd and Ryanair Designated Activity Company 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:990, paras 119-122 
91 Case C-222/04 Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA, 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato and Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato SpA 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:8, paras 99-100. See also in this context: Article 65(2) TFEU 
92 Case C-35/98 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v B.G.M. Verkooijen ECLI:EU:C:2000:294, paras 35-
37; Case C-319/02 Petri Manninen ECLI:EU:C:2004:484, para 55; Case C-271/09 Commission v 
Poland ECLI:EU:C:2011:855, para 71; Case C-292/04 Wienand Meilicke, Heidi Christa Weyde and 
Marina Stöffler v Finanzamt Bonn-Innenstadt ECLI:EU:C:2007:132, paras 37-38 
93 Quigley (n 8), 226-227 
94 Consider for example the objectives of the contested measure in Verkooijen (n 92), para 34. 
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and could therefore not benefit certain undertakings, sectors, or regions, as per its 
objectives.  
Finally, Articles 30 and 110 TFEU are particularly relevant to this thesis. Those 
two Articles, despite encompassing prohibitions of different scope,95 have the same 
objective of prohibiting discriminatory taxation.96 However, the Court has 
recognised that they pursue a more specific objective than Article 107.97 The 
relevance of Article 30 and 110 is particularly pronounced in the financing of an aid 
measure. For example, the financing of an aid scheme granting advantages to 
domestic products with a levy of general application can be discriminatory,98 unless 
the advantages are extended to products coming from other Member States,99 or 
imported products are exempted from the charge,100 as otherwise an effectively 
discriminatory additional net fiscal burden is imposed.101 When the levy 
corresponds to a service actually rendered, non-discriminatorily, the charge will not 
infringe Article 110.102 In effect, charges are governed by Article 30 or Article 110 
TFEU, while the use to which they are put may constitute State aid, which will be, if, 
and to the extent that,103 either of those Articles is violated, incompatible with the 
internal market.104 
b. Severability  
A severability approach has been developed in relation to the interaction of 
State aid law and other Treaty provisions. If an aid measure contains aspects that 
infringe on specific Treaty provisions and which are “indissolubly linked to the 
 
95 Case 94/74 Industria Gomma Articoli Vari IGAV v Ente nazionale per la cellulosa e per la carta 
ENCC ECLI:EU:C:1975:81, paras 12-13. See also, in the context of their interaction with State Aid 
rules: Joined Cases C-78/90, C-79/90, C-80/90, C-81/90, C-82/90 and C-83/90 Compagnie 
Commerciale de l'Ouest and others v Receveur Principal des Douanes de La Pallice Port 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:118, para 27 
96 Joined Cases C-393/04 and C-41/05 Air Liquide Industries Belgium SA v Ville de Seraing and 
Province de Liège ECLI:EU:C:2006:403, para 55; Case C-221/06 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten and 
Gemeindebetriebe Frohnleiten GmbH v Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und 
Wasserwirtschaft ECLI:EU:C:2007:657, para 30 
97 Case C-206/06 Essent Netwerk Noord BV supported by Nederlands Elektriciteit 
Administratiekantoor BV v Aluminium Delfzijl BV, and in the indemnification proceedings Aluminium 
Delfzijl BV v Staat der Nederlanden and in the indemnification proceedings Essent Netwerk Noord 
BV v Nederlands Elektriciteit Administratiekantoor BV and Saranne ECLI:EU:C:2008:413, para 60 
98 Italy v Commission (n 28), para 15; Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest (n 95), para 26 
99 Hansen (n 84), para 17 
100 Case C-333/07 Société Régie Networks v Direction de contrôle fiscal Rhône-Alpes Bourgogne 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:764, para 115 
101 Case 77/72 Carmine Capolongo v Azienda Agricole Maya ECLI:EU:C:1973:65, paras 13-14 
102 Joined Case C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse SpA v Ministero delle Finanze ECLI:EU:C:2003:640, 
para 62 
103 Case C-174/02 Streekgewest Westelijk Noord-Brabant v Staatssecretaris van Financiën 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:10, paras 24-25. See also: Case C-174/02 Streekgewest Westelijk Noord-Brabant v 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën Opinion of AG Geelhoed ECLI:EU:C:2004:124, paras 28-29; 
Enirisorse (n 102), para 47 
104 Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest (n 95), para 32; Italy v Commission (n 28), para 9; Nygård (n 
54), para 55 
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object of the aid”, it is impossible to evaluate the effects of the offending aspects 
separately, meaning that they are an integral part of the aid measure. In those cases, 
the entirety of the aid, including the problematic aspects, must be assessed under 
the State aid framework, as provided by Article 108 TFEU.105 However, if those 
aspects of the aid can be separated from the aid measure, in the sense that they are 
not necessary for the aid to achieve its objective and be successfully administered, 
then those aspects that infringe on other provisions can be assessed separately, and 
the aid is not necessarily incompatible.106 In other words, the severability analysis 
includes a necessity element.107 An interesting conflict between (fiscal) State aid and 
internal market rules can arise in relation to existing aid which turns out to 
(indissolubly) violate internal market rules, as rectifying the fundamental freedoms 
infringement can result in the creation of new aid by widening the scope of the 
existing measure, which is outside the competence of national courts.108 
The severability approach has been applied in a somewhat confusing 
manner.109 Under the severability approach, a measure applicable only to domestic 
products but not similar imported ones, will be incompatible with the Treaty, 
conflicting with Article 34 TFEU.110 In relation to Articles 45, 49, and 56, it is possible 
for a measure to violate those Articles, as well as the State aid prohibition.111 An 
infringement of free movement law cannot in practice be invoked to frustrate State 
aid proceedings.112 It is also clear that the introduction of discriminatory taxes can 
lead to the inadvertent creation of an aid measure.113 The severability approach can 
also be applied in relation to the competition provisions of the Treaty, even though 
 
105 Iannelli & Volpi (n 17), para 14 
106 Ibidem 
107 Ibidem, para 15; Case T-162/06 Kronoply GmbH & Co. KG v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2009:2, para 
66 
108 Case C-598/17 A-Fonds v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst ECLI:EU:C:2019:352, paras 28, 41, 
46-54, 60 
109 Biondi and Farley (n 87), 280. See also: A-Fonds (n 108), paras 46-51 
110 Iannelli & Volpi (n 17), paras 14-15; Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland ECLI:EU:C:1982:402, paras 
16-18, 20-30; Commission v France (n 83), paras 13, 17; Case 103/84 Commission v Italy 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:229, paras 19, 24; Du Pont de Nemours (n 82), paras 20-21; Case C-351/88 
Laboratori Bruneau Srl v Unità sanitaria locale RM/24 di Monterotondo ECLI:EU:C:1991:304, para 7. 
See however: Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland Opinion of AG Capotorti ECLI:EU:C:1982:293, 
paras 6-7 
111 Regione Sardegna (n 90), paras 7, 34-50, 61-64; Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission (n 5), 
paras 8-9, 84-87. See also: Ministero dell'Economia (n 91), paras 150-152; Calafiori (n 59), paras 3-9, 
48-50, 72; Case C-17/92 Cinematográficos v Estado Español and Unión de Productores de Cine y 
Televisión ECLI:EU:C:1993:172, paras 4, 15-22. See however: Case C-222/07 Unión de Televisiones 
Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) v Administración General del Estado ECLI:EU:C:2009:124, paras 
15, 29-40, 44-46 




they are addressed at undertakings.114 In effect, aid cannot be granted without 
verifying that the recipient is not in a position that violates either Article 101 or 102 
TFEU.115 It is clear from the case law that severability is rarely considered 
substantively in relation to the fundamental freedoms, or even competition law 
provisions.116 Hancher et al. note that since State aid rules can be used as 
derogations from Treaty Articles, this is in line with a strict interpretation of Treaty 
derogations.117 
In relation to Articles 30 and 110 TFEU, the key issue is how the revenue 
raised from the levy is used,118 as State aid cannot be considered separately from its 
method of financing,119 especially if that method forms an integral part of the 
measure.120 Thus, the financing method is an integral and central part of the 
compatibility analysis.121 In effect, an aid scheme can be declared incompatible with 
the internal market solely based on its method of financing,122 meaning that that 
method ought to be examined under the prism of both Article 107(1) and Article 
110 TFEU.123 A tax will be treated as an integral part of an aid measure if it is 
hypothecated to the aid measure, under national rules.124 A tax cannot be 
hypothecated to an exemption from the same tax, as a tax exemption’s application 
does not depend on the tax revenue raised by said tax.125 A tax is hypothecated to 
an aid when the revenue from that tax is necessarily allocated for financing that aid, 
as the revenue raised from the tax has a direct impact on the amount of the aid, and 
 
114 Matra (n 27), paras 41-45. See also: Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette SA v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:1994:89, para 47; Joined cases T-197/97 and T-198/97 Weyl Beef Products BV, 
Exportslachterij Chris Hogeslag BV and Groninger Vleeshandel BV v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2001:28, para 75 
115 Case C-164/98 P DIR International Film Srl, and others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:48, para 29 
116 See for example: Commission v Ireland (n 110), paras 16-18; Commission v Ireland Opinion of 
AG Capotorti (n 110), paras 6-7; Case T-49/93 Société Internationale de Diffusion et d'Edition (SIDE) 
v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1995:166, para 72 
117 Hancher, Ottervanger, and Slot (n 65), para 3-114. See also: van Calster (n 40), paras 50-54 
118 Compagnie Commerciale de l'Ouest (n 95), para 35 
119 Case 47/69 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1970:60, paras 7-8, 16; van Calster (n 40) para 47 
120 Société Régie Networks (n 100), paras 89-92; Pearle (n 42), para 29; van Calster (n 40), para 49 
See also: Case C-449/14 P DTS Distribuidora de Televisión Digital v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:848  
121 Hancher, Ottervanger, and Slot (n 65), para 3-129 
122 Case C-553/03 P Panhellenic Union of Cotton Ginners and Exporters v Commission (Order) 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:170, para 45; Joined Cases C-128/03 and C-129/03 AEM SpA and AEM Torino SpA 
v Autorità per l'energia elettrica e per il gas ECLI:EU:C:2005:224, para 45; C-194/09 P Alcoa 
Trasformazioni Srl v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:497, para 48 
123 France v Commission (n 119), para 14; Italy v Commission (n 28), para 6. See also: Société Régie 
Networks (n 100), paras 115-116  
124 Streekgewest Westelijk (n 103), para 26 
125 Joined cases C-266/04 to C-270/04, C-276/04 and C-321/04 to C-325/04 Nazairdis SAS, now 
Distribution Casino France SAS and Others v Caisse nationale de l'organisation autonome 
d'assurance vieillesse des travailleurs non salariés des professions industrielles et commerciales 
(Organic) ECLI:EU:C:2005:657, para 41; Air Liquide (n 96), para 46 
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its compatibility with the internal market.126 Additionally, such a financing method 
makes the amount of aid uncertain, and has the potential to exacerbate the 
distortive effects of the aid, further complicating a comprehensive compatibility 
analysis.127  
Effectively, non-hypothecated charges appear to be equivalent to severable 
violations of a Treaty provision. In this context, it is submitted that there are 
“indicators” of hypothecation of a tax to an aid.128 The logical extension of the 
hypothecation approach is that non-hypothecated charges, even though they may 
infringe on either of Articles 30 and 110 TFEU, and even if they, to an extent, finance 
an aid, will not be illegal under Article 107(1),129 as they are not integral parts of the 
aid measure. This is a useful limitation, as in effect all State aid is financed via State 
resources, which come primarily from taxation. The financing method of the aid thus 
only becomes truly relevant when a tax itself is problematic under Union law and 
has a direct link with the aid. Interestingly, a parafiscal aid measure whose funds are 
earmarked is less likely to satisfy the State resources criterion,130 but if it does, the 
earmarking makes it more likely that the financing charge will be seen as 
hypothecated, making the aid measure less likely to be compatible.  
c. Conclusion 
 This section has discussed the application of the criterion established in 
Commission v Italy, that compatible State aid can never produce a result that is 
contrary to specific provisions of the Treaties.131 Conceptually, the objective of State 
aid is not dissimilar to those of internal market provisions. In this context, a 
severability approach has been developed by the Courts. It has been shown that 
the application of this compatibility condition, while not materially different when it 
comes to fiscal aid, can still be somewhat complicated, especially in relation to 
partial tax exemptions, or differential taxation. Additionally, conceptual problems 
can arise due to the wide scope of Article 63 TFEU in relation to the policy-making 
aspect of taxation, which effectively frustrate the function of certain fiscal incentives. 
Finally, the relationship between Articles 30 and 110 TFEU and State aid is 
particularly complex, especially when it comes to the financing of an aid measure 
via special charges. In brief, it is clear that, in this context, fiscal aid can be somewhat 
 
126 Streekgewest Westelijk (n 103), paras 26-28; Air Liquide (n 96), para 46; Société Régie Networks 
(n 100), paras 111-112; AEM (n 122), para 47. See also: Case C-175/02 F. J. Pape v Minister van 
Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij ECLI:EU:C:2005:11, paras 15-17 
127 France v Commission (n 119), paras 19-21 
128 See for example: Pape (n 126), paras 15-17. A similar indicators-based approach is employed in 
relation to the fist limb of the State resources criterion, namely the measure’s imputability to the 
State. See: Part II(a)(i) of the Notions of State Resources, Effect on Trade, and Distortion of 
Competition Chapter. 
129 Nazairdis (n 125), para 53 
130 See for example: Pearle (n 42), paras 36-41 
131 Italy v Commission (n 28), para 11 
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different to non-fiscal aid, and potentially subject to more scrutiny during the 
compatibility analysis. This effectively limits the possibilities to use fiscal aid as a 
policy tool. 
IV. Conclusion 
This Chapter has aimed to offer a brief account of the compatibility regime 
applicable to State aid, focusing on fiscal aids. The Commission enjoys a very wide 
margin of discretion, a central role in the compatibility process, and extensive 
powers, being the central player when it comes to compatibility and the assessment 
of aid in general. Due to the necessarily narrow scope of all derogations, the ever-
expanding categories of aid covered by the GBER, and the catalogue of soft law 
instruments applicable, the derogation regime is becoming increasingly 
streamlined. The relationship of State aid with other Treaty provisions, especially in 
relation to fiscal aids, remains somewhat convoluted, and is probably the most 
legally complex of the common compatibility criteria, as it entails careful 
consideration of two (or more) different sets of rules, and their own inherent logic. 
In the application of this compatibility regime, the existence of common 
principles, namely those of necessity, proportionality, and observance of other 
Treaty rules, also informs the limits of what types of aid may be deemed compatible. 
However, those principles, and specifically the antipathy towards operating aid and 
the omnipresence of the incentive effect, especially as understood through the 
prism of the GBER, can create particular problems for the compatibility of fiscal aids. 
This results from the logic of the notion of incentive effect, as by making necessity a 
requirement of compatibility, in principle operating aids are de facto and de jure 
incompatible with the internal market. Equally, it has been shown that fiscal aid can 
come into conflict with the fundamental freedoms, and with the discriminatory 
taxation provisions. Overall, the State aid compatibility regime encompasses 
several different derogations, but at the same time it arguably is quite limiting for 
fiscal aids, despite the fact that at first glance there is no difference in the approach 
to fiscal and non-fiscal measures.  
In effect therefore, it is clear that there are significant hurdles to the 
compatibility of fiscal aids, which mean that the chances for such aids being 
deemed compatible with the internal market are limited. This conclusion needs to 
be analysed in conjunction with the wide definition of the concept of fiscal State aid 
under Article 107(1) TFEU. As the remaining Chapters of Part I demonstrate, the 
notion and the scope of fiscal aid have been significantly widened, as a result of the 
consistent widening of the selectivity criterion which sits at the centre of the notion 
of fiscal aid. The combination of a wide concept of aid, which in effect means that 
more fiscal measures can be classified as aid, and a limited compatibility regime can 
arguably significantly limit a Member State’s powers to pursue varied policy 
objectives through its fiscal regime. Thus, even though the compatibility regime for 
30 
 
fiscal aids is not conceptually materially different or more stringent than the one 
applicable to non-fiscal aids, it can still be particularly limiting especially in the 
context of the increasing width of the notion of fiscal aid itself. This conclusion 
therefore informs the analysis in Part I of this thesis, as practically, on the one hand 
the ever-widening scope of material selectivity and the notion of aid can render a 
host of national tax rules State aids, while on the other the possibilities for such aids 
to be compatible are severely limited. In short, both issues can be potentially 
problematic in and of themselves, but their combined effects create clear issues, 
both in terms of the scope of the (conditional and non-absolute)132 prohibition of 
(fiscal) aids, and in relation to the exercise of exclusive taxing powers by Member 
States. 
 
132 Steinke und Weinlig (n 2), para 8; La Poste (n 2), para 36 
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The Notion of Fiscal Selectivity  
I. Introduction 
The existence of aid, under the State aid prohibition expressed in Article 
107(1) TFEU, hinges on five cumulative requirements. In general, before mentioning 
the criteria, it is important to note that, as State aid forms part of the Commission’s 
competition apparatus, the aid must be granted to undertakings, as defined for the 
purposes of competition law in general. First of all, a measure must favour its 
recipient, by conferring an advantage. Secondly, the intervention of the State must 
distort, or threaten to distort, competition, and thirdly, must affect trade between 
Member States. Fourthly, the aid must be granted by the State or through State 
resources, and finally, the State measure granting the aid must favour certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods, or in other words be selective. This 
Chapter will look at the notion of selectivity as it applies to fiscal cases, while the 
remaining four criteria are discussed in the following Chapters. 
In the wording of Article 107(1) selectivity is expressed by the phrase 
“favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods”. This means 
that the selectivity condition in essence relates to a limitation of the advantage 
granted. A measure which could be construed as a general advantage, for example 
a reduction of the corporate tax rate, is not limited in any way that favours certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods; it favours all undertakings and the 
production of all goods. Thus, it is a general measure. The recipient of the aid needs 
to be compared with other undertakings, in a similar legal and factual situation. This 
can be understood, and indeed has been,1 as an expression of the general EU law 
principle of equal treatment. As pointed out by Cisotta, the preferential treatment 
afforded to only some of the market operators, intuitively appears to “undermine 
the existence of a level playing field”.2 As AG Maduro explains, selectivity offers the 
best rationale for the application of State aid, as it deals with the crux of the concept 
of aid, preferential treatment.3 In principle, as he states, only distortions resulting 
from preferential treatment are the proper subject of the State aid prohibition.4 
Selectivity sits therefore at the heart of the State aid prohibition. Lang observes that 
in fiscal cases selectivity is extremely important, as it is inevitably linked with the 
analysis of the advantage, and on occasion, of State resources.5 Therefore, the 
relevance of the selectivity analysis in fiscal cases cannot be understated, as its 
 
1 Case C-353/95 P Tierce Ladbroke v Commission Opinion of AG Cosmas ECLI:EU:C:1997:233, para 
30 
2 Roberto Cisotta, ‘Criterion of Selectivity’ in H Hofmann and C Micheau (eds) State Aid Law of the 
European Union (OUP 2016), 129 
3 Case C-237/04 Enirisorse SpA v Sotacarbo SpA Opinion of AG Maduro ECLI:EU:C:2006:21, para 
49 
4 Ibidem 
5 Michael Lang, ‘State Aid and Taxation: Selectivity and Comparability Analysis’ in I Richelle, W Schön, 
E Traversa (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 2016), 29 
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application can interfere with two of the remaining four criteria (and arguably the 
only two remaining relevant ones).6 This Chapter, recognising the paramount 
importance of selectivity in fiscal cases, will analyse the limbs of the test employed 
by the Commission and the CJEU to determine the selectivity of a given fiscal 
measure. The examination of the case law reveals a number of significant problems 
with the notion of fiscal selectivity. Through this analysis, this Chapter will show that 
the notion of fiscal selectivity has been significantly widened. Given the importance 
of the notion of selectivity described above, such a widening is in itself problematic, 
and, as will be shown in the remaining Chapters of Part I, in effect means that the 
notion of fiscal aid itself has been widened. 
Throughout the analysis of selectivity, and aid in general, it is essential to 
remember that both concepts focus on the effects of the contested measure or 
scheme. This is evident from the very early case law,7 and expanded upon since. For 
example, in Italy v Commission the ECJ held that Article 107 is preoccupied with 
effects over form or policy aims.8 Thus, the fiscal form or policy aim of a given 
measure is irrelevant when it comes to the application of Article 107, or that 
measure’s aid character.9 This principle has found consistent expression in the case 
law of the ECJ,10 and as will be shown plays a significant role in the analysis of all 
criteria. 
Additionally, it is worth noting from the outset that the scope of selectivity is 
not generally concerned with secondary selective effects.11 In Viscido, AG Jacobs 
argued against the extension of the State aid prohibition to such effects stemming 
from the effects of a general measure, as it would entail an investigation of a 
Member State’s entire economic and social system.12 The Commission, in its 2016 
Notice, clarifies that secondary effects will only be within the scope of selectivity if it 
 
6 “It is clear from the Court' s case law that the requirement of an effect on trade between Member 
States is easily satisfied”. See to that effect: Joined cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v 
Commission Opinion of AG Jacobs ECLI:EU:C:1994:112, para 33. This is also discussed in Part III of 
the Notions of State Resources, Effect on Trade, and Distortion of Competition Chapter. 
7 Case 30/59 De gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority ECLI:EU:C:1961:2, 19 
8 Case 173/73 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1974:71, para 13 
9 Ibidem 
10 Case C-241/94 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1996:353, para 20; Case C-75/97 Belgium v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:311, para 25; Case C‑409/00 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:92 
para 46; Case C-172/03 Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck ECLI:EU:C:2005:130, para 46; Case C-487/06 
P British Aggregates Association v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2008:757, para 85; Case C-522/13 
Ministerio de Defensa and Navantia SA v Concello de Ferrol ECLI:EU:C:2014:2262, para 28; Case C-
124/10 P Commission v EDF ECLI:EU:C:2012:318, para 77; Joined Cases C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 
P Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others 
EU:C:2013:175, para 102 
11 Commission Notice on the notion of State Aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C 262/1 paras 115-116 
12 Joined cases C-52/97, C-53/97 and C-54/97 Epifanio Viscido, Mauro Scandella and Others and 




is possible ex ante to determine the secondary beneficiaries, as an identifiable 
undertaking or group of undertakings.13 This position follows from the fact that 
general measures are in principle outside the scope of selectivity. 
The 1998 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to 
measures relating to direct business taxation (the 1998 Notice), as well as the 2016 
Commission Notice on the notion of State aid (the 2016 Notice), set out very similar 
tests for determining whether a particular measure is selective.14 In simple terms, 
selectivity, in fiscal cases, occurs when certain undertakings are treated, for tax 
purposes, differently from the “norm”, meaning that there must exist a derogation 
from the (general) system, to the undertakings’ favour. As a result, traditionally, and 
in both the 1998 and 2016 Notices, selectivity in State aid has been examined 
through a three-step analysis. The three-step approach as it applies to fiscal cases 
can be briefly expressed as follows: (a) identification of the general tax system which 
constitutes the relevant reference benchmark, (b) assessment of whether the tax 
measure departs from the reference tax system, and (c) an examination of whether 
the tax measure can be justified by reference to the logic of the tax system.15 It is 
worth noting that the CJEU has iterated several formulations of the test: the case 
law on the matter, though extensive has been nebulous, at best. Micheau however 
explains that only one test exists, although it has been described in different ways.16 
Any test would include the necessity to identify a general scheme, and whether 
there is a difference in treatment by analysing undertakings in a comparable legal 
and factual situation (within the aforementioned general scheme), before 
examining potential justifications for any derogation. Paint Graphos was a seminal 
case, where the most up-to-date formulation of the three-step test was reaffirmed.17 
Prior to that case, usually the analysis of selectivity and the application of the test 
was formalistic and resulted in the national tax system being the reference system, 
meaning that every variation on it would be a derogation for the purposes of 
 
13 2016 Notice (n 11), para 116 
14 Commission Notice on the application of the State Aid rules to measures relating to direct business 
taxation [1998] OJ C 384/3, para 16; 2016 Notice (n 11), para 128 
15 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten ECLI:EU:C:2001:598, para 41 
16 Claire Micheau, ‘Tax Selectivity in European Law of State Aid: Legal Assessment and Alternative 
Approaches’ (2015) 40 European Law Review 323, 328 
17 Joined Cases C-78/08, C-79/80, and C-80/08 Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia 
delle Entrate v Paint Graphos Soc. coop. arl Adige Carni Soc. coop. arl, in liquidation v Agenzia delle 
Entrate and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Ministero delle Finanze v Michele 
Franchetto ECLI:EU:C:2011:550. See also: Joined Cases C-78/08, C-79/80, and C-80/08 Ministero 
dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle Entrate v Paint Graphos Soc. coop. arl Adige Carni 
Soc. coop. arl, in liquidation v Agenzia delle Entrate and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 
and Ministero delle Finanze v Michele Franchetto Opinion of AG Jääskinen ECLI:EU:C:2011:411 
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selectivity.18 As a result, the Paint Graphos formulation of the three step test, and its 
evolution over the last decade, will be the main formulation used in this Chapter.  
The increasingly complex regulatory techniques employed by the Member 
States to confer selective advantages through their tax systems complicates matters 
even more,19 creating situations where even the entirety of the corporate tax system 
can be seen as selective.20 Consequently, it is no surprise that each of the three 
steps, and especially the first two, can give rise to serious issues. Those issues will 
be discussed in this Chapter, in which each limb of the test described above will be 
examined individually in a dedicated section, allowing for a systematic analysis of 
selectivity as it applies to fiscal cases.  
II. Step One 
a. General Position 
As mentioned above, the analysis of fiscal selectivity is based on a three-step 
test. The first step of this test requires the identification of a reference framework, 
based on which the contested measure will be judged. Before the comparability 
element of selectivity can begin in earnest therefore, first of all, the reference 
framework must be ascertained. This section of the Chapter will examine what is 
meant by a reference framework and will showcase how this framework has been 
defined in the case law. Additionally, it will look at the importance of identifying the 
correct reference framework, and of its width.  
The reference framework is, in broad terms, a general scheme from which 
the derogation occurs, and against which the derogation is measured. This initial 
step of the analysis bears great significance, as the general framework can be 
defined narrowly or widely. A wide system of reference means that finding a 
derogation from it becomes significantly easier. It is reasonable that the 
Commission, who is in charge of conducting the investigations, and bears the 
burden of proof for the first two steps of the analysis, has an interest in defining the 
system of reference widely. This step is particularly important because it informs the 
rest of analysis,21 and it has been called “the heart of the selectivity test”.22  
 
18 Jose Luis Buendia Sierra, ‘Finding Selectivity or the Art of Comparison’ (2018) 17 European State 
Aid Law Quarterly 85, 87. See also: Flavia Tomat, ‘The Preliminary Ruling of the Court of Justice on 
Preferential Taxation of Cooperatives and State Aid Rules’ (2012) 11 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 462 
19 Wolfgang Schön, ‘Tax Legislation and the Notion of Fiscal Aid: A Review of 5 Years of European 
Jurisprudence’ in I Richelle, W Schön, E Traversa (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 
2016), 23 
20 See for example: Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government 
of Gibraltar and United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2011:732. This “de facto” selectivity will be discussed 
further in this Chapter. 
21 Case C-88/03 Portugual v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, para 56. See also: Case C-88/03 
Portugual v Commission Opinion of AG Geelhoed ECLI:EU:C:2005:618. 
22 Case C-270/15 P Belgium v Commission Opinion of AG Bobek ECLI:EU:C:2016:289 para 29 
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The 2016 Notice defines the reference framework as being “composed of a 
consistent set of rules that generally apply — on the basis of objective criteria — to all 
undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its objective”.23 When it comes to 
tax, the tax base, the taxable persons, the taxable event and the tax rates can all be 
used to define the reference framework.24 However, this is not as straightforward as 
it appears. In a number of judgments, the CJEU has found the reference framework 
to be as wide as the general, ordinary system of taxation. The reference framework 
has for example been found to be the general regime for the taxation of business 
profits,25 the general property tax system, as established by the relevant national 
legislation,26 the tax rate in force in the geographical area in question,27 the rules on 
“the tax treatment of financial goodwill”, as a part of the general national corporate 
tax regime,28 or the fiscal regime applicable to all undertakings.29 In British 
Aggregates, where the measure in question was a special levy, the levy itself was 
the relevant reference framework.30 In France Telecom v Commission the reference 
system was held to be the various rates applicable in the different local authorities 
across France, as opposed to the weighted average tax to which France Telecom 
was subject.31 Overall, it is clear that a degree of flexibility exists in the definition of 
a reference framework, which also means that that definition is not always 
straightforward. In fact, as will be discussed below, it is even possible for two 
reference frameworks to be applicable to the same case. This is the inevitable result 
of the inherent complexity of corporate taxation regimes, and the aforementioned 
regulatory techniques. 
b. The Form and Width of the Reference Framework 
In Paint Graphos, the general regime of corporation tax was held to be the 
relevant reference framework.32 This however was not done automatically. Rather, 
the ECJ argued that since co-operative societies had the same basis of assessment 
for the purposes of corporation tax as for-profit companies, the two categories had 
 
23 2016 Notice (n 11), para 133 
24 Ibidem, para 134 
25 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, para 95 
26 Concello de Ferrol (n 10), para 36 
27 Portugal v Commission (n 21), para 56 
28 Case T-399/11 Banco Santander SA v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:938, para 54; Case T-219/10 
Autogrill España SA v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:939, para 50; Joined Cases C-20/15 P and C-
21/15 P Commission v World Duty Free Group (formerly Autogrill España), Banco Santander & 
Santusa Holding ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, para 63 
29 Adria-Wien (n 15), paras 49-51 
30 Case T-210/02 RENV British Aggregates Association v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2012:110, paras 49-
51 
31 Case C-81/10 P France Telecom v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:811, para 18 
32 Paint Graphos (n 17), paras 49-50 
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to be within the same reference framework. This was reinforced by the objective of 
the reference framework, namely the taxation of corporate profits.33 It is worth 
noting that the objective of the measure will also be used in the analysis, not to 
define the reference framework, but rather to inform the limits of the comparison 
inherent in the second step.34 However, the reference framework does not have to 
be a general regime. In Sigma Alimentos the General Court stated that it was 
possible for a measure to be its own reference framework, if it is clearly delimited, 
and it pursues specific objectives, thusly being distinguishable from all other fiscal 
rules applicable in the relevant territory.35 In such cases, the Court went on to say, 
the selectivity of a measure is to be assessed based on whether that measure 
excludes from its scope undertakings that in light of the objectives of the system are 
comparable (legally and factually) to those to which it applies.36 If such a reference 
framework, defined in line with the applicable legal regime, is not in itself 
discriminatory and is applied in a non-discriminatory way, selectivity cannot exist, as 
was the case in Hansestadt Lübeck.37 This case shows how important the width of 
the reference framework can be, and how interlinked it is with the legal regime 
applicable to the measure in question. 
An interesting example of how the reference framework can be defined can 
be found in Aer Lingus. The contested measure was a differential rate of Air Travel 
Tax (ATT) chargeable on different flights, based on the distance travelled. The 
reference system was defined as “the taxation of air passengers departing on an 
aircraft” from an Irish airport.38 Given that only a small percentage of all flights were 
subject to the lower rate of ATT, the Commission argued that the higher rate had to 
be seen as the rate applicable to the reference framework, while the lower rate 
formed an exemption from this reference framework.39 On a joint appeal, the ECJ 
upheld this determination of the reference framework,40 despite the fact that both 
rates were introduced simultaneously and by the same legislation. Additionally, the 
ECJ held that a third, uniform rate introduced at a later date could not be the 
reference framework, as it was not applicable at the time.41 As the lower rates were 
essentially applicable primarily to domestic flights, there was a possibility that the 
 
33 Ibidem, para 54 
34 Case C-279/08 P Commission v The Netherlands (NOx) ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, para 87 
35 Case T-239/11 Sigma Alimentos Exterior v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2018:781, para 113 
36 Ibidem 
37 See for example: Case C-524/14 P Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck ECLI:EU:C:2016:971, paras 
61-64 
38 Case T-473/12 Aer Lingus v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:78, para 54; Case T-500/12 Ryanair v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:73, para 79 
39 Ibidem, para 55; para 80, respectively 
40 Case C-164/15 P Commission v Aer Lingus Ltd and Ryanair Designated Activity Company 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:990, paras 52, 58 
41 Ibidem, paras 49, 52 
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higher rate would be struck down as a violation of free movement provisions,42 but 
the ECJ held that this was not relevant in the assessment of State aid, and therefore 
the reference framework.43 This judgment confirms on the one hand that the 
reference framework has to be determined based on its actual effects, and that 
hypothetical elements and future developments cannot inform it. 
In light of the above, a case worth analysing in detail is the Gibraltar case,44 
and its appeal.45 Gibraltar was (and still is) one of the more controversial State aid 
cases, drawing praise and criticism, being dubbed a “methodological revolution”,46 
and credited with “heralding a new age in State aid control of tax measures for the 
completion of the Union's internal Market”.47 What made the case unique, and by 
extension controversial, was the fact that the ECJ was asked to evaluate the 
selectivity of the entirety of a tax system as opposed to that of a specific tax 
measure.48  
Due to the peculiar facts of this case, some discussion of its context is 
necessary before analysing the judgments. In 2002, the government of Gibraltar 
decided to reform the entirety of its corporate tax system. It replaced the standard 
corporate regime it had employed until then with a new regime, based upon three 
distinct charges, namely a payroll tax, a business property occupation tax, and a 
registration fee.49 The liability of any given company under those two taxes was to 
be capped at 15% of their annual profits, meaning that both taxes, beyond being 
capped, only applied to companies that were realising profits,50 despite the tax base 
not being profit induced. The registration fee also varied.51 The system also 
provided for an additional top-up tax for financial services companies, but the 
overall liability remained capped at 15%.52 At first glance, a lot of elements of 
Gibraltar’s tax reform seem potentially problematic.53 Unprofitable companies did 
 
42 Ibidem, paras 69, 75 
43 Ibidem, para 77 
44 Joined Cases T-211/04 and T-215/04 Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:595 
45 Gibraltar (n 20) 
46 Michael Lang, ‘The Gibraltar State Aid and Taxation Judgment A "Methodological Revolution"?’ 
(2012) 11 European State Aid Law Quarterly 805, 807 
47 Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccanico, ‘Gibraltar: Beyond the Pillars of Hercules of Selectivity’ (2012) 11 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 443 
48 Cristina Romariz, ‘Revisiting Material Selectivity in EU State Aid Law Or “The Ghost of Yet-To-Come’ 
(2014) 13 European State Aid Law Quarterly 39, 44 
49 Commission Decision 2005/261/EC of 30 March 2004 on the aid scheme which the United 
Kingdom is planning to implement as regards the Government of Gibraltar Corporation Tax Reform 
[2005] OJ L 85/1 
50 Ibidem, recital 14 
51 Ibidem, recital 15 
52 Ibidem, recital 19 
53 Ibidem, recital 31 
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not incur any tax liability in relation to payroll and property occupation,54 while 
companies with large profits also benefited by having their tax liability capped.55 
However, the main contentious issue of the reform was that, in effect, offshore 
companies were exempted from taxation, since they would not have any 
employees, and would not occupy any business premises.56 As a result, and in light 
of the scale of the offshore sector in Gibraltar, the Commission held that the new 
corporate taxation system put in place was not of a general character, and therefore 
was selective.57 It is safe to agree with Luja, who argues that Gibraltar’s proposed 
reform was “far from a textbook model of either a corporate income tax, a payroll 
tax or a property tax”,58 and almost invited the Commission’s scrutiny. The stage was 
set for a landmark judgment, regardless of who would eventually win. 
The General Court overturned the Commission’s Decision, arguing that the 
Commission had failed to identify a proper reference framework to benchmark any 
derogation from, since the general framework was the one under review.59 It went 
on to state that a differentiation in treatment between undertakings is “not selective 
when it arises from the nature or general scheme of the system of charges of which 
it forms part”.60 On appeal, AG Jääskinen in his Opinion stated that the increasing 
complexity of tax measures made it incrementally more difficult to differentiate 
between general measures and selective ones.61 He agreed with the General Court, 
arguing that the logical conclusion of the Commission’s reasoning would be a 
“comparison between the tax regime as it exists and another – hypothetical and non-
existent – system”.62 The main crux of the argument as it emerges through his 
Opinion is that the lack of a properly determined “normal” regime cripples the 
selectivity analysis, and that the ECJ should not resort to “ad hoc” solutions.63 
However, the ECJ decided to set aside the EGC’s judgment and disregard 
the AG’s Opinion. The effects-based approach64 was expanded to say that a 
measure is independent of the (regulatory) techniques used. The ECJ expanded on 
this issue, arguing that the General Court had erred by assessing the form rather 
than the effect of the measure,65 and that if such an approach was to become the 
 
54 Ibidem, recital 128 
55 Ibidem, recitals 134-135 
56 Ibidem, recitals 140-142 
57 Ibidem, recitals 143-144 
58 Raymond Luja, ‘(Re)shaping Fiscal State Aid: Selected Recent Cases and Their Impact’ (2012) 40 
INTERTAX 120, 129 
59 Gibraltar (n 44), para 170 
60 Ibidem, para 144 
61 Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and 
United Kingdom Opinion of AG Jääskinen ECLI:EU:C:2011:215, para 178 
62 Ibidem, para 202 
63 Ibidem, para 134 
64 British Aggregates (n 10), para 85 
65 Gibraltar (n 20), para 88 
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norm, it would make national tax rules immune to State aid by placing them outside 
of its scope.66 The ECJ confirmed that the reference framework was indeed the 
entirety of the tax regime,67 arguing that the system itself favoured offshore 
undertakings. Additionally, the ECJ argued that the absence of another basis of 
assessment that would catch offshore companies meant that the effects of the 
corporate tax system as a whole were discriminatory, even though those (existing) 
bases were based on objective criteria.68 The Court explained that the bases of 
assessment used in the general tax regime allowed certain undertakings to be ex 
ante identified and characterised as a “privileged category”, thus giving rise to 
selectivity.69  
In essence, the beneficiaries of the seemingly “general” reform were ab initio 
identifiable based on their inherent characteristics. Commentators argued that the 
judgment demonstrates that the selectivity assessment of tax measures is 
“substantive rather than formal”,70 and that the ECJ was right to look at what the 
objective of a “normal” system of corporate taxation should and was purported to 
be (the taxation of all companies established in Gibraltar).71 What this judgment 
essentially says is that the effects of the measure are more important than finding a 
benchmark against which those effects can be examined. The rationale of Gibraltar 
therefore reinforces the effects-based approach, and as a result of this 
demonstrates the possibility for selective tax systems to exist. 
It can be argued that Gibraltar is a unique judgment, responding to a unique 
situation, but the logic employed is far from clear, and not consistent with the way 
in which the selectivity assessment of fiscal measures was supposed to work, as 
expressed through the three-step test.72 If we wish to follow the logic of this test, in 
essence the ECJ was presented with an arguably ab initio discriminatory general 
system, and decided to increase the level of generality of the reference framework 
to a hypothetical corporate tax system (which, in all fairness would mirror what is the 
norm across the world, having as its objective the taxation of corporate profits, in 
line with the revenue-generating role of taxation),73 in order to be able to declare 
the actual general system as the problematic measure. The legacy of the Gibraltar 
case, rather than the novel approach or the methodological revolution, in the 
author’s opinion is a further blurring of the lines between general measures (that 
 
66 Ibidem, para 92 
67 Ibidem, para 95 
68 Ibidem, paras 101-102 
69 Ibidem, para 104. See also: Conor Quigley, ‘Direct Taxation and State Aid: Recent Developments 
Concerning the Notion of Selectivity’ (2012) 40 INTERTAX 112, 118 
70 Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccanico, ‘The Gibraltar Judgment and the Point on Selectivity in Fiscal Aids’ 
(2009) 18 EC Tax Review 67 
71 Lang, ‘A "Methodological Revolution”?’ (n 46), 811 
72 Paint Graphos (n 17), para 49 
73 See in general: Luja, ‘(Re)shaping Fiscal State Aid’ (n 58), 129-131 
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ought, by virtue of their generality, escape State aid control as they cannot by 
definition by selective), and de jure or de facto selective ones. However, despite any 
vagueness or uncertainty the judgment may have created, it showcases that ab 
initio, de facto selective systems can be caught by Article 107(1), lending the 
selectivity analysis a great deal of functionality. What Gibraltar essentially tells us is 
that a measure will not only be selective if it takes the form of an exemption, but also 
when it provides for an obligation that has too narrow a scope. The judgment is 
however silent on what constitutes too narrow a scope. Despite the Court taking 
issue with regulatory technique, this case does not necessarily stop it. As Luja 
observes, if Gibraltar had argued that it was merely introducing a payroll and a 
business occupancy tax instead of a general system of corporate taxation, given that 
there is no obligation for a Member State to have such a system in place, it could 
have escaped the scrutiny of State aid rules.74  
In the context of the Gibraltar approach, it is necessary to discuss, albeit 
briefly, the ANGED preliminary references.75 All five cases deal with three regional 
taxes, one in Catalunya, one in Asturias, and one in Aragón.76 The three 
aforementioned regions introduced taxes on large retailers (each regional law 
containing a different definition of “large retailer”) in order to offset the negative 
effects such retailers can have on the environment and the local economy. All three 
taxes were to be levied based on the square footage of the retailers, and all three 
taxes included exemptions for certain kinds of retailers. The judgments, all resulting 
from preliminary references from the Tribunal Supremo, are very similar, as are the 
Opinions of AG Kokott.77 As a result, they will be considered together. 
 
74 Raymond Luja, ‘The selectivity test: The Concept of Sectoral Aid’ in A Rust and C Micheau (eds) 
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de Catalunya ECLI:EU:C:2018:280; Joined Cases C-234/16 and C-235/16 Asociación Nacional de 
Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Consejería de Economía y Hacienda del Principado 
de Asturias and Consejo de Gobierno del Principado de Asturias ECLI:EU:C:2018:281; Joined Cases 
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de Catalunya Opinion of AG Kokott ECLI:EU:C:2017:852; Joined Cases C-234/16 and C-235/16 
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In all three judgments, the ECJ reiterated that a reference framework can be 
regional, if the entity introducing it enjoys sufficient autonomy.78 This means that 
selectivity ought to be determined within the limits of the jurisdiction that adopts 
the contested measure. Equally, it showcases that the constituent elements of the 
selectivity analysis must also reflect the system in which selectivity is to be assessed. 
What makes those judgments relevant to the discussion of the reference framework 
is that the ECJ appears to endorse a more functional approach for the 
determination of the reference framework. Having stated that the point of the 
exercise of selectivity is substantive, the ECJ confirmed that the effects of the 
measures need to be examined, rather than their form, and that regulatory 
technique could not exclude from the outset potentially comparable undertakings, 
even in the lack or the apparent lack of a derogation from a reference framework.79 
The effects of the contested measures were such, to the extent that they excluded 
from the application of the relevant taxes undertakings using smaller retail areas. In 
that regard, the contested measures were indistinguishable from the reference 
framework, which was found to be “a regional tax on retail establishments whose 
sales areas exceed a certain threshold”.80 
What emerges from this judgment is that selectivity can exist at multiple 
levels. When it comes to the size-specific thresholds, the whole system can be 
selective, by excluding smaller retail areas ab initio, necessitating a Gibraltar-style 
approach, and an analysis of its effects. The formal exemptions on the other hand 
clearly depart from the reference framework. In other words, a measure can on the 
one hand be its own reference framework, while also containing a derogation from 
itself. An interesting point arises from the Opinions of AG Kokott in the cases, where 
she stated that “the determination of a ‘normal’ tax system cannot be decisive”.81 
What this means exactly is unclear, as the discussion of the reference system, both 
by AG Kokott and the ECJ, was brief. However, given that she referred to the 
Gibraltar case in conjunction with the above statement, and advocated that the 
decisive factor ought to be the effects of the measure,82 it is reasonable to conclude 
that the above statement is a rejection of the overtly formalistic approach towards 
the determination of a reference system, and an endorsement of a more functional 
and substantive one.  
In summary, the case law shows that a measure may be its own reference 
system. It is easy to see the parallels between Gibraltar and ANGED, as in both cases 
 
78 ANGED v Catalunya (n 75), para 41; ANGED v Asturias (n 75), para 34; ANGED v Aragón (n 75), 
para 29 
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81 ANGED v Catalunya Opinion of AG Kokott (n 77), para 88; ANGED v Asturias Opinion of AG Kokott 




the reference framework (despite the vast difference of the level of generality 
between the two) excluded certain types of undertakings from tax liability, without 
a formal derogation being necessary. Not needing a derogation can be particularly 
useful in functional terms, as it allows a measure to be examined in light of its effects, 
without getting bogged down in the search of a higher level of generality which 
may not actually exist. It essentially is a clever way to get around the structure of the 
three-step test. As such, the generality or width of a reference framework can wildly 
vary, from a specialised levy to the entirety of a territory’s corporate tax regime and 
everything in between. It is clear that the focus of the analysis should be placed on 
the effects, but at the same time the reference framework has an intra-systemic 
limitation, being dependant on the jurisdiction and tax regime in which it exists.  
c. The Sanierungsklausel Cases and the Holistic Approach  
As mentioned above, it is not always easy to identify the correct reference 
framework for a given case, as there may be more than one possible option. As it 
has been shown in the previous part, the width of the reference framework can 
range from being very narrow to the widest one imaginable. Nonetheless, ensuring 
its correct identification is of paramount importance. In this context, the series of 
cases stemming from Commission Decision 2011/527,83 which examined a German 
loss carry-forward provision (the Sanierungsklausel), are of particular interest. 
Under German law, corporate taxation is based on the 
Einkommensteuergesetz (Income tax Act - EStG) and the Körperschaftsteuergesetz 
(Corporate Income Tax Act - KStG), both of which have provisions allowing losses 
to be carried forward,84 which is a common feature of several national EU tax 
systems.85 However, those provisions resulted in Mantelgesellschaften, the trade in 
dead companies that still had losses to carry forward, leading to the amendment of 
the KStG in 1997 to stop this practice. The 1997 rule was further restricted in a 2008 
amendment, but a further amendment in 2009 relaxed the rules on the availability 
of the loss carry-forward to undertakings in difficulty if they were acquired for the 
purposes of restructuring, subject to a list of objective criteria.86 Under the new 
regime, according to the Commission, the general rule was the forfeiture of loss 
carry-forwards upon a change in ownership, meaning that the 2009 amendment 
was an exception to said rule.87 The Commission, starting from rule (a), the taxation 
 
83 Commission Decision 2011/527/EU of 26 January 2011 on State Aid C 7/10 (ex CP 250/09 and 
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84 Ibidem, recital 5  
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13 European State Aid Law Quarterly 518, 521 
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of profits under the KStG and the EStG which is the most general system, moved 
into rule (b), the exemption from taxation of profits which are set against losses 
carried forward (§10d(2) EStG and §8(1) KStG) to rule (c), the non-application of (b) 
in certain cases to prevent abuse, in other words the forfeiture of losses, (§8c(1) 
KStG), to rule (d) an exception to rule (c) and the application of rule (b) in the case 
of undertakings in difficulty, subject to the conditions of rule (d) (§8c(1a) KStG). This 
structure goes from a general principle of taxation to a very specific rule (the 
exception of an exception of an exemption). This factual breakdown demonstrates 
the importance of selecting the correct reference system, in order to be able to 
assess whether a measure is actually selective. 
In its Decision, the Commission determined rule (c) above, to be the 
reference framework.88 The Commission noted that it has used the same rule as a 
reference framework in a previous Decision,89 stating that the rationale of that 
Decision applies in the current one, thusly limiting its analysis of the reference 
framework to two paragraphs. However, the MoRaKG Decision to which the 
Commission refers is threadbare when it comes to the analysis of selectivity, or most 
of the other criteria of State aid for that matter. The analysis is carried out simply to 
the extent where the Commission “notes that the measure is undisputedly 
selective”, without going into much more detail.90  
The Decision was appealed by some undertakings affected by it. The position 
of the applicants was that rule (b) above is the general system, while rule (c) is an 
exemption to it, and rule (d) an exemption to the exemption which “merely re-
establishes the general rule”.91 However, the General Court agreed with the 
Commission’s determination of the reference system as the forfeiture of losses when 
a change of ownership occurred.92 Following a rather formalistic approach,93 the 
logic of the Commission and the General Court appears sound. After all, it is a 
general rule of the German corporate tax regime that carrying-forward losses is 
limited to companies that have not changed ownership. At the same time however, 
it is an equally, if not more, general rule that companies are allowed to carry-forward 
losses (rule (b) above). The judgments were appealed.  
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AG Wahl’s Opinion in Dirk Andres contains a thorough discussion of the 
reference system, stating inter alia that it is an essential part of the analysis of 
selectivity, as the comparison necessary in the second limb of the test can only work 
in light of an objectively defined benchmark.94 To illustrate the difficulties inherent 
in such a definition, he argues that under the Commission’s own definition in the 
2016 Notice, it is possible for “any number of fiscal provisions, or the combination 
thereof to fit that description”.95 This is to an extent the result of the lack of proper 
guidance in this definition exercise from the Union judicature’s case law.96 He goes 
on to say that the reference system in this case is not based upon objective criteria, 
and that, based on the Court’s case law, in the determination of the reference 
system a “broad approach is favoured”, while formalistic approaches should be 
rejected.97 Based on those considerations, he gives a very good account of what 
should, based on the case law, be seen as the reference framework, stating that the 
“Court has endorsed an approach that seeks to identify the entire body of rules that 
influence the tax burden weighing on undertakings. In my view, such an approach 
is warranted. It ensures that the selectivity of a tax measure is assessed against a 
framework that includes all relevant provisions, and not against provisions that have 
been carved out artificially from a broader legislative framework”.98 The ECJ 
explicitly accepted this formulation.99 
The ECJ reiterated that the selectivity analysis should begin with the 
identification of a reference framework, stressing the added importance that step 
has in fiscal cases, given that any comparison, both for determining the existence of 
an advantage, and for the purposes of the second limb of the selectivity test, 
necessitates the existence of correctly defined reference framework.100 The focus of 
the ECJ’s analysis seems to shift in the following paragraphs. At the centre of this 
part of the judgment are selective systems, like the one that was the subject of the 
Gibraltar case. The Court states that an undertaking may be the recipient of a 
selective advantage even in cases where it escapes the tax that forms the reference 
system. The extension of this is a reiteration of the Gibraltar principle, that selectivity 
can exist even in the lack of a deviation from the reference system.101 In essence, it 
is a question of the width of the scope of the reference framework. The same 
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discussion can be found in the other three judgments stemming from the contested 
Decision, all delivered on the same day.102  
 In the following paragraphs (in all four judgments) the ECJ expanded upon 
the importance of the scope, by drawing attention to issues stemming from 
regulatory technique. In essence, a formalistic approach such as the one employed 
by the Commission and the General Court would result in some national tax rules, 
that were designed with the “correct” technique falling “from the outset” outside the 
scope of selectivity, and by extension State aid. This could happen despite the fact 
that “by adjusting and combining various tax rules, they produce the same effects 
in law and/or in fact”.103 This of course cannot stand, as the focus of the State aid 
analysis is the measure’s effects, not its objectives, causes, or aims, and by extension 
the regulatory technique employed.104 Based on this logic, the ECJ declared that 
since regulatory technique cannot be used to enable a measure to escape the 
scrutiny of State aid, it should also be ignored in the determination of the reference 
framework.105 In other words, a measure cannot be caught by the State aid 
prohibition simply as a result of its regulatory technique, in the same way it cannot 
circumvent the prohibition on the same basis. As Nicolaides points out, this last 
point seems to be a confirmation and extension of the principle that when 
determining the reference framework the focus of the analysis should be its effects, 
rather than its objectives.106 However, the regulatory technique of a tax measure 
remains somewhat relevant when it creates a derogation.107 
 The ECJ explained that an “overall examination” of the measures making up 
the German regime shows that instead of the (a)>(b)>(c)>(d) structure discussed 
above, which moves from the general to the more specific rules, the correct 
interpretation of the German system is that (c) and (d) both define situations falling 
within (b). Thusly, (b) is the correct reference framework, because the selectivity of 
a tax measure cannot be assessed based on a reference framework made up of 
provisions artificially removed from a broader legislative framework.108 Finally, the 
ECJ confirmed that an error in the determination of the reference framework vitiates 
the entirety of the selectivity analysis.109 In casu, therefore the exclusion from the 
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reference framework of the general loss carry-forward rules meant that the General 
Court (and the Commission) had erred in law.110 
 There is no doubt that these judgments are noteworthy for their discussion 
of the importance of the reference framework, and their affirmation and extension 
of the principles seen in Gibraltar. However, it is still not clear how we are supposed 
to determine the reference framework. Nicolaides, validly, wonders whether 
problematic companies taken over are “in the set of all companies carrying losses 
forward or in the set of companies taken over”.111 Since the ECJ unequivocally 
rejected regulatory technique as a guide to determining the reference framework 
(and by extension seemingly rejected the formalistic logic that gave rise to the 
Commission’s Decision and the General Court’s judgment), it is argued that a more 
consistent reading of the judgment should place more emphasis on the explicit 
acceptance of AG Wahl’s reasoning in Dirk Andres, where the reference framework 
was theorised as “the entire body of rules that influence the tax burden weighing on 
undertakings”.112 In such a reading of the case, the reference framework would have 
to be (b) (as the ECJ found), with (c) and (d) forming part of it. To exclude (c) and (d) 
from the reference framework, even though they, alongside with (b), form in the 
eyes of the ECJ the general framework of rules applicable to loss carry-forward 
would indeed seem artificially narrow. Such an understanding would be more in line 
with the effects-based approach. In essence, the Court seems to have said that a 
rule being a derogation from another rule is not sufficient to declare the latter the 
reference framework, but that an overall assessment of all relevant rules is 
necessary.113 Unfortunately, the ECJ did not actually say in detail what exactly 
constitutes the reference framework, and as such a degree of uncertainty is 
inevitable. At the end of the day there is still a clear lack of objectivity in the exercise 
of determining the reference framework.  
In the context of Dirk Andres, P Oy is worth examining. Notably P Oy was 
decided before Dirk Andres, but it has been suggested that the Commission 
Decision that gave rise to Dirk Andres influenced the ECJ’s judgment in P Oy.114 In 
that case, there was a scheme in place very similar to the one discussed in Dirk 
Andres. Effectively, the Tuloverolaki, a Finnish law on income tax, provided for the 
deduction of losses in the following fiscal years,115 providing for an exception upon 
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change of ownership to minimise abuse.116 This somewhat mirrors the German 
regime discussed above, and has its roots in the same desire to stop “loss making 
companies being converted into a commodity”.117 However, the relevant Finnish law 
provided that the non-deductibility of losses would not apply in cases of a company 
being inherited, or when the competent tax office decided to allow such a 
deduction “for special reasons”, necessary for the company to continue 
operating.118 Those special reasons were detailed in a letter published by the tax 
authorities.119 Thus, we have the general rule (a) that provides for loss deduction 
and carry-forward, the scope of which is limited by an anti-abuse rule (b) that 
stipulates that a change in ownership removes the benefit of (a), while rule (c) 
provides that under certain circumstances, under the discretion of the tax 
authorities, the exception contained in (b) will not apply, allowing for the application 
of (a). All those rules exist in the context of the general corporate taxation system.  
As noted by the referring Court, there are two alternative interpretations of 
the facts of the case as they pertain to the determination of the reference framework, 
one being that the reference framework is (a), meaning that (c) is not a derogation 
as it provides for the same treatment as the general system, and the other being 
that (b) is the reference system, meaning that (c) is a derogation.120 The ECJ, with 
minimal analysis, seemed to suggest that the correct interpretation would be the 
latter.121 However, such a reading of the national law is problematic, as it fails to take 
into account the overall structure of the system, as the only reason (b) exists is to 
mitigate abusive tax practices stemming from the generality of (a), while the 
derogation (c) in turn only exists to limit the scope of the blanket ban included in 
(b). Following AG Wahl’s Opinion in Dirk Andres, and the proposed reading of that 
judgment, it follows that the ECJ was not correct in its assessment of the reference 
framework. What becomes apparent from the discrepancy between Dirk Andres 
and P Oy is that the definition of the correct reference framework remains more an 
art than a science.  
The proposed reading of the Dirk Andres judgment advocated above seems 
to be confirmed in the A-Brauerei judgment, where the ECJ held that the reference 
framework was “German law rules on real property transfer tax”, taken together.122 
The ECJ effectively held that a tax, and its exemption taken together, formed the 
reference system. Similarly, in Sigma Alimentos, the General Court found that the 
contested measure was but a modality of the application of a larger system (in this 
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case the taxation of companies), and thus could not be its own reference system,123 
but rather that the reference system was the entirety of the tax measures dealing 
with the treatment of goodwill.124 In World Duty Free the ECJ found that the 
reference system was the general Spanish system for the taxation of companies and, 
more specifically, the rules relating to the tax treatment of financial goodwill within 
that tax system.125 In GIL Insurance the ECJ found that the “higher rate of IPT and 
VAT form part of an inseparable whole”.126 In other words, in those cases, a set of 
rules was found to be the reference framework, in lieu of an isolated measure cut 
off from the system it belongs and therefore its context. 
Nonetheless, the width of this contextualised reference framework is still 
uncertain. In Hungary v Commission, where the subject of the dispute was the 
progressivity of a tax on the turnover of advertising activities, the General Court held 
that the only applicable reference framework could be the entirety of the 
advertising tax, including the progressive rates and successive bands.127 A similar 
conclusion was reached in Poland v Commission, where the case again revolved 
around a progressive tax on turnover, this time of retailers. The General Court held 
that the only possible applicable reference framework that would not be incomplete 
or purely hypothetical was the entirety of the retail tax, again with its progressive 
rates and successive bands.128 AG Kokott also lends support to this position, arguing 
that a progressive tax rate is not an exception for certain undertakings to a ‘normal’ 
tax rate, but is itself the rule. Under such a rule, all taxable persons are subject to 
different average tax rates, by design.129 As Monsenego argues, this interpretation 
of the reference system criterion is quite functional when it comes to fiscal aid, as 
even a highly specific tax measure is part of a consistent whole, and cannot be 
separated from that whole.130 In other words, a fiscal provision that interacts with 
other provisions is only meaningful in that context.  
In summary, this part has shown that determining the correct reference 
framework can be particularly difficult in fiscal cases, due to the interplay of several 
rules operating concurrently. Through the case law, it has been demonstrated that 
a given factual pattern can be subjected to different readings, and thus different 
assessments over what actually constitutes a reference framework, leading to 
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potentially different selectivity and aid assessments. Additionally, the case law 
suggests that the determination of a reference framework should take note of the 
fiscal context in which the contested measure operates, to allow for a proper 
analysis of a measure’s effects, as opposed to its form. Such an approach essentially 
allows some scope for the nature of taxation to be examined as part of the selectivity 
analysis. 
d. Conclusion 
It is clear that the reference framework needs to be determined 
independently of the regulatory technique employed and needs to take account of 
the measure’s effects rather than its form, while remaining coherent. In functional 
terms, it is obvious from the preceding discussion that the reference framework 
cannot be artificially narrowed. In this context, it is unsurprising that the width of the 
reference framework can vary wildly, as it needs to look at the effects of the measure. 
At the same time, the determination of the reference framework does not 
necessitate that the contested measure be a derogation from it, as a reference 
framework may be in itself selective, if it is discriminatory and defines a category of 
recipients which can be identified in advance. 
It also appears that for the objectives and effects to be properly analysable it 
is necessary to look at the “consistent whole” of the relevant provisions, and to not 
isolate measures from their context and application. Such an approach can be 
argued to be necessary to allow for the peculiarities of taxation. It is clear that the 
inherent logic of taxation and that of State aid can clash, meaning that a more fiscal 
outlook in the context of State aid could be beneficial. As Traversa argues, national 
corporate taxation systems tend to be complex, and to a certain degree, coherence 
can only be found “in the simultaneous application of apparently distinct tax 
provisions, which for this reason should not be treated in an isolated perspective”.131 
Luja proposes that the only way to make sense of the CJEU’s case law is to 
determine the reference framework only “by looking at the nature and structure of 
tax system as a whole and not by the initial tax base alone”.132 
This raises an interesting point as to the rationale of the current approach. 
The selectivity analysis essentially necessitates the breaking apart of a holistically 
designed and developed system of taxes that only make sense when operating 
alongside one another. Finding a reference framework from which one can 
derogate, necessary as it may be within the framework of the notion of selectivity, 
fails to take into consideration the fact that a tax system may consist not of a general 
rule, but of a number of interwoven rules that interact with one another, and can 
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only be coherent as a system when read in conjunction with one another. General 
exceptions for example, even though they formally derogate from the basic 
principle, are inherent parts of the logic of the general rule. The general rule from 
which they derogate can operate at a level of generality that requires every taxable 
entity to pay its share of taxes exactly because there are derogations allowing the 
State to achieve policy aims through its tax system, including purely fiscal objectives 
such as operating a tax system based on the ability to pay principle, or 
redistribution. It emerges from the more recent case law of the CJEU that it is indeed 
possible to allow for a consideration of the “consistent whole” to be taken into 
account when determining the reference framework. 
Given the inherent complexities of general taxation it is submitted that this 
holistic approach should become the norm. First of all, it allows for a complete 
definition of the “normal” market conditions, which is a significant part of what the 
reference system is examining and trying to define. The questions and occasional 
furore surrounding the width of the framework are quelled, as its width is 
dependent on the specificity of the rules examined. Additionally, under such an 
approach it would be necessary to look at the nature and structure of the tax system 
as it operates, and not necessarily at the initial tax base as defined by the basic legal 
framework, meaning that a holistic approach would be more in line with an effects-
based approach and will not run the risk of getting bogged down in the formalism 
apparent in the first instance judgments on the Sanierungsklausel Decision, or the 
P Oy judgment. Beyond this, if the reference framework is defined as the coherent 
sum, or inseparable whole, of the interwoven fiscal rules applicable to a given 
situation (and as a result the undertakings that find themselves in it), the Gibraltar 
approach of de facto material selectivity actually feels more comfortable, as it allows 
the effects of a given cluster of measures to shine through, actually limiting the 
potential for regulatory technique. The same can be argued in relation to the self-
referential nature of the levy in British Aggregates. This outlook could also bring the 
Gibraltar and Dirk Andres rationales closer, as both stress different sides of the 
irrelevance of regulatory technique,133 and can thus be argued to be two sides of 
the same anti-formalistic, functional coin. In other words, this approach would still 
allow for selective systems to exist, and would thus not limit the effective scope of 
the notion of selectivity. Therefore, beyond its benefits, the proposed holistic 
approach arguably follows from well-established case law as well. At the same time, 
a holistic approach could be seen as a move towards a more fiscal outlook in 
relation to fiscal aid, an outlook which can better deal with the inherent complexities 
of taxation by first and foremost recognising their existence. Further, the more fiscal 
outlook which would follow from the adoption of a holistic approach, would allow 
for the actual effects of a given measure to shine through, as it would in effect 
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necessitate the careful analysis of the fiscal context, and maintain the exclusion of 
secondary selective effects from the scope of fiscal aid. Such an approach, as will be 
discussed below, can also allow for a better comparability analysis in the second 
step, as the limits of the comparable situation are clearly defined.  
III. Step Two 
Once the reference framework has been established, the second step of the 
selectivity test can be examined. In this step, it must be determined whether a 
derogation from the reference framework differentiates between economic 
operators which, in light of the objectives of the system, are in a comparable legal 
and factual situation. This is the part of the test that establishes prima facie 
selectivity, subject to the caveat of the third and final step. The comparability 
analysis is preoccupied both with the notion of equality, and the distortive effects of 
the aid.134 
In some cases, a derogation is not per se necessary.135 This is the case when 
the reference framework itself creates a difference in treatment.136 The principle that 
derogations are not always necessary can be found in British Aggregates, where the 
reference framework was a specialised levy itself.137 That levy was very narrowly 
devised, exempting ab initio some types of aggregates. Due to State aid being 
concerned with effects over form, the regulatory narrowness employed by 
seemingly general measures, or at the very least measures that are capable of 
forming the reference framework can backfire. However, in most cases a derogation 
from normal taxation will be necessary, to introduce the differentiation in treatment 
in light of the objectives of the reference framework or the measure, and to facilitate 
the analysis.138 The fact that a derogation is not present however does not mean that 
it is possible to move straight into the third step of the selectivity test. Rather, as 
shown by British Aggregates and Gibraltar, the measure in question is prima facie 
selective exactly because it provides for different treatment between undertakings 
that are in a comparable legal and factual situation in light of the objectives of the 
reference framework or the measure.139 It follows from this that the comparability 
analysis still needs to be undertaken even in the absence of a derogation, as it is the 
very heart of the second step of the selectivity test.  
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This section will first look at the objectives that inform this comparability 
analysis, before then examining that comparability analysis. Using those two parts, 
this section will then discuss the Spanish Goodwill saga, and its implications and 
importance for the second step of the selectivity test.  
a. Objectives of the Measure, Objectives of the System 
It is clear that this part of the test relies to an extent on the objectives of the 
contested measure.140 This is a relatively new development, formally introduced in 
the logic of the analysis of fiscal selectivity, as Bartosch says, with the Adria-Wien 
judgment.141 It is arguable that such considerations were already present in the 
ECJ’s case law,142 but it was Adria-Wien that first offered a clear statement of this 
principle. The contested measure, the Energieabgabenvergütungsgesetz, 
provided for a rebate only available to undertakings that were primarily producers 
of goods, while it did not apply to undertakings providing services.143 The ECJ 
observed that the nature of the scheme in place could not provide any justification 
for the difference in treatment, while the same applied to the ecological 
considerations informing the scheme, as energy consumption, be it from 
manufacturers or service providers, is equally damaging to the environment.144 The 
Court declared that the comparison exercise in the second step of the analysis of 
selectivity needed to be undertaken in the context of the objective pursued by the 
Energieabgabenvergütungsgesetz.145 The ECJ in that case placed emphasis on the 
objectives pursued by the contested measure, as the analysis of those objectives 
was necessary to conduct a fruitful comparability analysis, given that the rationale 
of the contested measure was not based on general fiscal principles, but rather had 
environmental aims. 
Thus, despite State aid being an objective construct to be analysed based on 
its effects, the objectives underpinning the contested measure are important in 
determining the limits of the comparability analysis. This links the first two steps of 
the test to an extent, as the objective of a measure will follow from the reference 
framework, and the width of the two will be interlinked. If, for example, the general 
system of property taxation is taken as the reference framework, as was the case in 
Concello de Ferrol, then its objective would be taxing the ownership or use of 
land.146 On the other hand, if the reference framework was taken as being the tax 
exemption for state-owned land and land used for the purposes of national security, 
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then the objective of the measure would be related to national defence.147 
Objectives can be classified as intrinsic or extrinsic (also seen in academic writing, 
judgments, and Decisions as “internal” or “inherent” and “external”) to the system 
or measure. Intrinsic objectives relate to taxing something,148 while extrinsic 
objectives on the other hand are more varied; examples include environmental,149 
social,150 security151 and other considerations. However, it is important to note that 
a measure cannot escape classification as State aid solely based on its objectives.152 
Despite the obvious importance of the objectives of a given measure or 
system, the case law is not clear in relation to which objectives are the relevant ones. 
First of all, when it comes to taxation, it is imperative to distinguish between the 
objectives attributed to a tax scheme, and “the mechanisms inherent in the tax 
system itself, which are necessary for the achievement of such objectives”.153 In 
Portugal v Commission for example the policy objective of the tax scheme (a tax 
reduction) was to alleviate commercial disadvantages stemming from the insularity 
of the Azores, but the inherent structural objective of the system was “the allocation 
of the tax burden in accordance with ability to pay, with the aim of redistribution”.154 
Based on the objective of the system, the Court found that the extension of the 
exemption to all taxpayers was not justifiable, as the generality of it could not ensure 
that the “ability to pay” element of the system was observed.155 In P Oy, the objective 
of the system on loss carry-forwards was in line with the general system of taxation, 
but the objectives of the derogation were not, as they were unrelated to the 
structure of the general system.156 
The objective of the system in Paint Graphos was the taxation of corporate 
profits (in other words, to raise money for the state).157 In 3M the objective of the 
measure in question (a tax amnesty) was held to be “ensuring compliance with the 
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principle that judgment must be given within a reasonable time”.158 In A-Brauerei 
the objective of the system was found to be “to tax any transfer of the right of 
ownership in a property”.159 In Osnabrück it was held that the “polluter pays” 
environmental principle was part of the objective of an excise duty on the use of 
nuclear fuel in energy production, as that charge was designed to reduce the 
budgetary burden of safely dealing with nuclear waste.160 In Sardegna, the objective 
of the measure was environmental, in particular the alleviation of damage caused 
by tourism.161 It is clear that the objectives’ scope can itself vary, from general 
principles of taxation to specific, regional, environmental or other policy. The 
objective of the measure, especially if said objective relates to economic or financial 
policy, is not in itself sufficient to place the measure outside the scope of Article 
107(1), as such an approach would negate the usefulness of the State aid 
prohibition.162 
Despite the importance of the determination of the objectives, it is not 
obvious whether the objectives that ought to be examined are those of the 
measure,163 or those of the statutory scheme or system,164 as shown by the differing 
focus of the objectives described. The General Court has also pointed at this 
discrepancy.165 Those two approaches, as similar as they may appear, are not 
identical, as a “measure” can have much narrower objectives than a “system”. As 
Bartosch explains, the former interpretation could theoretically be used to justify 
laser-guided measures, “even applying to only one single undertaking”.166 Equally, 
the scope of their effects can vary wildly. A good example of that uncertainty would 
be the aforementioned Gibraltar case, where the ECJ used the revenue-raising 
objective of the tax system to undertake the comparability analysis.167 In World Duty 
Free the ECJ stated that the objectives that need to be taken into account are those 
of the reference framework.168 This confirms a trend that is apparent in Paint 
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Graphos,169 Portugal v Commission,170 and Hansestadt Lübeck,171 which suggests 
that the “objectives of the measure” formulation of Adria-Wien has been replaced 
by the “objectives of the system” one, or at the very least the “objectives of the 
reference framework” one. It is clear that the newer formulation allows for a far wider 
comparability analysis, by focusing on wider objectives. The General Court has 
explicitly endorsed the wider position,172 but nonetheless a lack of clarity persists. 
This for example can be evidenced by the fact that in World Duty Free the ECJ relies 
for this finding on MOL Magyar,173 but in the paragraph of MOL Magyar referred to, 
the Court clearly refers to the objective of the measure, not that of the system.174  
This Part has aimed to demonstrate the importance of the objectives 
informing the measure or system, and as such the entirety of the comparability 
analysis on which selectivity hinges. It has also showcased the clear lack of 
consistency in the definition and scope of those objectives. This lack of consistency 
in the definition of the objectives of the tax measure or system is a reflection of the 
definitional difficulties discussed in the analysis of the first step, as the under the 
current trend in the case law the objectives of the reference framework or general 
system will likely be deemed the relevant ones. Additionally, it further showcases 
the importance of the correct determination of the reference framework, as 
mistakes can spill over into the analysis of the second and potentially third step, thus 
vitiating the entirety of said analysis.175 
b. Comparable Legal and Factual Situation 
The second half of the second step in a fiscal selectivity examination is the 
comparability analysis, under which the Commission has the responsibility to 
demonstrate that a tax measure introduces a difference in the treatment of 
comparable undertakings.176 Beyond the objectives of the measure or system 
discussed above, arguably another element that can inform this analysis is the 
competitive relationship between recipients and non-recipients.177 In Paint Graphos 
the ECJ held that the core of the “derogation” or difference from the reference 
framework can only be ascertained by looking at the differentiation in treatment 
between economic operators who “in light of the objective assigned to the tax 
system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal 
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situation”.178 This is because the actual effects of the derogation need to be 
examined, as opposed to its mere existence. This part will look into this comparable 
situation and discuss its application, and the analysis that needs to be undertaken. 
The comparability analysis between undertakings needs to be carried out in 
light of the objectives of the system or measure as set out above. This can be 
illustrated through the Italian banking cases, where Italian banks on the receiving 
end of favourable tax provisions (applicable only to banks) were found to be in a 
comparable situation, under the objectives of the general corporate tax system that 
was employed as the frame of reference, with undertakings in other sectors that, 
naturally, could not make use of the specific banking sector provisions.179 In the 
same vain, in Concello de Ferrol, where an undertaking operating under the ambit 
of the Spanish Ministry of Defence, for the purposes of national security, was 
granted an exemption from the payment of property taxes, it was held that all 
undertakings that owned or used land (and were as a result liable to pay property 
taxes) were in a comparable situation with the undertaking in question, not just 
those using land for purposes related to national defence.180 On the other hand, it 
is worth mentioning the Osnabrück case, where a measure placed a special excise 
duty on the use of nuclear fuel, thusly affecting the price of electricity produced 
through nuclear fission. The ECJ held that undertakings producing electricity 
through other means, were not in a comparable legal or factual situation in light of 
the objectives of the excise duty.181 
This means that where the objectives of a general system are taken into 
account, all undertakings liable to pay tax are in a comparable situation.182 On the 
other hand, where the narrower, more specific objectives of the measure are taken 
into account, comparability is limited to the undertakings for whom those objectives 
are relevant.183 If the objectives of the reference framework are deemed to be the 
relevant ones, then their width will depend on that of the framework itself. In Paint 
Graphos, cooperative societies were not liable for tax. The ECJ compared in detail 
the legal and factual situation of cooperative and non-cooperative corporate 
entities, in the context of general corporate taxation. The focus of the analysis was 
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the different legal form of the two types of entities, the differences in governance,184 
the mutualistic nature of cooperatives and their economic situation,185 the fact that 
assets and profits are not distributed as dividends, the fact cooperatives have to rely 
on their own revenue-raising activities, and their low profit margins.186 Following 
that analysis, the ECJ concluded that, in principle, in light of the objective of the 
taxation of profits, the two types of entities were not in a comparable situation with 
each other.187 A substantive, material analysis such as the one conducted and 
endorsed by the ECJ in Paint Graphos is necessary to evaluate the specifics of the 
case. Only such a complete and substantive analysis can be actually focused on the 
contested measure’s effects.  
In ANGED for example, the objective of the measures was to “contribute 
towards environmental protection and town and country planning”, in order to 
counteract the consequences of the large retail establishments.188 The ECJ 
recognised that the environmental impact of retail establishments correlates to their 
size, while the same is true in regards to their effect on town planning. Thus, the 
size-based thresholds were held to be consistent with the objectives of the 
measures.189 This in turn means that the size-based thresholds employed by each of 
the regional authorities did indeed differentiate between undertakings, but those 
undertakings were not in a comparable legal and factual situation based on the 
objectives of the measures.190  
Further, all the measures included exemptions for certain types of 
undertakings. Looking at a formal derogation rather than the ab initio exclusion 
found in the size-specific exemption, the ECJ again examined the situation of the 
exempted undertakings in comparison with the large retail establishments that 
were to be fully taxed. All three regional authorities submitted that the exempted 
categories required by their very nature large retail areas, and therefore their size 
was not intended to attract the greatest number of consumers, and thus cause 
increases in traffic. Therefore, it could be argued that the exempted and non-
exempted undertakings were not in a comparable legal and factual situation.191 
Finally, the Catalan measure also included an exemption for collective large retail 
establishments. The ECJ compared the collective and individual retail 
establishments in light of the objectives of the measure and concluded that they 
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were indeed comparable.192 The form and content of the comparability analysis 
were mostly supported by AG Kokott.193 She also stated that comparability 
effectively needs to follow from the reference framework and be subject to potential 
justifications, as fiscal advantages can by definition only be granted in the context 
of the tax system, and that context and its intricacies need to be taken into 
account.194 
Another interesting example is the Dutch NOx case, which concerned an 
environmental levy on nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions above a certain limit, which 
also introduced an emissions trading scheme for large industrial facilities. Those 
larger facilities, and only those facilities, would be fined, if they exceeded the 
emissions’ levels. The General Court concluded that the bigger facilities were not in 
a comparable legal and factual situation in the context of the objective of the 
measure, which was the reduction of emissions,195 since they would be the only ones 
that could be potentially fined, and therefore were not subject to the same 
obligations.196 The ECJ disagreed with the EGC. Even though both Courts examined 
the measure in the context of the same objective, the ECJ found that all the 
undertakings that had to comply with the emission reduction obligation, regardless 
of whether they could be fined, were in a comparable legal and factual situation.197 
The two Courts seem to have examined the objective of the measure with a different 
scope, with the ECJ disregarding the different obligations embedded in the 
contested measure, as they were not per se consistent with the general objective of 
emissions’ reduction. As Werner and Stoican point out, this judgment confirms a 
wide interpretation of the comparable situation, and therefore State aid.198 
Essentially, the ECJ seems to have decided that despite the fact that the measure in 
question clearly defined the undertakings to which it would fully apply, there was 
an even wider benchmark against which the defined recipients should be 
compared. 
From this Part, it becomes clear that the comparability analysis is not, or at 
the very least should not, be a formulaic box-ticking exercise. The context in which 
it needs to be undertaken informs its limits, and its rationale. It is at its very core a 
pragmatic, effects-oriented analysis, that needs to examine in detail the contested 
measure, as shown in ANGED or Paint Graphos. However, the limits of this analysis, 
which demarcates the two categories to be compared, recipients and non-
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recipients, are not set in stone, and can extend to be particularly wide, as shown by 
NOx. The cases discussed showcase the need for a substantive comparability 
analysis. 
c. The Spanish Goodwill Saga and Its Context 
What becomes apparent from the discussion of the “comparable legal and 
factual situation” thus far is the potential difficulty in differentiating between a 
measure available to all comparable undertakings in theory and in practice. The ECJ 
dealt with this issue in World Duty Free. That case was the culmination of the Spanish 
Goodwill Saga, where the Commission based a finding of selectivity on the fact that 
the treatment of undertakings carrying out certain types of investments abroad 
differed from that of undertakings that did not.199 
The General Court overturned the Commission’s Decision and adopted a 
(much) narrower approach: it held that the fact that a tax measure was an exception 
from the reference framework was not sufficient to consider that the measure was 
selective, particularly when the measure was potentially accessible to all 
undertakings and had no differentiation baked into its criteria. 200 Rather, the 
Spanish law was aimed to a category of economic transactions, that could 
potentially be carried out by undertakings in a comparable legal and factual 
situation. The General Court concluded that since the measure was potentially 
accessible to all, it was not selective, but rather it was a general measure.201 
However, the ECJ disagreed with the General Court, arguing that its approach 
would narrow the scope of selectivity by introducing both a requirement that 
beneficiaries of alleged aid needed to be distinguished from other undertakings, 
as well as a limitation to comparability based on accessibility.202 
 According to the ECJ, the measure had the effect of differentiating between 
comparable undertakings, and as such was selective.203 Even a seemingly general 
measure with a condition attached can be selective, if that condition leads to a 
distinction being made between comparable undertakings, as “it represents 
discrimination against undertakings which are excluded from it”.204 However, the 
conditionality of the advantage is not in itself sufficient to render the measure 
selective.205 The use of the term “discrimination” in this part of the analysis is 
particularly interesting, especially because in this case, factually, we are looking at 
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reverse discrimination.206 The Court reiterated that even if the condition to receive 
the benefit is carrying out “specified transactions”, the measure can still be 
selective,207 meaning that the fact that the measure was open to potentially all 
undertakings is irrelevant.208 In this instance the Court seems to be departing from 
the notion of a “privileged category” established in Gibraltar.209 The ECJ seems to 
have, based on its case law, clarified what constitutes the bare minimum necessary 
in order to establish the selectivity of a measure that derogates from a general 
scheme, holding that is sufficient to “demonstrate that that measure benefits certain 
operators and not others” in a comparable situation.210 However, the ECJ did not 
decide whether the two groups of undertakings (those who benefited and those 
who did not) are indeed in a comparable situation, but referred the case back to the 
General Court.211 The ECJ has since reiterated the formulation discussed above in 
numerous cases.212 Indeed, as Giraud and Petit explain “this judgment will certainly 
be quoted and, after Adria-Wien, will certainly become the new mantra of the 
Commission and the EU Courts”.213 
Given the apparent importance of the judgment, it is necessary to briefly set 
out the principles that emerge from it, removed from the specifics of the case. First 
of all, the Court reiterated the three-step test,214 meaning that the general structure 
of the selectivity analysis of fiscal measures remains the same. In this context, it 
clarified the importance of conducting the comparability analysis of the second step 
in light of the objectives of the system,215 and added that the difference in treatment 
can be classified as “discriminatory”.216 The focus on the difference being 
“discriminatory” is not alien to the concept of State aid,217 and is in line with the 
effects-based approach.218 It has actually featured a lot in more recent judgments, 
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where the ECJ has held that a non-discrimination approach is inherent in the 
concept of selectivity.219 
Beyond those restatements and clarifications however, the judgment in 
World Duty Free has some problematic extensions. First of all, the Court stated that 
the conditionality of an advantage can in itself be “grounds for a finding that that 
aid in selective”,220 even if the conditions are not discriminatory.221 Essentially, a 
transactional condition, open to and satisfiable by any operator in the defined 
comparable legal and factual situation can still be selective.222 This in effect makes 
the behaviour of the pool of potential recipients of the aid the determining factor, 
as the difference in treatment does not result from state-sanctioned limitations of 
applicability, but rather from the choices each potential recipient makes. It is that 
behaviour, that choice, in casu, to invest or not to invest, that delineates the two 
categories. This “behavioural” selectivity is one of the worrying aspects of the 
judgment, because the two categories of comparable undertakings, recipients and 
non-recipients are defined not by the contested measure or by any characteristic 
inherent in them, but rather by their choices; in other words the State’s influence or 
discretion on who benefits from an advantage is non-existent. There is no reason 
why this cannot be applied to, for example, capital allowances or exemptions for 
Research and Development. The logical extension of this reasoning is that any non-
compulsory general measure can be selective, because an undertaking selected 
not to participate in it. 
In order to fully appreciate what the World Duty Free judgment means in this 
context, some analysis of subsequent case law in necessary. In Commission v Spain, 
Spain introduced a complex tax lease system which conditionally allowed for tax 
advantages to accrue to a specialised investment vehicle, in which any undertaking 
could participate. The ECJ, applying the rationale developed in World Duty Free, 
argued that it was irrelevant that the specified financial transaction was available to 
all, as the tax lease system still discriminated between the undertakings that 
participated in the scheme, and those that did not.223 On the contrary, in 
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Netherlands Maritime, which again revolved around a tax lease system, the ECJ 
held that since the measure was open in principle to any undertaking, it was not 
selective.224 The ECG, whose judgment the ECJ upheld, in effect argued that since 
in principle any undertaking, regardless of its size or the sector in which it is active, 
could benefit from the measure, the measure had to be deemed to be selective.225 
This discrepancy between two very similar cases demonstrates that there is a 
degree of confusion in relation to the potential selectivity of general measures. 
It is clear that the apparent confusion partly stems from the Gibraltar 
judgment, where the analysis hinged on the identification of an ab initio privileged 
category, that would clearly benefit from the application of an otherwise general 
measure.226 That category, in other words was ex ante identifiable. There was 
nothing a bricks-and-mortar undertaking could conceivably do to benefit from the 
same advantages granted to offshore companies. Hence, it was indeed reasonable 
for the ECJ to reach the conclusion it reached.227 Even though this approach was 
accepted in Netherlands Maritime,228 in World Duty Free it was clearly and explicitly 
abandoned with the ECJ chastising the General Court for applying it, claiming this 
approach was tantamount to the creation of an additional step in the selectivity 
analysis.229 In effect, this reasoning means that the ECJ gladly accepted that the 
differentiation resulting from the operation of the system was selective. This 
illustrates, in the author’s opinion, the basic inherent problem with the reasoning of 
World Duty Free. The judgment commits to a line of thought that refuses to 
recognise the generality of the application of derogations that is inherent in fiscal 
systems. Specifically, it declares that a “measure conferring a tax advantage of 
general application” will be selective, if it derogates from the normal or ordinary tax 
system, introducing “through its actual effects” a difference in treatment.230 
Essentially, the rationale of World Duty Free gets rid of the word “certain”, which 
can be found in the wording of Article 107(1), qualifying the undertakings or sectors 
benefitting from the advantage. This in itself can be problematic, as it significantly 
alters the scope of the notion of selectivity, by failing to exclude general 
measures.231 As AG Darmon explained in Sloman Neptun, selectivity is the criterion 
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most fit to perform the essential, for the scope of the aid prohibition, role of 
differentiating between general measures and State aid.232 Losing the word 
“certain” from the formulation therefore widens the notion of fiscal aid as a whole, 
not just of fiscal selectivity. Thus, the erasure of “certain” can bring general measures 
within the (expanded) scope of the State aid prohibition. 
d. World Duty Free and General Measures 
The judgment in World Duty Free, in the author’s view, is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of “general measures”. As AG Jacobs explained in 
France v Commission, the application of aid rules to general measures can be tricky, 
as it is not easy to distinguish between aid and socioeconomic policy.233 In other 
words, the distinction between general and selective measures determines the 
limits of fiscal State aid control.234 AG La Pergola also drew a distinction between 
general measures and situations where “the sectoral nature of the measures 
emerges […] from the very wording of the disputed measures”.235 Jaeger argues 
that provisions where the beneficiaries are in no way determined or determinable 
at the time of the entry into force of the contested measure are not selective,236 
presumably because the measure at hand does not have a ratione personae, a 
ratione materiae or a ratione territoriae.237 
This line of thought, contrary though it may be to the ECJ’s approach in World 
Duty Free, stems from a careful reading of the case law on general measures.238 For 
example, a Belgian measure that provided for a reduction in employer’s social 
security contributions on the condition of the introduction of shorter working hours 
was deemed to be a general measure.239 In MOL Magyar, the Court recognised that 
 
232 Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo 
Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG Opinion of AG Darmon ECLI:EU:C:1992:130, para 47 
233 Case C-241/94 France v Commission Opinion of AG Jacobs ECLI:EU:C:1996:195, para 30. See 
also: Case C-189/91 Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan Sidal Opinion of AG Darmon, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:458, paras 57-65 
234 Joined cases C-400/97, C-401/97 and C-402/97 Administración General del Estado v Juntas 
Generales de Guipúzcoa and Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa, Juntas Generales d'Alava and 
Diputación Foral d'Alava, and Juntas Generales de Vizcaya Opinion of AG Saggio 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:340, para 33; Cees Peters, ‘Tax Policy Convergence and EU Fiscal State Aid Control: 
In search of Rationality’ (2019) 28 EC Tax Review 6, 7, 9 
235 Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission Opinion of AG La Pergola ECLI:EU:C:1998:534, para 18 
236 Thomas Jaeger, ‘Tax Measures’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck 
Hart Nomos 2016), para 42 
237 Christoph Arhold, Viktor Kreuschitz, Franz Jürgen Säcker, Ulrich Soltesz, Michael Shuette, Andreas 
Schwab, ‘Article 107 TFEU’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck Hart 
Nomos 2016), paras 415-435 
238 See for example: Dirk Andres (n 99), para 94 
239 Report from the Commission, XXXIst Report on Competition Policy 2001 (SEC/2002/0462), 113; 
Authorisation of 22 of September 2001 for State Aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty 
— Cases where the Commission raises no objections [2001] OJ C 268/5. See also: Commission 
Decision of 13 November 2001 C(2001)3455fin – State Aid N674/2001. See in this context: 
Authorisation for State Aid pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty – Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections [2002] OJ C 30/14, 15 in reference to Aid No: N674/2001.  
64 
 
the fact that only a limited number of undertakings out of the potential pool of 
beneficiaries of a (general) measure opted to take the steps necessary to obtain the 
advantage cannot be sufficient to be render the measure selective.240 This principle 
has been consistently reiterated in fiscal cases.241 In Germany v Commission the ECJ 
held that a measure conferring an advantage based on a transactional condition 
was a “general measure applicable without distinction to all economically active 
persons”, and thus could not be classed as aid,242 at least in this context.243 
The openness or general satisfiability of the conditions attached to the aid is 
important. A measure whose conditions make it realistically applicable only to a 
certain sector, will not be treated as a measure of general application.244 The same 
applies to measures applicable only to a certain category of undertakings.245 For 
example, in Belgium v Commission, a case on which the ECJ relied in its World Duty 
Free judgment, a seemingly general measure was granting an advantage that could 
conceivably only benefit undertakings in the bovine sector by subsiding Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) testing.246 As a result, it was not an actual general 
measure, but a sectoral one. Similarly, in Air Liquide the condition for the award of 
the advantage was so specialised in terms of the activities it applied to, that it could 
not deemed to be general.247 Additionally, the degree of latitude afforded to the 
national authorities when awarding the advantage can jeopardise the generality of 
an otherwise general measure. If the national authorities enjoy a wide degree of 
discretion, a measure that on its face may be general may be deemed selective.248 
On the contrary, when this discretion is limited and regulated by law, the measure 
in question will be deemed to be general.249 The World Duty Free judgment 
arguably turns this on its head, by essentially saying that an open, seemingly 
general, measure has a degree of selectivity embedded in it, even though there was 
no discretion on behalf of national authorities. 
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It is possible to infer from the case law that in cases where the difference in 
treatment results from choices made by undertakings, provided that all options 
were available to all undertakings, a finding of State aid cannot be supported.250 The 
case law relied on by the ECJ in World Duty Free in this part of its analysis concerned 
measures that were either purely or primarily sectoral, despite the fact that some 
non-sectoral undertakings could also benefit from them.251 It is true, as Traversa 
notes, that general measures can be applied selectively,252 which, could arguably 
be the case here, as small companies would probably be less likely to invest than 
larger ones,253 but such an assessment is not present in the ECJ’s analysis. Instead, 
what this analysis betrays is unwarranted formalism. Instead of examining the 
generality of the application of the measure, which would be more in line with the 
effects-based approach, the ECJ focused on its form. It was essentially enough to 
show that the measure was a derogation from the reference framework,254 
regardless of the actual general applicability of the measure based on its conditions 
and effects. Specifically, the ECJ stated that the condition of selectivity is satisfied 
when the Commission “is able to demonstrate that that measure is a derogation 
from the ordinary or ‘normal’ tax system applicable”,255 with no further discussion. 
There are examples of the logic permeating the World Duty Free judgment 
being applied to other cases, without the (warranted) controversy that followed this 
particular judgment.256 In Commission v Italy, the General Court held that simply 
because a measure (in that case a reduction in excise duty paid for diesel) was open 
to all undertakings that chose to operate greenhouses, that did not mean it was not 
selective, as the agricultural producers that did operate greenhouses were in a 
comparable legal and factual situation with those that did not.257 The same 
conclusion was reached in Fineco Asset Management, where the advantages 
accruing from specialised investment vehicles were conditional on a specific legal 
form.258 The same principle can also be found in Diputación Foral de Álava, where 
a tax credit available to any undertaking investing more than 2.5 billion pesetas in 
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the region “in fixed assets”, differentiated between the companies that could do so, 
and those that did not have the money for it.259 In all of those cases however, the 
contested measures created a differentiation ex ante; it was clear from the outset 
that only a number of undertakings could conceivably satisfy them, based on their 
inherent characteristics, as opposed to all undertakings that would be in a 
comparable situation. This arguably sets those judgments apart from World Duty 
Free and means that this particular judgment represents a significant evolution of 
the case law.  
The World Duty Free formulation can practically give rise to a very wide 
reading of the second step of the criterion of selectivity. This is not helped by the 
fact that, as seen above, the first step is also quite wide, and open to interpretation. 
Equally, the objectives under which the comparability analysis is to be undertaken 
have also been widened. Of course, as academics and commentators have pointed 
out, an extensively broad reading of the first two steps of the test can lead to a 
situation where every deviation from the reference framework is deemed to be 
selective, and therefore, prima facie, contra legem.260 As AG Geelhoed pointed out 
in GIL Insurance, a broad interpretation of selectivity “would be to extend the 
substantive scope of the prohibition on State aid far beyond the limits contemplated 
by the framers of the Treaty”.261 The role of selectivity as a concept is arguably 
undermined by the World Duty Free logic. Maintaining a meaningful selectivity 
criterion, especially in relation to the distinction between general measures and 
selective ones is essential to ensure that Article 107(1) does not become a vehicle 
for tax harmonisation, but instead maintains its objective of prohibiting distortive 
aid.262 
Based on the Spanish Goodwill saga, it is argued that this judgment 
misapplied the law on general measures. It introduced an element of “behavioural” 
selectivity, where the factor determining whether there has been a differentiation of 
treatment between recipients and comparable non-recipients is based solely on the 
behaviour of those two groups; the two groups are defined based on their 
behaviour. The transformation of the law on general measures is of particular 
interest when placed in the context of this behavioural selectivity. The effects of this 
extensive widening of the second step of the selectivity analysis signalled with this 
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judgment cannot be foretold, but it arguably looks like the scope of fiscal aid, where 
the remaining four conditions exist around selectivity, has been blown wide open. 
e. Conclusion 
This section as a whole has looked at the comparability analysis which forms 
the base of the second step of the selectivity test. First of all, this analysis needs to 
be undertaken in light of the objectives of the system or the measure; the case law 
is unclear on this issue, demonstrating how uncertainties from the first step of the 
analysis can spill over into the second. This is especially true if the objectives 
deemed relevant are those of the reference framework. Secondly, the actual 
element of comparability also has free-flowing limits, as those are defined by the 
first part of the analysis of the second step. It is submitted that the comparability 
analysis, as it emerges from the case law, is limited by one crucial factor, namely the 
reference framework, as only those undertakings which are subject to the same 
legal framework can be said to be actually comparable.263 It is also important to note 
that the comparability analysis needs to take into account a wide range of elements, 
as shown in Paint Graphos or ANGED, in order to be substantive and avoid 
becoming a mere box-ticking exercise. All this points to the malleable width of the 
second step of the analysis, which seems to have been extended further by the 
Spanish Goodwill saga. Thus, this section has shown the influence the first step can 
have on the second, and how the combination of the two can result in an 
exceedingly wide notion of fiscal selectivity. 
IV. Step Three 
So far, this Chapter has discussed the two first steps, which establish whether 
a measure is prima facie selective. As has been shown thus far, those two initial steps 
are subject to a wide, and arguably widening, interpretation, meaning that prima 
facie selectivity is increasingly easy to establish. As such, it is now necessary to 
examine the third step, and the potential justification of a selective measure. 
The third, and final, step of the selectivity test deals with the justification of 
the contested, prima facie, selective measure. It must be determined whether the 
prima facie selectivity of the measure can be justified on the basis of the logic of the 
system. This notion of justification was introduced by the ECJ in the form of an obiter 
dictum in Italy v Commission.264 The principle of justification has been reaffirmed 
several times, and has repeatedly found expression in the CJEU’s jurisprudence.265 
It is worth noting that Member States bear the burden of proof; it is for them to 
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demonstrate that the measure in question can be reasonably justified as intrinsic to 
the nature or structure of the tax frame of reference, or that it results from the 
guiding principles of the tax system.266 As such, in Concello de Ferrol, an attempted 
justification on the grounds of national defence was unsuccessful, as it was not 
related to the objectives of property tax.267 In Netherlands Maritime it was held that 
a “rational justification”, understood as the “economic rationale” of a given measure, 
if it relates to the functioning and effectiveness of the tax system, can be allowed as 
a part of the justification analysis.268  
In Paint Graphos, a requirement of proportionality was introduced into the 
third step of selectivity,269 as well as requirement for that proportional nature to be 
monitored,270 presumably to ensure the continued proportionality of the 
measure.271 Additionally, Paint Graphos clarified that only intrinsic considerations 
can lead to justification.272 The contested measure thus needs to be consistent with 
and proportional to those intrinsic aims.273 As Micheau observes, proportionality in 
the context of State aid is used exclusively in the justification phase of the analysis, 
and thus cannot be applied to assess the derogation.274 Even with this limited scope, 
the requirement for proportionality has not been (often) reiterated, as Buendia 
Sierra points out.275 Nonetheless, proportionality is occasionally mentioned as part 
of the justification process.276 
Given that only intrinsic considerations can be successful, it is important to 
illustrate the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic considerations as they apply 
to justifications. There is no closed list of accepted intrinsic objectives, but rather an 
open one developed through the jurisprudence of the CJEU. Even with objectives 
that have in the past been found to be intrinsic to the logic of the system, such as 
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social security,277 environmental protection,278 or equal treatment, the Courts still 
need to examine the details of each case.279 For example, in Adria-Wien, the Court 
found that the environmental objectives underlying the measure could not justify 
the difference in treatment entailed in the measure.280 Protectionist objectives, such 
as improving or safeguarding competitiveness in a given sector, cannot be 
accepted as intrinsic to the logic of the tax system, as they relate to economic policy, 
rather than the nature or logic of the tax system, and therefore are extrinsic to the 
system.281 The case law therefore shows that even recognised intrinsic 
considerations cannot always justify a selective measure, and the actual justification 
of such a measure will depend on the circumstances of the case. This is rational, 
following from the fact that justifications need to be examined in the context of the 
logic of a given system, which changes with each given system examined.  
Certain tax-specific objectives have been found to be intrinsic to the logic of 
the system. It is important to stress that those look at the logic of the tax system, and 
not at the logic or the objectives of the executive passing the relevant tax 
legislation.282 A measure which is necessarily part of the “inseparable whole” of the 
tax system is in line with its logic, and therefore justifiable.283 Therefore, the effective 
functioning of a national tax system is an important part of the justification analysis, 
which can be taken to mean that ensuring that effectiveness would be an acceptable 
objective justification.284 Avoiding double taxation has been found to be a valid 
basis for justification,285 as well as preventing fiscal abuse.286 Taxable capacity, or 
more commonly the ability to pay, forms part of the basis of the entire tax system, 
and as such can be used as a justification.287 The progressivity of tax, and the 
redistribution of generated revenue, in the context of income taxation have also 
been accepted as justifications.288 However, similar redistributive considerations 
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were not sufficient to justify a Portuguese measure, as the scope of the measure was 
too wide.289 Finally, the 2016 Notice and the 1998 Notice also set out some tax-
specific intrinsic justifications.290 However, even an accepted fiscal objective does 
not guarantee that a measure will be justified, as the measure’s proportionality is 
also relevant,291 as are the specifics of a given case and a given system.  
In effect, considering the importance the case law on potential justifications 
places on the system’s consistency, it is possible, given the Courts’ and the 
Commission’s recognition of specific systemically inherent fiscal justifications, to 
argue that an element of fiscal coherence is present. Systemic consistency is 
generally an important element of fiscal selectivity,292 meaning that such a 
consideration could be present in the final step of the analysis. It has been 
suggested that fiscal State aid, in order to maintain its effect-based outlook in 
relation to taxation, needs to draw from tax law principles,293 and this approach 
follows from that observation, especially given that arguably the logic of the 
inherent tax-specific justifications is indeed at least conceptually linked to this 
concept of systemic cohesion.294 Given that tax-specific justifications have been 
accepted, and bearing in mind the requirement of proportionality present in this 
step of the selectivity test, it is submitted that fiscal coherence is also present, if 
unnamed.295 Fiscal coherence ensures that the measures to be justified flow from 
the logic of the system and are proportional to that logic. A fiscal coherence outlook 
in this step would ensure a degree of systemic symmetry, relating to the symmetrical 
nature of certain advantages and certain disadvantages, or the suspension of anti-
abuse rules such as loss forfeiture in instances where abuse cannot take place. The 
excessive widening of the first two steps of the selectivity analysis will arguably 
increase the importance of the third step of the analysis.296 In order to maintain a 
functional distinction between selective effects and those flowing from the 
application of an internally consistent, coherent system, and in the interest of 
maintaining the scope of the fiscal aid prohibition, the notion of fiscal coherence 
should be employed more overtly in the justification step of the test. After all, the 
effectiveness of the system is closely linked to its internal consistency and 
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coherence, or “economic rationale”,297 meaning that it would not be alien to the 
case law. Accepting such a fiscal coherence justification would be another step, 
alongside the emergence of the holistic approach for the determination of the 
reference framework, towards the adoption of a more fiscal outlook in fiscal aid 
cases, which recognises the inherent complexities and peculiarities of taxation. 
This section has discussed the third step of the selectivity analysis. In this step, 
the burden of proof is reversed, which is particularly relevant in the context of the 
width of the first two steps.298 Measures whose existence can be proven to be 
necessary for the effective functioning of the tax system, and which have, in this 
context, an economic rationale, will in principle be deemed to be justified. However, 
a justification will need to be intrinsic to the system and adhere to the principle of 
proportionality in order to be able to be successful. In this context, tax-specific 
justifications have been recognised. In practical terms, therefore there is little to no 
systematisation, which arguably follows from the inconsistencies present in the first 
two steps, which to an extent inform the material content of the justification analysis. 
The fact that tax principles have been used as bases for justification, as illustrated 
above, could prove to be very interesting in the future, if the regulatory technique 
of Member States came to stretch the third step of the analysis as well, in response 
perhaps to the widening of the first two steps. In this context, the notion of fiscal 
coherence could prove very helpful, both by protecting Member States from an 
ever-expanding notion of aid, and by ensuring that regulatory technique cannot be 
used to create a justification out of thin air. 
V. Conclusion 
This Chapter has looked at the notion of fiscal selectivity, by examining each 
of the three limbs of the well-established test.299 First of all, throughout this analysis, 
it is apparent that the three-step approach and its formulation are alive and well, 
despite “discrimination” becoming more relevant in the context of selectivity,300 and 
despite the notion itself being widened. As such, the core of the fiscal selectivity 
analysis still requires the identification of a reference framework, based on which, 
via derogation or design, some undertakings are favoured when compared to 
others which are in a similar legal and factual situation in light of the objectives of 
the measure, the system, or the reference framework. Such a difference in treatment 
establishes prima facie selectivity, which can be reversed, if the granting State can 
show that the contested measure or scheme results from the logic of the system or 
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is justified by it. It is clear that the first two steps have been widened considerably, 
while entire general systems, as well as general measures, can be deemed selective 
by adjudging their effects under this exceedingly wide construct. It is also possible 
to argue that there are elements of the selectivity analysis that struggle with fiscal 
cases, or at the very least with fiscal elements of cases.  
In brief, the application of the selectivity criterion to fiscal cases is obviously 
messy, and the case law does not make things much clearer. The case law is far from 
settled, in fact it is fragmented, as Merola points out.301 A particular problem, 
observed by commentators, is that the ECJ has the tendency to overrule General 
Court judgments that attempt to narrow the focus of the concept of selectivity,302 
and arguably ends up expanding the concept of selectivity a bit more with every 
repudiation of the General Court’s approaches. The rigidity, and on occasion the 
formalism, of the ECJ’s approach forces the General Court to apply an unsatisfactory 
legal regime.303 Thus, we end up with a vague regime,304 based on unclear and 
occasionally conflicting analytical approaches, as evidenced by the discrepancies in 
the case law. There is no agreement as to how wide the “general system” is, the 
“comparable legal and factual situation” is equally ambiguous, with an increasingly 
wider reading of that step becoming the norm, while the final step depends on the 
individual circumstances of each case. In fact, it appears that, since the established 
law allows for some latitude, all three steps depend, to an increasing extent, on the 
merits of each individual case,305 with subjective approaches becoming more 
common,306 arguably eroding the objective nature of the concept of aid. At the 
same time, the three-step formulation of the test is universal, and not challenged. 
Based on the case law, the Commission’s decisional practice, and the soft law 
applicable to State aids, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the concept of 
selectivity, especially when it comes to fiscal cases is becoming increasingly wide;307 
to the point where only a few measures can escape its reach.308 Equally, Lang 
observes that the reading of selectivity offered by the ECJ in Gibraltar is very wide, 
to the extent that it can theoretically allow the Commission to pursue its own policy 
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aims under the auspices of the State aid prohibition.309 The same view is echoed by 
Romariz,310 and Perez-Bernabeu,311 while Micheau also seems to concur.312 It has 
also been suggested that the concept of selectivity risks becoming as wide as the 
notoriously broad criteria of distortion of competition and effect on trade.313 Given 
however that, as the previous sentence attests, some of the conditions of fiscal aid 
are already excessively wide,314 such a broad reading of fiscal selectivity can be 
troublesome. 
This relates to the importance of selectivity, as it is the crux of State aid law. 
This is because it is relevant to all cases, its inherent logic is linked with the notion 
of aid itself, and its application cannot be frustrated by regulatory technique.315 AG 
Kokott, in her Opinion in Finanzamt Linz, observed that selectivity is the decisive 
criterion of the existence of (fiscal) aid.316 Similarly, AG Geelhoed in his Opinion in 
GIL Insurance, explained that taking a wide view of selectivity would be tantamount 
to extending “the substantive scope of the prohibition on State aid”.317 In this 
context, he argued that such expansive readings of selectivity may reduce the 
Member States’ ability to use taxation as a policy instrument, or even remove some 
Treaty-assigned competences from them.318 Nicolaides makes a similar argument, 
based on the fact that tax systems, by design, will tend to include exceptions of 
general application, due to taxation’s inherent role as a multifaceted policy 
instrument.319  
To illustrate this point, let us consider the example of the Spanish Goodwill 
saga. On the one hand, the more famous line of cases dealt with reliefs for 
undertakings acquiring shares in EU-based companies, which were found to be 
contra legem.320 On the other hand, a similar measure providing the same reliefs for 
extra-EU investments was struck down by the General Court in Sigma Alimentos.321 
If Spain had attempted to introduce a similar relief measure for acquisitions in 
domestic companies, the judgment of the ECJ in Finanzamt Linz, where the Court 
dealt with an Austrian Goodwill scheme, strongly suggests that such a measure 
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would also be legally problematic, from the perspective of the fundamental 
freedoms.322 Thus, it appears that only a replacement of the general system of 
taxation could escape fiscal State aid control, while any minor tweak would invite 
the Commission’s and the Courts’ scrutiny, arguably limiting or at the very least 
making harder the exercise of the Member States’ fiscal competences. AG Maduro 
also expressed concerns that the excessive widening of State aid rules could mean 
that all economic policy decisions taken by Member States could fall within the 
scope of the State aid prohibition, especially if general measures are within the 
scope of selectivity.323 Such an application of the rules, he maintained, would not be 
in line with the rationale of the concept of State aid and its role within EU 
competition law.324  
In this light it is true that a plausible reading of the current understanding of 
fiscal selectivity is that any difference in the treatment of undertakings can lead to 
the conclusion that the contested measure creates a difference in treatment among 
undertakings in a comparable situation, making it prima facie selective.325 This is 
especially true if the reference framework itself is excessively wide,326 as the limits of 
the “comparable situation” are themselves expanded. In this context, it is clear that 
the scope of fiscal selectivity has been significantly widened. It is equally clear that 
a wide concept of selectivity can limit Member States’ fiscal sovereignty. The case 
law discussed in this Chapter shows that even general measures are not necessarily 
outside of the scope of fiscal selectivity. This is particularly important, as selectivity 
performs an important function in relation to the scope of State aid and its internal 
rationale by delineating what is deemed to be preferential treatment.327 The 
 
322 Case C-66/14 Finanzamt Linz v Bundesfinanzgericht, Außenstelle Linz ECLI:EU:C:2015:661, para 
54. In general, one of the primary concerns of the internal market and the law guaranteeing its 
existence is the removal of nationality-based discrimination. Essentially, EU law requires that national 
tax legislation does not create directly or indirectly discriminatory obstacles to economic activity. 
This includes covert discrimination, which by the application of other criteria of differentiation has 
the same effects as overt or direct discrimination. Discrimination is defined in the case law as the 
application of different rules to comparable situations, or the application of the same rules to 
objectively different situations, and covers tax legislation which may deter, discourage, dissuade, or 
restrict the exercise of the fundamental freedoms, or place non-nationals at a disadvantage in the 
pursuit of economic activity. See: Case C-330/91 The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex 
parte Commerzbank AG ECLI:EU:C:1993:303, paras 14-15, 19; Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc v Elliniko Dimosio ECLI:EU:C:1999:216, para 26; Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v 
David Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) ECLI:EU:C:2005:763, para 31; Case C-345/05 
Commission v Portugal ECLI:EU:C:2006:685, para 15; Case C-311/08 Société de Gestion Industrielle 
(SGI) v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:2010:26, para 50; Case C-303/12 Guido Imfeld and Nathalie Garcet 
v État belge ECLI:EU:C:2013:822, paras 52-53; Case C-296/12 Commission v Belgium 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:24, para 31; Case C-385/12 Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- 
és Vámhivatal Közép-dunántúli Regionális Adó Főigazgatósága ECLI:EU:C:2014:47, para 30; Case 
C-48/13 Nordea Bank Danmark A/S v Skatteministeriet ECLI:EU:C:2014:2087, para 22 
323 Enirisorse Opinion of AG Maduro (n 3), para 45  
324 Ibidem, para 46 
325 Prek and Lefèvre (n 260), 341 
326 Micheau ‘Legal Assessment and Alternative Approaches’ (n 16), 337 
327 Enirisorse Opinion of AG Maduro (n 3), para 49 
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widening of the notion of selectivity, and its application in the case law, in turn 
means that it can no longer perform the essential task of differentiating between 
preferential and general measures.328 Additionally, the widening of individual 
components of the selectivity test like the reference framework can impact the 
assessment of the existence of an advantage, as to an extent the “normal” market 
conditions in which the latter is to analysed are based on that framework. In effect, 
the reference framework to an extent determines the rule of which the “normal” 
application is to be assessed. 
Thus, it is clear from the outset that the scope of fiscal selectivity influences 
the scope of fiscal aid in general, and can influence the application of other criteria 
of aid. However, the following Chapters of Part I will demonstrate that selectivity is 
far more important in fiscal cases, as it defines the scope of fiscal State aid itself, due 
to the limitations or internal logic of the remaining criteria in relation to taxation. 
Thus, a wide concept of fiscal selectivity translates into a wide scope for the fiscal 
State aid prohibition in general, which becomes (even more) problematic in the 
context of the limitations of the compatibility regime discussed in the previous 
Chapter. In brief therefore, the excessive widening of the notion of fiscal selectivity 
analysed in this Chapter represents at the same time an excessive widening of the 
scope of aid itself. This is particularly troublesome, as the system of fiscal aid itself 
is becoming overreaching, potentially significantly limiting Member States’ ability 
to conduct policy through their tax system – as all policy Decisions effected through 
the fiscal regime can fall within the scope of selectivity.329 Equally, due to the central 
role of selectivity and the fact that the remaining criteria do not provide normative 
limitations to the scope of fiscal aid, there is no obvious obstacle to the ceaseless 
expansion of the scope of selectivity and therefore fiscal aid. As the components of 
the selectivity test change and become wider, it is important to remember AG 
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The Notion of Fiscal Advantage 
I. Introduction 
The notion of advantage is, in practical terms, perhaps the most 
straightforward of the five conditions of State aid. It effectively refers to the benefit 
or favourable treatment reserved to the beneficiaries of the aid. Arguably, the 
presence of an advantage is the starting point of the State aid analysis.1 The other 
four conditions in effect look at the characteristics of that advantage – its selectivity, 
its distortive potential, and whether it is granted via State resources. Despite this, 
the advantage criterion rarely receives a lot of attention in fiscal State aid cases, 
despite its relevance in general State aid.2 Before discussing the specific application 
of the notion of advantage in fiscal cases, it is necessary to make some preliminary 
remarks. First of all, it should be noted that, as is the case with selectivity, the precise 
form of the measure is irrelevant.3 What is of importance, and what is examined, is 
the effect of the measure.4 As a result, a measure cannot fall outside the scope of 
Article 107(1) TFEU solely on the merits of its objectives, while on the other hand, a 
non-advantageous or commercially sound measure that also promotes a political 
aim, will not be found to be aid solely because of said political aim. 
This Chapter will first look at the general concept of advantage, and its 
application and relationship with fiscal measures. It will then briefly discuss the 
Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP), looking at its importance within the 
concept of advantage while also examining the characteristics of the hypothetical 
comparable market economy operator. Following this, an analysis of the 
applicability of the MEOP to fiscal cases, and to cases where the exercise of State 
authority forms an integral part of the measure will be undertaken, leading to an 
examination of its application to fiscal cases. Finally, this Chapter will address the 
allocation of the burden of proof, and the requisite standard of proof inherent in the 
analysis of the MEOP, and the notion of advantage in general. Throughout, this 
Chapter will aim to demonstrate the differences between the notion of advantage 
in fiscal cases as opposed to non-fiscal cases, the issues that the MEOP, the main 
analytical tool of this notion, faces in relation to fiscal cases, and the importance of 




1 See for example: Case C-15/14 P Commission v MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt Opinion of AG 
Wahl ECLI:EU:C:2015:32, para 47. See also: Peter J Wattel, ‘Comparing Criteria: State Aid, Free 
Movement, Harmful Tax Competition and Market Distorting Disparities’ in I Richelle, W Schön, E 
Traversa (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 2016), 61-62 
2 See for example: Case 323/82 Intermills v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1984:345, paras 29-31 
3 Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg ECLI:EU:C:2003:415, para 84 
4 Case 173/73 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1974:71, para 13 
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II. Concept of Advantage  
The notion of advantage is, in fiscal cases, closely linked to the notion of 
selectivity, since the existence of an advantage can only be assessed upon a 
comparison with the frame of reference. In general, an “advantage”, for the 
purposes of Article 107(1), means “any economic benefit which an undertaking 
would not have obtained under normal market conditions”.5 The frame of reference 
in effect defines those “normal” market conditions. More broadly, an advantage is 
any measure that mitigates the charges usually applicable to the budget of an 
undertaking,6 as it has the same effect as a direct subsidy.7 This serves to stress that 
the effects of the measure in question are the focus of the analysis of the existence 
of an advantage,8 regardless of the measure’s aims or causes, and with no regard 
for the regulatory technique employed.9  
In relation to tax, the “normal” market conditions, or the mitigation of 
charges, will have to be assessed based on the reference framework, as it 
represents the normal conditions for other comparable undertakings.10 As a result, 
a fiscal advantage can in many cases be presumed by virtue of selectivity being 
present.11 For example, a tax exemption confers an economic advantage to the 
recipient undertaking, as it mitigates the charges that would, in normal market 
conditions, be borne by that undertaking.12 However, the potentially beneficial 
application of normal rules does not confer an advantage.13 This showcases the 
limits of the notion, and the importance of the “normal market conditions” or the 
“usually” applicable charges; the application of rules on, for example, bankruptcy 
or the repayment of charges irregularly collected is indeed in line with normal 
market conditions, and does not mitigate any charges usually applicable.14 Jaeger 
 
5 Case C-39/94 SFEI and Others v La Poste and others ECLI:EU:C:1999:116, para 60 
6 Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España v Ayuntamiento de Valencia ECLI:EU:C:1994:100, para 
13; Case C-6/97 Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1999:251, para 15 
7 Case C-74/16 Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v Ayuntamiento de Getafe 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:496, paras 65-66; Joined Cases C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P Bouygues and 
Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others EU:C:2013:175, 
para 101 
8 Case C-522/13 Ministerio de Defensa and Navantia SA v Concello de Ferrol ECLI:EU:C:2014:2262, 
para 21 
9 Case C-203/16 P Dirk Andres (faillite Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2018:505, 
para 91; Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, paras 87, 92-93 
10 Case C-501/00 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:438, para 115 
11 Case C-66/02 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2005:768, para 78; Joined cases C-393/04 and C-
41/05 Air Liquide Industries Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2006:403, para 30 
12 Concello de Ferrol (n 8), para 27-29 
13 Case C-200/97 Ecotrade v Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola ECLI:EU:C:1998:579, para 36; Case C-
480/98 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:559, para 18; Case 61/79 Amministrazione delle 




argues that this generally reductive reasoning makes the advantage analysis of fiscal 
cases devoid of substance.15  
As AG Tizzano stated, a failure to levy tax is not necessarily tantamount to the 
granting of an advantage, but rather a “solution must be sought on a case by case 
basis, with regard being had to the particular circumstances of the case”.16 This is 
perfectly in line with the notion of advantage, as the normal market conditions 
element of it suggests. In this context, it is important to make the distinction 
between the advantage obtained, and the benefit which the recipients derived from 
said advantage,17 as the recipient and the beneficiary of an advantage need not be 
the same.18 Additionally, if there are two rates, a “normal” one and a higher one, 
those taxpayers who pay the lower one are not in fact receiving an advantage,19 as 
an advantage is defined based on normal taxation. This additionally means that the 
undertakings paying the higher rate cannot rely on State aid to get out of their 
liabilities.20 Furthermore, contrary to the formulation seen above that any mitigation 
of charges will be seen as an advantage, in certain cases dealing with structural 
disadvantages the CJEU has been willing to recognise that the mitigation of those 
specific charges, stemming from the disadvantage, does not constitute an 
advantage.21 Based on the case law, it seems that for this line of thought to apply a 
“dual derogation” is necessary, which means that the disadvantage to be redressed 
needs to be itself a derogation.22 This limits the scope of application of this atypical 
exemption. 
Despite the similarities that may exist between the notions of advantage and 
selectivity as they apply to tax, and the tendency to get them mixed up, it is 
important that they remain separate, as they are two separate criteria, requiring two 
separate analyses. This is important for the soundness of the analysis involved in 
 
15 Thomas Jaeger, ‘Tax Measures’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck 
Hart Nomos 2016), para 75  
16 Case C-53/00 Ferring SA v Agence centrale des organismes de sécurité sociale Opinion of AG 
Tizzano ECLI:EU:C:2001:253, para 39 
17 Joined Cases C-164/15 P and C-165/15 P Commission v Aer Lingus and Ryanair 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:990, paras 101, 115 
18 Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2000:467, para 27; Case C-128/16 P 
Commission v Spain and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:591, paras 45-46 
19 Case C-308/01 GIL Insurance Ltd and Others v Commissioners of Customs & Excise 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:252, para 76 
20 Joined cases C-266/04 to C-270/04, C-276/04 and C-321/04 to C-325/04 Nazairdis SAS, now 
Distribution Casino France SAS and Others v Caisse nationale de l'organisation autonome 
d'assurance vieillesse des travailleurs non salariés des professions industrielles et commerciales 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:657, paras 43-44; Air Liquide (n 11), para 43 
21 Case C-237/04 Enirisorse SpA v Sotacarbo SpA ECLI:EU:C:2006:197, paras 47-49; Case T-157/01 
Danske Busvognmænd v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2004:76, para 57 
22 Case C-211/15 P Orange v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2016:798, paras 25-26. See also: Adrien Giraud 
and Sylvain Petit, ‘The French Pension Case: The Defence Based on Compensation of Structural 
Disadvantages Consigned to Oblivion’ (2017) 16 European State Aid Law Quarterly 82 
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both criteria, and as a recognition that they perform different roles within the realm 
of fiscal State aid control. This position can be supported by MOL Magyar, where 
the ECJ clearly stated that “the requirement as to selectivity under Article 107(1) 
TFEU must be clearly distinguished from the concomitant detection of an economic 
advantage”.23 AG Wahl, whose Opinion the Court followed, went further, stating 
that the “requirement as to selectivity […] of the measure must be clearly 
distinguished from the detection of an economic advantage. In other words, once 
an advantage, understood in a broad sense, has been identified as arising directly 
or indirectly from a particular measure, it is then for the Commission to establish 
that that advantage is specifically directed at one or more undertakings”.24 Thus, the 
existence of an advantage is the starting point of the State aid analysis.25 Only if an 
advantage is selective will it be deemed to confer State aid.  
Maintaining the distinction between selectivity and advantage in this context 
becomes paramount, even if “normal” market conditions are defined based on the 
reference framework utilised in the selectivity analysis. The formal and strict 
distinction is important because if selectivity were to be merged with the notion of 
advantage, or replace it, it would then necessarily become the starting point of the 
State aid analysis. In turn, this would mean that the structure and rationale of the 
State aid prohibition would be altered, as it would no longer revolve around the 
existence of an advantage but would depend on differential treatment, very broadly 
construed as evidenced by the preceding Chapter. Focusing on the differential 
treatment as opposed to its actual effects (the benefit derived) would first of all 
depart from the effect-based approach, and would potentially make the existence 
of aid incumbent on regulatory technique. Despite this need for a clear distinction 
between the two notions, the Court has held that in cases of individual aid, the 
identification of an advantage would, in principle be sufficient to presume that said 
advantage is also selective.26 However, this presumption is and should remain 
strictly limited to instances of individual grants of aid, meaning that the presumption 
would stem from the individual character of the aid as opposed to the existence of 
an advantage.27 A general presumption that the existence of an advantage is 
sufficient for selectivity to be assumed would be problematic or even inappropriate 
in the examination of fiscal cases, as in fiscal cases selectivity is the decisive 
 
23 Case C-15/14 P Commission v MOL Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyrt ECLI:EU:C:2015:362, para 59 
24 MOL Magyar Opinion of AG Wahl (n 1), para 47 
25 Wolfgang Schön, ‘Tax Legislation and the Notion of Fiscal Aid: A Review of 5 Years of European 
Jurisprudence’ in I Richelle, W Schön, E Traversa (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 
2016), 12, 16-17; Wattel (n 1), 61-64 
26 MOL Magyar (n 23), para 60 
27 See for example: Richard Lyal, ‘Transfer Pricing Rules and State Aid’ (2015) 38 Fordham 
International Law Journal 38 1017, 1042 
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criterion,28 meaning that the scope of fiscal State aid would be substantially widened 
and become little more than an economic analysis.  
In short, the notion of advantage is preoccupied with economic benefits not 
obtainable in normal market conditions, or the mitigation of normally applicable 
charges. This basic formulation is functional enough to catch advantages passed on 
from the recipient, and flexible enough to (potentially) allow for structural 
disadvantages to be redressed. Nonetheless, when it comes to purely fiscal 
measures, despite this relative flexibility, the application of the notion of advantage 
can be relatively basic, as any departure from normal conditions will usually lead to 
at least charges being mitigated. In this context, it becomes clear that in general the 
notions of fiscal (prima facie) selectivity and fiscal advantage seem to be subject to 
very similar test: finding the frame of reference/normal market conditions and then 
finding a derogation/deviation from it; even though the two notions and tests must 
be distinguished. Beyond this basic position, the notion of advantage encompasses 
a Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP), which although of limited use to 
fiscal cases, needs to be discussed. 
III. The Market Economy Operator Principle 
The MEOP adds more substance to the analysis of the advantage criterion, 
by looking at the actual economic conditions in which it is granted. As the 
Commission mentions in its 2016 Notice on the Notion of Aid (the 2016 Notice), by 
virtue of Article 345 TFEU, State aid law is “neutral with regard to the system of 
property ownership”.29 This, as Arhold suggests, is the basis of the logic behind the 
MEOP.30 In order for State aid rules to remain neutral, they have to allow public 
undertakings to operate in the market, while also being subject to the same rules as 
private undertakings. This balance is expressed through the MEOP, which in effect 
means that an advantage would be present if a Member State treats an undertaking 
in a different way than a private operator would.31 Through several cases,32 it was 
 
28 Case C-66/14 Finanzamt Linz v Bundesfinanzgericht, Außenstelle Linz Opinion of AG Kokott 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:242, paras 114-115; Liz Lovdahl Gormsen, ‘EU State Aid Law and Transfer Pricing: 
A Critical Introduction to a New Saga’ (2016) 7 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 
369, 374-375; Kyle Richard, ‘Are All Tax Rulings State Aid: Examining the European Commission’s 
Recent State Aid Decisions’ (2018) 18 Houston Business and Tax Law Journal 1, 17; Saturnina 
Moreno Gonzalez, ‘State Aid and Tax Competition: Comments on the European Commission's 
Decisions on Transfer Pricing Rulings’ (2016) 15 European State Aid Law Quarterly 556, 566 
29 Commission Notice on the notion of State Aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C 262/01, para 73 
30 Christoph Arhold, Viktor Kreuschitz, Franz Jürgen Säcker, Ulrich Soltesz, Michael Shuette, Andreas 
Schwab, ‘Article 107 TFEU’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck Hart 
Nomos 2016), para 154  
31 Joined cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission Opinion of AG Jacobs 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:112, para 28 
32 Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:142, paras 18-19; Case T-16/96 Cityflyer 
Express v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1998:78, para 51; Joined Cases T-129/95, T-2/96 and T-97/96 
Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke and Lech-Stahlwerke v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1999:7, para 104 
81 
 
established that the actions of the State as an economic operator should be looked 
at comparatively with the actions of private economic operators in a situation as 
similar as possible, since the principle’s objective is to scrutinise the actions of the 
State. In other words, it is necessary to assess whether, in a similar set of 
circumstances, a private economic actor operating in normal conditions could have 
been prompted to make the intervention in question. 
The MEOP started being formulated as a concept related to State aid in the 
1980s,33 through a combination of soft law,34 AG Opinions,35 and a handful of 
cases.36 The basic underlying principle of the MEOP is the necessity to properly 
distinguish between the capacity of the State in its entrepreneurial activities and its 
granting of subsidies for the purposes of the State aid control, which can achieved 
via a comparison to a hypothetical market operator.37 As a result, the MEOP became 
part of the notion of advantage (and is thus focused on effects38), effectively 
providing a more case-sensitive benchmark. The MEOP allows an economically 
rational intervention which is in line with the hypothetical actions of a private 
operator to avoid being classified as aid, allowing the State to participate in the 
economy, without being able to play favourites or otherwise distort competition in 
the context of State aid law. 
The MEOP has evolved and grown in sophistication. Even though it started 
as an “investor” principle, it has grown to encompass more types of economic 
activities. It still remains one unitary principle, with multiple iterations.39 The 
typology of those iterations is not limited. In the Commission’s 2016 Notice, the 
principle appears under the heading “Market Economy Operator Test”, as it 
encompasses more and more scenarios, including a “private creditor test”,40 and a 
“private vendor test”.41 As Arhold suggests, the MEOP can take various forms, 
 
33 Aindrias O’ Caoimh and Wolf Sauter, ‘Criterion of Advantage’ in H Hofmann and C Micheau (eds), 
State Aid Law of the European Union (OUP 2016), 105-107 
34 Secretariat General, Bulletin of the European Communities: No 9 (1984 Volume 17), 93-95 
35 Case C-323/82 Intermills v Commission Opinion of AG VerLoren van Themaat 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:260, 3847; Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission Opinion of AG Lenz 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:151, 2270; Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission Opinion of AG Lenz 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:152, 2328 
36 Case 234/84 Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1986:302, para 14; Case 40/85 Belgium v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1986:305, para 13 
37 Ibidem, para 14; para 13, respectively; Belgium v Commission Opinion of AG Lenz (n 35), 2270-
2271; Belgium v Commission Opinion of AG Lenz (n 35), 2328-2329 
38 Case C-56/93 Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1996:64, paras 78-79; Joined Cases C-214/12 P, 
C-215/12 P, C-223/12 P Land Burgenland and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2013:682, paras 48-
50; European Commission, XXIXth Report on Competition Policy (SEC(2000) 720 FINAL 1999), para 
224 
39 Case C-256/97 Déménagements-Manutention Transport SA (DMT) Opinion of AG Jacobs 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:436, para 35. See also: Albert Sanchez Graells, ‘Bringing the "Market Economy 
Agent" Principle to Full Power’ (2012) 33 European Competition Law Review 35 




beyond those in the 2016 Notice.42 For example, the State can be compared to a 
“private lender”,43 a “private creditor”,44 a “private supplier/service provider”,45 a 
“private purchaser”,46 and a “private vendor”.47 Following the logic of the concept 
of advantage, any transaction that produces a result departing from normal market 
conditions, defined as the acts of a MEO, would fail to satisfy the MEOP, regardless 
of the specific nature of the transaction. However, if a State intervention is in line 
with the acts of a MEO, it will be deemed to have been carried out in normal market 
conditions, meaning that the advantage criterion will not be satisfied. The MEOP 
necessitates an actual comparison to establish whether a given measure conforms 
to market conditions, resulting in a multitude of possible iterations, but as stated 
above, its internal logic is unitary. In this context, and since the MEOP is an integral 
part of the notion of advantage,48 it is worth briefly considering the characteristics 
of a market operator who is to be compared to the State. 
Through the evolution of the concept, it emerges that the hypothetical 
operator is construed as being prudent and efficient, utilising the most appropriate 
means available.49 The MEO has also been described as reasonable, stable, and 
ordinary,50 and is generally recognised to be profit-motivated and not concerned 
with policy aims.51 In this context, when the State acts as an investor, it is not bound 
to pursue the most lucrative investment, but it cannot forgo a clear profit-making 
opportunity.52 Arguably, any profitable intervention, or profitable enough to entice 
a private operator, could thus satisfy the MEOP.53 The operator should also be 
 
42 Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, Schwab (n 30), paras 168-229 
43 Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission (n 36), para 13 
44 Case C-342/96 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:210, para 46; Case C-73/11 P Frucona Košice 
v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2013:32, para 73 
45 Case C- 279/08 P Commission v The Netherlands (NOx) ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, para 86; Joined 
cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85 Van der Kooy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1988:38, paras 53-55 
46 Case T-14/96 BAI v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1999:12 para 80 
47 Land Burgenland (n 38), para 92; Case C-277/00 Germany Commission ECLI:EU:C:2004:238, para 
80; Case C-390/98 H.J. Banks & Co. Ltd v The Coal Authority and Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry ECLI:EU:C:2001:456, para 77 
48 Case C-124/10 P Commission v EDF ECLI:EU:C:2012:318, para 103 
49 Case C-276/02 Spain v Commission Opinion of AG Maduro ECLI:EU:C:2004:211, paras 36-37; 
Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission Opinion of AG van Gerven ECLI:EU:C:1990:352, paras 9, 11, 14  
50 Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission Opinion of AG van Gerven ECLI:EU:C:1991:4, paras 9, 11. See 
also: Commission Decision 2016/1991/EU of 4 July 2016 on the measures SA.41614 - 2015/C (ex 
SA.33584 - 2013/C (ex 2011/NN)) implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional 
football club FC Den Bosch in 's-Hertogenbosch [2016] OJ L 306/19, recital 51. 
51 See for example: Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1996:194. Compare however 
with: Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1991:136, para 21; Joined cases C-278/92, C-
279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1994:325, para 25 
52 Case T-228/99 WestLB v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2003:57, para 226. See also: Commission 
Decision 2017/97/EU of 4 July 2016 on the State Aid SA.40168 - 2015/C (ex SA.33584 - 2013/C (ex 
2011/NN)) implemented by the Netherlands in favour of the professional football club Willem II in 
Tilburg [2017] OJ L 16/28, recitals 33-38 
53 WestLB (n 52), para 255; Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, Schwab (n 30), para 158  
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moderate in his pursuit of profits. Following from the MEO’s reasonableness, in 
effect the MEO’s behaviour must be economically rational.54  
In this context, compliance with market conditions can thus be established 
based on empirical data, or where such data are not available, based on other 
methods, such as benchmarking.55 Additionally, activities carried out “pari passu” 
by public entities and private operators,56 and those carried out through an open, 
transparent, sufficiently well-publicised, non-discriminatory and unconditional 
tender procedure, as described in the Union’s Public Procurement Directives,57 will 
be deemed to be in accordance with market criteria. Practically, a generally 
accepted and standard assessment methodology must be employed,58 and up-to-
date, reliable data needs to be used.59 The State has to ex ante evaluate the 
rationality of its intervention, with data available at the time of the intervention,60 
meaning that determining the timing of the assessment is also an important element 
of it.61 The assessment must thus be derived from available, objective, verifiable, 
and reliable data.62 
It is clear that the MEOP has several different iterations, all of which are based 
on the same core principle of comparing the State’s actions to those of a 
comparatively relevant market economy operator. If the State’s actions are line with 
those of such a hypothetical operator, then no advantage will be conferred, as the 
outcome would reflect market conditions. Based on the practical requirements, and 
on the characteristics ascribed to the MEO, it is possible to state that the MEO is 
reasonable, well-informed, prudent, and motivated by profits. Those characteristics, 
and the actions that would follow from them, inform the context of the application 
of the MEOP. The practical elements of the MEOP’s application are also relevant, 
especially in relation to the methodological tools and data used to arrive at an 
economically rational assessment of the transaction in question.  
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IV. The MEOP in Fiscal Cases  
a. Applicability of the MEOP to Fiscal Cases 
It is obvious from the foundational logic of the MEOP that it is not particularly 
well-suited to dealing with fiscal cases, as States enjoy a monopoly in the exercise 
of taxation.63 This makes any actual comparison with a MEO conceptually and 
practically hard to carry out. The MEOP distinguishes between actions taken by the 
state in its capacity as an economic operator and its capacity as a public authority, 
and is only applicable in the former case.64 This by extension means that there is no 
basis for comparison in most straightforward fiscal cases, even though its 
application cannot be automatically ruled out.65 Taxation is inherently a policy 
instrument. Following the logic of the applicability of the MEOP, it would be easy to 
conclude that, since no private market operator has, even theoretically, the ability 
to grant tax exemptions or guarantee preferential tax treatment to undertakings, 
any fiscal measure would have to be viewed as falling within the purview of the State 
as a public authority, and therefore outside the scope of the MEO test. However, 
the flaw in this approach is apparent, as the foundational logic of the notion of 
advantage is concerned not only with whether the recipient has indeed received an 
economic advantage, but also whether that advantage could have been obtainable 
in normal market conditions.66 Therefore, the MEOP should be seen as a general 
principle of the notion of advantage, and a constituent part of the State aid analysis, 
even for fiscal cases.67 This can be demonstrated by the EDF saga. 
EDF, in the process of its privatisation, received a capital injection in the form 
of a tax break on liabilities stemming from changes to special rules on concessions.68 
The French authorities claimed that the restructuring of EDF’s accounts that gave 
rise to the aid was an investment into EDF, but the Commission rejected that 
argument due to the fiscal nature of the measure, since a private investor could not 
hold a tax claim over an undertaking.69 On appeal, the EGC explained that the 
State’s actions cannot be attributed to its exercise of State authority simply because 
it has access to or uses resources stemming from the exercise of such authority.70 
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Since States rely on their tax income (accrued through State authority) to participate 
in the economy, such a narrowing of the MEOP would render it “futile”.71 In the same 
vein, the Court held that the form of the measure cannot be taken to mean that the 
MEOP is not applicable.72 
On a further appeal, this time from the Commission, the ECJ concurred with 
the EGC, and found that it is the Commission’s responsibility to assess the relevant 
evidence needed to establish whether the MEOP is applicable.73 The Court 
reiterated that a distinction between the State’s activities as a MEO and a public 
authority must be maintained, with only the former being part of the analysis.74 As 
such, the MEOP is a generally applicable part of the advantage criterion, and not an 
exception to it, meaning that its applicability must be examined in any given case, 
to allow for a complete consideration of the notion of advantage.75 The recipient of 
the aid can invoke the MEOP themselves,76 as if the MEOP could only be invoked 
by the granting State, then a recipient undertaking would have to disprove the 
existence of an advantage in lieu of the Commission having to prove it.77 This is 
because the non-application of the MEOP would essentially mean that since the 
measure mitigated a charge normally applicable, the advantage condition would 
be deemed to be satisfied. Additionally, given that State aid is an objective concept, 
the classification of a measure as aid by a Member State does not mean that the 
Commission can assume that measure to indeed be aid.78 This in effect means that 
the Commission is in charge of analysing both the applicability and the application 
of the MEOP.79 This follows from the reasoning of EDF, as if the MEOP is seen as a 
general principle of the advantage analysis, then assessing its applicability is in 
effect a preliminary step in the analysis of an advantage.80 
In EDF, since the objective (and the effect) of the measure was to inject capital 
into an undertaking, which is an economic objective that a market economy investor 
could pursue, it stands to reason that the MEOP could have been applicable. Based 
on a follow-up Decision and appeals all the way to the ECJ, it was established that 
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the MEOP was not actually applicable to the facts of EDF.81 However, the follow-up 
judgments did confirm the principle that MEOP is in principle applicable to fiscal 
cases, even if they were not revolutionary.82 From the EDF saga therefore it is clear 
that MEOP can be applicable in fiscal cases, as it is general principle of State aid 
law. Additionally, the line between a measure constituting an expression of State 
authority and one stemming from the actions of the State as a MEO was somewhat 
clarified, providing useful guidance on the occasionally overlooked element of 
applicability.83 
In this context, it is worth examining the distinction between actions 
stemming from the exercise of public authority and those which reflect the State 
acting as a MEO to illustrate the applicability of the MEOP post-EDF. In her Opinion 
in ING Groep, AG Sharpston attempted to clarify the dichotomy between the 
applicability and application of the MEOP, stating that there needs to be a twofold 
analysis, where first it is necessary to examine whether the action of the State “can 
be meaningfully compared” with the act of a private market operator.84 If this step 
is satisfied, then it is necessary to assess whether the action taken by the State was 
based on “considerations which are relevant only or at least primarily to the State in 
its capacity as public authority”, or whether a market operator in a comparable 
situation might have taken the same or similar action.85 In the same case, where 
following an original grant of aid the Netherlands were holding securities in ING, it 
was held that a restructuring amendment of the original aid should be evaluated in 
the context of the MEOP, despite being linked to a grant of aid which is 
quintessentially an expression of State authority, as the Netherlands held securities 
and could renegotiate their redemption in a manner potentially comparable to a 
MEO.86 However, any risks and liabilities arising from the exercise of public authority 
cannot be taken into account in the evaluation of the aid character of any 
subsequent measures,87 as they would not be relevant to a private operator. This is 
true even in cases where the State would benefit, from a purely rational and 
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economic perspective, by a further intervention in the economy.88 In effect, in the 
context of the applicability and application of the MEOP, in a meeting between law 
and economics, the former prevails.89 
  In brief, if a State measure can have an economic character, then the MEOP 
is, in principle, applicable, with the measure’s economic soundness being 
ascertained in the application stage of the MEOP analysis. Thus, the applicability 
analysis looks at the economic character and nature of the intervention, and the 
application of it at is economic rationality.90 Additionally, the application of the 
MEOP cannot be clouded by previous actions that did not have an economic 
character, and were the result of the exercise of State authority. Thus, significant 
difficulties that can arise from the indissoluble link between an act of the State as an 
economic operator and as a public authority. In a typical fiscal aid case, such as a 
tax exemption, despite the de jure possibility of the MEOP being applicable, it is de 
facto extremely unlikely that the principle will be indeed found to be applicable. It 
is clear in this context, that the applicability of the MEOP to fiscal cases will remain 
limited, as due to taxation being an area of exclusive State power, any comparison 
loses its meaning and becomes a purely theoretical, non-verifiable exercise. 
Nonetheless, the Commission is not absolved of its responsibility to evaluate the 
MEOP’s applicability.  
b. Application of the MEOP to Fiscal Cases 
Based on the discussion above, it is clear the MEOP is unlikely to be found to 
be applicable in fiscal cases. However, one area where the MEOP has been found 
to be applicable to fiscal cases consistently and for a relatively long period of time 
is the repayment of tax debts, as the recovery of such debts is not materially different 
from the recovery of any other type of debt.91 Thus, the private creditor iteration is 
the most relevant in relation to taxation. 
Despite the intricacies of debt recovery and the multitude of moving parts 
(from the timescale of the debt the economic position of the creditor), the 
application of the MEOP has been relatively consistent. It has been held for example 
that accepting a rate of interest lower than those available on the market is not 
contrary to the MEOP, as a creditor is more preoccupied with facilitating the 
repayment of debts.92 In this context, the relevant question is whether the facilities 
extended by the State are manifestly more generous than those a hypothetical, 
highly comparable private creditor would extend.93 For example, tolerating the 
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long-term non-payment of debts is not in line the behaviour of a private creditor.94 
Given the distinction between the role of the State as a public authority and as a 
MEO, the fact that forcing a debtor into liquidation can result in the loss of future tax 
revenues for the State is irrelevant in the application of the MEOP,95 as it is a 
consideration which is not related to the role of the State as a MEO. There is 
however a degree of ambiguity, as to which iteration of the MEOP should be 
applied, as a payment deferral can for example have characteristics similar to those 
of a loan.96 In this context, it is worth noting that more than one iterations of the 
MEOP can be taken into account.97 
Additionally, the MEOP should be fully applied and accompanied by an 
economic analysis which includes case-specific elements, looking at the type of 
debt, the amounts relative to other creditors, or the existence of securities. This 
economic analysis is necessary for the Commission’s application of the MEOP to be 
substantiated.98 The Commission cannot rely on a formulaic approach, and must 
take into account the relevant economic factors, as the CJEU can only review 
manifest errors of assessment, and cannot substitute the Commission’s appraisal for 
its own.99 This means in effect that if a conclusion is not properly reached and 
argued by the Commission in light of the economic factors at play, the Courts can 
call its soundness into question.100 As the Courts cannot make up for any mistakes 
on the part of the Commission, factual mistakes and errors in the economic analysis 
effectively vitiate the advantage analysis. 
Based on this brief discussion, it is possible to conclude that both the 
applicability and application of the MEOP to fiscal cases can be complicated. It is 
clear that the rationale of the MEOP can be applied to fiscal cases, and that thus its 
applicability must be examined. In practice however, the theoretical limitations of 
the MEOP mean that only cases pertaining to fiscal debts can be said to be well and 
truly within its scope of applicability. Even in such cases, the potentially privileged 
position of the tax authorities when compared to other regular creditors further 
showcases the difficulties in the application of the MEOP to cases relating to 
taxation.101 Those issues demonstrate the case-specific nature of the MEOP both in 
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terms of its applicability and in terms of its application in fiscal cases. However, even 
with this case-specific nature and the de jure lack of official distinction between fiscal 
and non-fiscal cases, it is clear that de facto the inherent logic of MEOP makes its 
applicability to most standard fiscal cases extremely complex. 
c. Burden and Standard of Proof in the Application of the MEOP 
A particularly interesting element of the applicability and application of the 
MEOP is the allocation of the burden of proof, and the standard of proof. This 
section will present the extent of the Commission’s investigative obligations, and its 
obligation to state reasons. This analysis will use the Frucona Košice series of cases 
as an example. 
Frucona Košice had financial difficulties, and took advantage of a Slovakian 
tax measure that allowed it to defer payments of excise duty on spirit. The local tax 
authority accepted the deferred payment of tax and took securities over assets held 
by Frucona Košice, while a change in the applicable legislation limited the latter’s 
ability to obtain further deferrals on a regular basis, which led Frucona Košice to 
became further indebted to the tax authority, in addition to its already deferred 
payments. Frucona Košice applied for a debt arrangement with all its creditors 
(public and private), which was accepted by the creditors, and the regional Court. 
The agreement entailed a repayment of 35% of its debts in a short period after the 
agreement, while the rest of the debt would be forgiven. All the creditors, public 
and private were to be treated in exactly the same way, despite the fact that the tax 
authority held securities over part of the debt.102 The Commission took the view that 
the tax authorities failed to act in a way consistent with the actions of a private 
creditor, as they did not press for a tax execution, or a bankruptcy procedure, that 
would have, according to the Commission’s economic analysis, resulted in a higher 
amount of debt being recovered.103 This is not an unreasonable conclusion, as the 
vast majority of Frucona Košice’s debt was held by the tax authority, which could 
have recouped a substantial part of its debt by selling the secured assets.104 
Even though the General Court upheld the Commission’s reasoning,105 on 
appeal the ECJ pointed out that the duration of the bankruptcy procedure was not 
taken into account in the application of the MEOP, meaning that the outcome of the 
test was erroneous, and that as a result the Commission had committed a “manifest 
error” in its assessment of the MEOP.106 On an appeal from a new Decision 
stemming from the same facts,107 the ECJ stated explicitly that the Commission’s 
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analysis must “necessarily cover all the options” that a MEO could have encountered 
and envisaged.108 This analysis must take into consideration all the relevant 
evidence, which is defined as all information liable to influence the decision-making 
process of a MEO available at the time of the contested measure, as well as any 
foreseeable developments.109 Any information obtainable during the administrative 
procedure is deemed to be “available” information.110 
This points to the role of the Union judicature, which is to verify that the 
evidence relied upon (such as the outcome of the MEOP analysis) is “factually 
accurate, reliable, and consistent”, while also containing all the relevant information 
necessary to substantiate any findings.111 In order for a concrete conclusion to be 
reached therefore, the Commission must have at its disposal “the most complete 
and reliable information possible”.112 The review of this information and of its 
completeness are consistent with the purpose of assessing a manifest error of 
assessment.113 For example, in casu, the Commission failed to correctly evaluate the 
liquidation factors, meaning it committed such an error, and its conclusion was not 
up the requisite legal standard.114 
As discussed above, the rationale of EDF and the MEOP’s position as an 
integral part of the notion of advantage mean that the burden of proof on its 
applicability and application rests on the Commission.115 This has been confirmed 
by the ECJ.116 In relation to the applicability of the MEOP, if the economic character 
of the measure is obvious, the Commission can “implicitly and necessarily” assume 
that it is applicable by applying it.117 In relation to the application of the MEOP, given 
the obligation to state reasons, and the requisite standard of proof, the Commission 
cannot conclude on the application of the MEOP (and by extension the existence of 
an advantage) without having all the relevant information,118 as defined by the 
ECJ,119 and without the conclusions it draws from said information being 
substantiated. In this context, it is important to stress that it is settled case law that 
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the Courts cannot substitute the Commission’s economic assessment for their 
own,120 but they are under an obligation to establish the factual accuracy and 
credibility of the evidence and calculations relied upon, and the completeness of 
the evidence, in light of the complex situations that are being assessed.121 This is 
essential, as it allows the Courts to review whether the conclusions the Commission 
has drawn can be substantiated.122 The exact limits of the Courts’ powers of review 
can be tricky to establish,123 but it is clear that the required standard of proof is 
high.124 
This stringent standard of proof associated with the MEOP is also applicable 
in straightforward fiscal cases, where the MEOP cannot be applied. This can be 
evidenced by the Barcelona case, where the Commission failed to examine the 
fiscal context of a reduced statutory tax rate, and by extension failed to ascertain 
whether the effective tax rate actually conferred an advantage on the undertakings 
concerned.125 In effect, the Commission is not entitled to conclude that an 
advantage exists without carrying out the necessary economic analysis. Rather, it 
has to assess the specific characteristics of the sector under examination, and has to 
rely on a wide range of information, in order to be able to adhere to its obligation 
to present credible and verifiable findings.126 A similar example can be found in Real 
Madrid, where the EGC held that the Commission must conduct a complete analysis 
of all relevant factors before being able to establish the existence of an 
advantage.127 By analogy, this means that if the analysis is incomplete, it cannot in 
fact be proven that an advantage results from the contested measure, as the 
requisite legal standard cannot be met.128 
This rationale echoes and makes very explicit a well-established line of CJEU 
case law,129 and confirms that the standard of proof required by Frucona Košice, as 
well as the allocation of the burden of proof, also apply in the determination of a 
fiscal advantage in the absence of the MEOP.130 This means that the Commission 
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must, in its assessment of a fiscal advantage, take into consideration all the elements 
of the fiscal regime, favourable or unfavourable, in order to successfully discharge 
its burden of proof.131 The detailed economic analysis required, and the fact that it 
must consider the fiscal context and environment in which the measure was 
adopted, represents a more fiscal outlook for the analysis of the notion of 
advantage. This requirement for a detailed economic analysis can also be said to 
follow from the effects-based approach to State aid, as it examines the effects rather 
than the form of a measure.132 Such a fiscal approach can add more substance in 
the advantage analysis of fiscal cases, as it makes it necessary for the Commission 
to examine the whole picture, rather than formulaically “ticking the boxes”. In effect, 
the adoption of a more fiscal outlook which follows from the depth of the economic 
analysis, beyond being more in line with the effects-based approach, recognises 
the complex nature of taxation and accepts that a prima facie beneficial fiscal rule, 
like the lower statutory rate in Barcelona, does not automatically translate to an 
advantage. In practical terms, this approach makes up to an extent for the 
inapplicability of the MEOP to the vast majority of fiscal cases, by adding significant 
economic weight to the analysis and contextualising the contested measure so that 
its effects may be accurately appraised. 
Finally, as can be evidenced by cases like Frucona Košice and Barcelona, 
selectivity is not necessarily the be-all and end-all of the fiscal aid analysis, even if it 
affects its scope in a manner that the notion of advantage cannot. The notion of 
advantage is after all the basis around which the notion of aid exists, the remaining 
four criteria effectively examine the advantage’s characteristics (selectivity and State 
resources), or its effects (effect on trade and distortion of competition). Since the 
(positively proven) existence of an advantage is the starting point of the State aid 
analysis,133 it is absolutely reasonable to employ a high standard of proof, and to 
examine the fiscal context in which an advantage is claimed to exist. The approach 
detailed in this section, by adding a degree of complexity to the notion of fiscal 
advantage, effectively makes the distinction between selectivity and advantage 
easier and more obvious. As a result, beyond being more effects-oriented and less 
formalistic, this approach can also help maintain the structure of the State analysis 
by endowing its practical centrepiece with significant value. In effect, this approach 
ensures that even when the selectivity of a measure is obvious, as in the individual 
aid offered to Frucona Košice, its aid character is not a foregone conclusion. 
d. Conclusion 
In short, the very nature and foundational logic of the MEOP mean it 
struggles with fiscal cases. The way in which the principle evolved through the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence indicates that its applicability to fiscal cases is, and will remain, 
 
131 Perez Bernabeu (n 129), 380 
132 Ibidem 
133 MOL Magyar Opinion of AG Wahl (n 1), para 47; Wattel (n 1), 61-64; Schön (n 25), 12, 16-17 
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practically limited, as taxation seldom can be dissociated from the exercise of State 
power, or meaningfully separated from the policy considerations underpinning any 
given fiscal system. These limitations are, unfortunately, the result of the MEOP’s 
internal rationale. The application of the MEOP to fiscal cases, once the hurdle of 
applicability has been dealt with, is also potentially problematic, as any element of 
the factual background that results from the State’s exercise of power can throw a 
spanner in the works. The rigidity of the construct of what MEO a given measure 
needs to be compared with, further limits the usefulness of the analysis as it 
discounts non-economic considerations. In the same vein, the application of the 
MEOP cannot be clouded by situations relating to the State’s exercise of public 
authority. Thus, the MEOP is of limited use to fiscal cases.  
Despite the limited applicability of the MEOP to fiscal cases, and the 
problems with its application when it is indeed applied, the high standard of proof 
it helped bring about has the potential to somewhat redress the balance, and 
ensure that the advantage criterion in fiscal cases does not become “devoid of 
substance” as Jaeger claims,134 or automatically satisfied if the measure in question 
is selective. This, arguably, represents an extension of the underlying logic of the 
MEOP, that not every transactional intervention of the State in the economy 
represents an aid measure if it conforms to market conditions, into fiscal cases, as 
not every fiscal measure that results in a differential tax treatment represents an 
advantage unless it is established to do so based on its context and actual effects. 
The consistent application of a high burden of proof, which must also take into 
consideration the context and application of fiscal rules,135 has the potential to make 
the criterion of advantage in fiscal cases as relevant and important as it is in non-
fiscal ones, even given the limited usefulness of the MEOP. This approach in tax 
cases arguably represents a more fiscal outlook, which focuses on the fiscal realities 
in which the contested measure exists, while at the same time ensuring the structure 
of the State aid analysis and the distinction between the notions of advantage and 
selectivity. 
V. Conclusion  
This Chapter has looked at the notion of advantage, focusing on its 
application to fiscal cases. It has been shown that the analysis of a fiscal advantage 
can be reductive and simplistic, and somewhat based on the rationale of the notion 
of selectivity. In fiscal cases, this results from the conceptual similarities between the 
two notions. However, as discussed in the relevant Chapter, selectivity is more 
nuanced, as a derogation can be justified in the third step of the analysis, and the 
comparability analysis needs to be undertaken in light of the objectives of the 
measure or system. As such, the bare-bones fiscal advantage analysis is in fact an 
embryonic application of fiscal selectivity that discounts the nuance of justifications 
 
134 Jaeger (n 15), para 75 
135 Barcelona (n 125), paras 58-59, 66 
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and objectives. In this context, it has been shown that it is important to maintain the 
clear distinction between the two notions,136 even if they have conceptual 
similarities. The fact that the reference framework used in the selectivity analysis is 
also the basis for the definition of “normal” market conditions does not mean that 
the two notions are one and the same, as assessing a departure (or derogation) from 
those conditions does not entail a comparability analysis, and such a departure 
needs to be proven to actually confer a benefit to its recipient. This does not mean 
that the two criteria are unrelated and have no influence on each other, but that they 
should remain clearly distinguished – a task that becomes difficult exactly because 
of the conceptual kinship between the two notions. However, beyond being 
separate criteria, they fulfil different roles in the rationale of a State aid analysis. The 
notion of advantage represents the starting point of that analysis, while selectivity, 
examines the limitation of that advantage to specific operators resulting in 
differential treatment, and is thus a necessary characteristic of a prohibited 
advantage. Neither a non-selective advantage nor a selective measure which results 
in no advantage are within the scope of the State aid prohibition. 
The MEOP and its increasing sophistication can offer non-fiscal measures the 
possibility to escape the State aid prohibition, as long as any advantage is granted 
in accordance with market conditions, and this Chapter has demonstrated that, in 
principle, this de jure extends to fiscal cases,137 even if its use remains limited due 
to the logic of the principle. Even in fiscal cases where the MEOP is actually 
applicable, the often-indissoluble link between an act of the State as an economic 
operator and as a public authority, and the often privileged position of the State 
mean that its application is far from straightforward. More importantly however, the 
burden and high standard of proof that permeate the MEOP analysis must also be 
applied, to the same level, in purely fiscal cases. The complex economic 
assessments that the Commission is called to undertake, requiring all relevant 
factors to be considered, can significantly increase the sophistication and relevance 
of the fiscal advantage analysis, and keep it separate from selectivity. Additionally, 
a full examination of the fiscal regime in the context of which an advantage is to be 
assessed is bound to be informed by the structure and logic of the tax system, and 
can as such lend the notion of (fiscal) advantage a more tax-oriented outlook. This 
approach is a welcome development, as it is in line with the effects-based notion of 
aid and recognises the fiscal context in which a contested tax measure must be 
examined. 
It is clear that the advantage criterion in fiscal State aid is, due to its nature, 
less important than that of selectivity, as it does not have an influence on the scope 
of fiscal aid. However, it remains the starting point of any State aid analysis, and as 
 
136 MOL Magyar (n 23), para 59; MOL Magyar Opinion of AG Wahl (n 1), para 47 
137 EDF (n 48), paras 103-104 
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such its importance must not be discounted. As the MEOP will remain inapplicable 
to the vast majority of fiscal cases, the advantage analysis may have to, partly, follow 
the logic of the selectivity analysis. The fact that the construct of the MEO is artificial 
and concerned exclusively with profit making or obtaining the best possible 
outcome makes the principle’s application to fiscal cases even more complex, as it 
discounts the policy considerations that tend to go hand in hand with taxation, thus 
greatly reducing its applicability. However, the Commission must in all cases 
examine the applicability of the MEOP. In general terms, as seen in this Chapter, the 
notion of advantage as it applies to fiscal cases can be notionally relatively easy to 
satisfy, although not as easy as Jaeger suggests.138 However, this does not mean 
that the notion of advantage can or should be discounted when analysing the legal 
framework applicable to fiscal State aid. This perceived ease of satisfaction should 
not be used as an excuse to minimise the criterion’s significance in the analysis of 
fiscal aid, especially in light of the evidential standard imposed on the Commission. 
The case law shows that a hasty and formalistic approach that hinges on a skin-deep 
analysis and does not take into consideration the actual (fiscal) effects of the 
measure cannot be allowed to stand. An advantage needs to be proven; it cannot 
be simply assumed, or even presumed. The extension of this logic and of the 
economic approach that the Commission employs to assess the MEOP to fiscal 
cases is of paramount importance, as it removes any formalism inherent in a hasty 
appraisal by the Commission or the judiciary, and makes sure a given measure is 
analysed in relation to its effects, ensuring that aid remains an objective concept. 
This approach arguably employs a more fiscal outlook, which in turn would mean 
that the existence of a fiscal advantage will continue to depend on case specific 
elements,139 but would also take into consideration the realities of taxation and the 
fiscal environment in which a given measure exists. 
 
138 Jaeger (n 15), para 75 
139 Ferring Opinion of AG Tizzano (n 16), para 39 
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The Notions of State Resources, Effect on Trade, and 
Distortion of Competition 
I. Introduction 
The State aid prohibition contained in Article 107(1) TFEU defines prohibited 
aid based on five cumulative criteria. In most cases, only three of those are 
extensively analysed, namely selectivity, advantage, and whether said advantage 
was granted through State resources. The remaining two criteria, effect on trade 
and distortion of competition, are not unimportant but are rather easy to satisfy.1 In 
fiscal cases, the State resources criterion can, generally, also be easily satisfied. 
Nonetheless, those three criteria and their application to fiscal cases need to be 
addressed. All three criteria exist in the wording of Article 107(1) and have therefore 
been part of the analytical framework of State aid since the beginning. The 
importance of the cumulative nature of the conditions of Article 107(1) cannot be 
understated.2 Selectivity, advantage, and State resources are the three necessary 
characteristics of an aid, while the aid’s effect on trade and distortion of competition 
are the negative jurisdictional limits of the State aid prohibition. Aids that do not 
have an effect on trade and do not distort competition will be outside the scope of 
Article 107(1), while measures that have an effect on trade and distort competition 
but fail to satisfy any one of the other three criteria will simply not be classified as 
aids.  
This Chapter will discuss the notions of State resources, effect on trade, and 
distortion of competition focusing on how they apply to fiscal and parafiscal aids. A 
particular focus of this examination will be the differences, in relation to those three 
criteria, between fiscal and non-fiscal aids, as it will be shown that the rationale of 
those criteria means that their application to fiscal cases can be relatively simplistic. 
In this analysis, the latter two criteria will be combined, reflecting the consistent 
practice of the CJEU and the Commission.3 This Chapter shows that the State 
resources criterion, which in non-fiscal cases has a significant effect on the scope of 
the State aid prohibition, is easily satisfied in fiscal cases. At the same time, the 
distortion of competition and effect on trade criteria will be shown to be very easily 
satisfied in general, and especially so in fiscal cases. This conclusion, read in 
conjunction with the previous Chapters in Part I, means that selectivity is in effect 
the only criterion of fiscal aid that influences the scope of the prohibition – practically 
 
1 Joined cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission Opinion of AG Jacobs 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:112, para 33 
2 Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:125, para 25; Joined Cases C-278/92, C-
279/82, and C-280/92 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1994:325, para 20; Case C-482/99 France v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2002:294, para 68 
3 Commission Notice on the notion of State Aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, [2016] OJ C 262/01, para 186 
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it is the only criterion that can influence it. Thus, the analysis of the criteria of State 
resources, effect on trade, and distortion of competition showcases their inherent 
limitations when examined in and applied to fiscal cases, while also further 
underscoring the importance of selectivity in the context of fiscal State aid. 
II. State Resources 
From the wording of Article 107(1) it becomes clear that the criterion of State 
resources has itself two sub-criteria, namely aid granted “by a Member State or 
through State resources”.4 In plain terms, the two sub-criteria are essentially the use 
of State resources, and the fact that the measure in question is imputable to the 
State. The former of those is designed to bring within the purview of Article 107(1) 
measures involving both direct and indirect use of State resources.5 Traditionally, 
these two sub-criteria have been interpreted as being cumulative.6 This approach is 
not without detractors, as it seems to deviate from the wording of the Treaty, which 
uses the term “or” rather than “and” in the relevant part of Article 107(1).7 
Nonetheless, this Chapter will examine them as cumulative sub-criteria, reflecting 
the jurisprudence constante of the CJEU.  
a. Imputability 
i. Imputability in General  
Imputability, as a concept, attributes the measure in question to the State. It 
is a reasonable condition, as it essentially means that aid needs to be imputable to 
the State, while ensuring that aid granted by institutions other than the State can still 
fit within the scope of the prohibition. Obviously, in relation to fiscal aid this element 
of the State resources criterion is particularly easy to satisfy, as taxation results from 
legislation, and as such is, in principle, clearly attributable to the State.8 As Soltesz 
points out, the “grey area” that imputability as a concept is designed to deal with 
consists of public undertakings or public shareholders.9 Imputability is essentially 
used to attribute the indirect use of State resources, usually through a public or 
private body set up to administer the aid, to the State itself. As a result, the 
 
4 France v Commission (n 2), para 32 
5 Case C-189/91 Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan Sidal ECLI:EU:C:1993:907, para 16 
6 France v Commission (n 2), para 24 
7 Thomas Jaeger ‘Goodbye Old Friend: Article 107’s Double Control Criterion’ (2012) 11 European 
State Aid Law Quarterly 535, 536 
8 Case C-262/12 Association Vent De Colère! Fédération nationale and Others v Ministre de 
l’Écologie, du Développement durable, des Transports et du Logement and Ministre de l’Économie, 
des Finances et de l’Industrie ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, para 17 
9 Christoph Arhold, Viktor Kreuschitz, Franz Jürgen Säcker, Ulrich Soltesz, Michael Shuette, Andreas 
Schwab, ‘Article 107 TFEU’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck Hart 
Nomos 2016), para 264 
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imputability of a given measure can be relevant in parafiscal10 cases, and only 
extraordinarily to fiscal measures. 
The concept of imputability as part of the criterion of State resources was first 
considered in Van der Kooy, where the Court argued that a lower fixed rate for gas 
was the “result of action by the Netherlands state”, falling within the notion of aid 
granted by a Member State.11 Under this reasoning, imputability, as Soltesz argues, 
was used to extend the scope of the State aid prohibition, not limit it,12 leading to a 
formalistic application of the notion by the Commission. In Stardust Marine, the 
Commission argued that the mere fact that the aid in question was provided by a 
subsidiary of an undertaking owned and controlled by the State was sufficient to 
establish the imputability of the measure,13 but the ECJ rejected this approach, 
holding that the mere fact that a measure was taken by a public undertaking cannot 
classify such a measure as imputable to the State.14  
Thus, State control over an undertaking cannot be “automatically assumed”, 
but rather the degree of autonomy of the undertaking in question needs to be 
ascertained.15 To this end, the Court offered a series of indicators of State control 
that could be used to establish the imputability of a measure adopted by a public 
undertaking or authority to the State, adding that whether the measure is actually 
imputable will depend on the circumstances, context, content and conditions 
attached to said measure.16 In essence, this means that the more indicators are 
present, the better the chance of the measure being attributable to the State,17 and 
that despite the general exercise of control by the State, the influence of the State 
in the adoption of the offending measure will need to be established.18 The 2016 
Notice on the Notion of Aid sets out some indicators that can be used to 
demonstrate imputability, including “organic” indicators linking the State to the 
body administering the aid.19 Despite the possibility that the indicators-based 
 
10 “The Court designates charges dedicated to a particular purpose as “parafiscal charges”. In the 
case of such charges, which are characterised by the fact that when they are levied they are already 
destined to finance a particular allocation of funds, State Aid law distinguishes between two 
transactions, namely the increase of State funds resulting from the levying of the charge and the use 
of those funds by allocating the proceeds to the recipient. The dedication of purpose creates a 
certain link between levy and allocation.” Joined cases C-34/01 to C-38/01 Enirisorse SpA v Ministero 
delle Finanze Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl ECLI:EU:C:2002:643, para 167 
11 Joined Cases 67/85, 68/85, and 70/85 Kwekerij Gebroeders van der Kooy BV and others v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1988:38, paras 37-38 
12 Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, Schwab (n 9), paras 271-272 
13 France v Commission (n 2), para 48 
14 Ibidem, para 51 
15 Ibidem, para 52 
16 Ibidem, paras 55-57 
17 Case C-472/15 P Servizi assicurativi del commercio estero SpA (SACE) and Sace BT SpA v 
European Commission ECLI:EU:C:2017:885, paras 38-39 
18 Ibidem, para 34 
19 2016 Notice (n 3), para 43 
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reasoning of the ECJ could lead to regulatory technique taking potential aid 
measures outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, the application of said 
reasoning by the CJEU has proved flexible enough to generally prevent such 
outcomes.20 
In short, the basic position of imputability looks at the influence or degree of 
control the State has on the granting body. It is recognised that the application of 
the notion of imputability will differ from case to case. This is the result of the 
indicators-based rationale endorsed in Stardust Marine, which necessitates such an 
analysis; the indicators essentially operate as a checklist, meaning that different 
factual patterns relate to different indicators.  
ii. Parafiscal and Fiscal Imputability 
This general position on, and approach to, the imputability of a measure to 
the State also applies to parafiscal charges. In most cases, such charges are easily 
attributable to the State, as they involve clear elements of State control, which under 
Stardust Marine can be seen as sufficient indicators. It is common for bodies 
administering parafiscal levies to be set up under public law by the State, and have 
limited economic activity, besides the administration of the levies.21 This situation 
would satisfy a number of important indicators, including organic ones. It is also not 
uncommon for the funding of the entity itself to be an indicator of imputability. The 
level of State control over the financing methods can be an indicator of 
imputability,22 and could also qualify under the State authority supervision indicator 
mentioned in the 2016 Notice. Despite the case-specific character of the indicator-
based rationale of imputability, given the nature and purpose of what Jaeger 
describes as “typical” parafiscal entities,23 and the list of indicators found in the 2016 
Notice, it is clear that standard parafiscal arrangements will be, in principle, 
attributable to the State.  
However, this is not always the case. For example, in Pearle, a trade 
association started a self-funded, “purely commercial” advertising campaign. Even 
though the association was set up under public law and supervised by the State, it 
 
20 See for example: Case T-384/08 Elliniki Nafpigokataskevastiki AE Chartofylakeiou, 
Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmbH and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems AG v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2011:650, paras 56-59, 68-69; T-387/11 Nitrogénművek Vegyipari v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2013:98, paras 63-66; Case T-251/11 Austria v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2014:1060, paras 
70-75; Case T-305/13 Servizi assicurativi del commercio estero SpA (SACE) and Sace BT v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:435, paras 61-63, 82 
21 See for example: Case 74/76 Iannelli & Volpi SpA v Ditta Paolo Meroni ECLI:EU:C:1977:51, para 
9; Case 78/76 Steinike und Weinlig v Germany ECLI:EU:C:1977:52, para 1; Case 94/74 Industria 
Gomma Articoli Vari IGAV v Ente nazionale per la cellulosa e per la carta ENCC ECLI:EU:C:1975:81, 
para 9; Case 259/85 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1987:478, para 2 
22 Case C-355/00 Freskot AE v Elliniko Dimosio ECLI:EU:C:2003:298, para 81 
23 Thomas Jaeger, ‘Tax Measures’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck 
Hart Nomos 2016), para 27 
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was found to enjoy a sufficient degree of autonomy, meaning that the measure 
could not be attributed to the State.24 Similarly, in Doux Élevage the Court held, in 
relation to an inter-trade group, that neither the recognition, and subsequent 
conferral of powers to an inter-trade organisation, nor the extension of an 
agreement establishing the contributions to such an organisation can be imputable 
to the State.25 Those two cases demonstrate that trade associations or other bodies 
whose form and general functions are set out in legislation and who operate under 
the supervision of the State, can still maintain sufficient independence to serve the 
interests of their members without breaching the State aid prohibition. The 
independence of the financing method seems to be of paramount importance.26 
As mentioned above, the imputability of fiscal measures is in most cases very 
straightforward, since taxes are controlled by the State, in their design, 
administration, and collection. The State is in other words clearly in control of 
adopting and enforcing the relevant tax measure. However, under the indicators-
based approach, it is possible, in principle, for fiscal measures to not satisfy this 
criterion. In Deutsche Bahn, it was argued that a tax exemption for aviation fuel was 
a result of Council Directive 92/81/EEC.27 The General Court accepted this 
argument, stating that the exemption was merely the result of the transposition of 
the Directive into national law, and as such was attributable to EU itself.28 Similarly, 
in Puffer the ECJ stated that the differences in treatment caused by the deduction 
of VAT input tax payable followed from the very nature of the Sixth Council Directive 
77/388/EEC,29 and as a result could not be attributed to a Member State.30 It is worth 
noting that the non-imputability of a legislative measure (fiscal or otherwise) 
implementing EU legislation would reasonably only stand to the extent that the 
Member State in question has no discretion in the implementation process.31 For 
example, Article 11 of Directive 2003/87/EC clearly states that the implementation 
of the emission allowance trading scheme will need to be carried out in accordance 
 
24 Case C-345/02 Pearle BV, Hans Prijs Optiek Franchise BV and Rinck Opticiëns BV v 
Hoofdbedrijfschap Ambachten ECLI:EU:C:2004:448, paras 7-15, 37, 40 
25 Case C-677/11 Doux Élevage SNC and Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE v Ministère de 
l’Agriculture, de l’Alimentation, de la Pêche, de la Ruralité et de l’Aménagement du territoire and 
Comité interprofessionnel de la dinde française (CIDEF) ECLI:EU:C:2013:348, paras 36-41 
26 Ibidem, paras 32, 40; Pearle (n 24), para 15 
27 Council Directive 92/81/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonization of the structures of excise 
duties on mineral oils [1992] OJ 1992 L316/12, Article 8(1)(b)  
28 Case T-351/02 Deutsche Bahn v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2006:104, para 102 
29 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of 
assessment [1977] OJ 1977 L 145/1 
30 Case C-460/07 Puffer v Unabhängiger Finanzsenat, Außenstelle Linz ECLI:EU:C:2009:254, paras 
68-71; Case C-460/07 Puffer v Unabhängiger Finanzsenat, Außenstelle Linz Opinion of AG 
Sharpston ECLI:EU:C:2008:714, para 70 
31 See: Case C-272/12 P Commission v Ireland and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:812, paras 45-53 
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with Article 107 TFEU.32 Finally, in Commission v Spain it was held that advantages 
created by the passing on of a direct fiscal advantage as a result of a combination 
of legal transactions between private entities cannot be imputable to the State.33 
This of course does not affect the imputability of the original advantage, but 
showcases that secondary spill-over advantages, even those resulting from fiscal 
measures, cannot be attributed to the State.  
In short, a finding of parafiscal imputability, as with normal imputability, will 
depend on the specifics of the case. Due to their nature and inherent characteristics, 
standard parafiscal measures will be easily attributable to the State. However, as the 
case law shows, the case-by-case approach means that parafiscal bodies can indeed 
be independent enough for their actions to not be imputable. In relation to pure 
fiscal measures, imputability is by definition satisfied, unless the offending measure 
forms part of the implementation of EU law. Despite this, secondary fiscal 
advantages cannot by attributable to the State. 
iii. Conclusion 
The imputability element of the State resources criterion aims to attribute a 
measure to the State, so that it can be classified as State aid. Despite the sub-
criterion’s formalistic origins, it has evolved through the case law to look at various 
indicators that can show whether and to what extent the authorities of a Member 
State can exercise power over a potential aid measure. The current form of the 
criterion is quite functional, taking into consideration various aspects of the 
relationship of the body involved and the State authorities. Due to the nature, 
purpose, and structure of a typical parafiscal entity, this indicators-based approach 
tends to attribute parafiscal schemes to the State, unless the bodies administering 
them are truly independent. In terms of fiscal imputability, most tax measures will, 
by definition, be attributable to the State, unless they are the result of the State 
implementing Union legislation with limited or no discretion. What this section has 
aimed to show is that in purely fiscal matters imputability is normally de facto 
satisfied, while parafiscal measures have a high chance of satisfying this sub-
criterion, due to the importance of “organic” indicators, and the form and legal 
status of typical parafiscal entities. In effect, the imputability sub-criterion can be 
said to be of little to no relevance for the purposes of fiscal aid. 
b. Burden on State resources 
i. Foundational Case Law 
The second limb of the analysis of the notion of State resources entails a 
burden being placed on the State’s financial resources. However, this concept is 
 
32 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ 2003 L 275/32, Article 11 
33 Case C-128/16 P Commission v Spain and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:591, para 95 
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wider than this wording suggests. It was introduced in its current form in Van 
Tiggele, where the ECJ, deciding on a minimum pricing scheme for alcohol, stated 
that an advantage was present, but that said advantage was not granted through 
State resources,34 as it did not result in any expenditure or loss of revenue for the 
State.35 However, the distinction between an expenditure of State resources and the 
State measure itself is not necessarily clear in the wording of the Treaty, as the Court 
remarked in Commission v France.36 In that case, the Court argued, disregarding 
the Van Tiggele judgment, that aid need not necessarily be financed from State 
resources.37 Even though the resources used were not taken from the State budget, 
the fact they were the resources of a State body was enough for the Court to 
consider them to be State resources.38 The Van Tiggele judgment was thus 
qualified, or arguably overruled,39 by Commission v France. The Court seems to 
have confirmed Commission v France implicitly in Van der Kooy, finding that the 
attribution of the measure to the State was sufficient to satisfy the criterion in 
question,40 and explicitly in Greece v Commission.41 Nonetheless, at the same time 
the Court seems to have applied at least the spirit of Van Tiggele, necessitating a 
direct or indirect link between the measure and loss of revenue for the State.42 This 
divergence demonstrates that from the early application of the notion of a burden 
on State resources, its limits have not been clear. What may not become apparent 
at first glance however is that the interpretation of this sub-criterion, as well as its 
limits, are particularly important elements in relation to width of the State aid 
prohibition.43 This results from the fact that a requirement that aid must be financed 
by State resources or result in expenditure or loss of revenue narrows the scope of 
Article 107(1) TFEU. 
In Sloman Neptun the Commission argued that a reduction of personnel 
costs which led to lower taxes being collected represented a burden on the State’s 
resources, but the ECJ held that the reduction in tax and social contributions 
revenue did not create any additional burdens for the State.44 The Court explained 
that the purpose of the distinction between aid granted by the State and aid granted 
 
34 Case 82/77 Openbaar Ministerie v Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele ECLI:EU:C:1978:10, para 25 
35 Case 82/77 Openbaar Ministerie v Jacobus Philippus van Tiggele Opinion of AG Capotorti 
ECLI:EU:C:1977:205, para 8 
36 Case 290/83 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1985:37, para 14 
37 Ibidem 
38 Ibidem, para 15 
39 Marco M Slotboom, ‘State Aid in Community Law: A Broad or Narrow Definition?’ 1995 (20) 
European Law Review 289, 293 
40 van der Kooy (n 11), paras 32-38 
41 Case C-57/86 Greece v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1988:284, para 12 
42 Case 72/79 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1980:109, paras 21, 24-25; Case C-102/87 France v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1988:391, para 14 
43 Slotboom (n 39), 293; Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, Schwab (n 9), para 302 
44 Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo 
Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG ECLI:EU:C:1993:97, para 21 
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through State resources is to bring within the scope of State aid not only aid granted 
directly by the State, but also aid “granted by public or private bodies designated 
or established by the State”,45 but still granted through State resources.46 This 
judgment serves as very useful dividing line, as it squarely places the non-creation 
of additional (tax) revenue outside the scope of State aid, as AG Darmon remarked 
in his (dissenting) Opinion.47 In this context, Jaeger argues that there needs to be a 
“tangible correlation” between the State measure and the expenditure.48 The ECJ 
has reaffirmed this position, stating that a measure which does not entail a direct or 
indirect use of State resources cannot be seen as State aid.49 
Further guidance on what constitutes a burden on State resources can be 
found in Preussen Elektra. The contested measure imposed in effect a high 
minimum price on electricity generated from renewable sources, the purchasers of 
which could apportion the burden stemming from the obligatory high prices 
between themselves and upstream network operators.50 The ECJ observed that the 
structure of the system resulted in private undertakings shouldering the costs of the 
minimum price, and as such resulted in no transfer of State resources, despite the 
obvious existence of an advantage and the statutory origins of the scheme.51 
Importantly, the ECJ also reiterated Sloman Neptun, stating that the possible, if not 
likely, decrease of the profits of the undertakings apportioning the expenditure 
stemming from the minimum price and the subsequent diminution of tax revenue 
cannot be seen as the means through which the advantage is granted,52 and as such 
is not related to the contested measure, being too remote.53 It is important to note 
 
45 Ibidem, para 19 
46 Ibidem, paras 19-20 
47 Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Firma Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v Seebetriebsrat Bodo 
Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG Opinion of AG Darmon ECLI:EU:C:1992:130, para 66 
48 Jaeger, ‘Tax Measures’ (n 23), para 22. See also: Joined cases C-52/97, C-53/97 and C-54/97 
Epifanio Viscido, Mauro Scandella and Others and Massimiliano Terragnolo and Others v Ente Poste 
Italiane Opinion of AG Jacobs ECLI:EU:C:1998:78, paras 15-16 
49 See for example: Kirsammer-Hack (n 5), paras 16-17; Joined cases C-52/97, C-53/97 and C-54/97 
Epifanio Viscido, Mauro Scandella and Others and Massimiliano Terragnolo and Others v Ente Poste 
Italiane ECLI:EU:C:1998:209, para 13; Case C-200/97 Ecotrade Srl v Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola 
SpA (AFS) ECLI:EU:C:1998:579, para 35; Case C-295/97 Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche 
Rinaldo Piaggio SpA v International Factors Italia SpA (Ifitalia), Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH and Ministero 
della Difesa ECLI:EU:C:1999:313, para 35 
50 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reußenköge 
III GmbH and Land Schleswig-Holstein ECLI:EU:C:2001:160, paras 6-10 
51 Ibidem, paras 59-61 
52 Ibidem, para 62 
53 Viscido (n 49), para 15; Viscido, Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 48), paras 15-16; Case C-200/97 Ecotrade 
Srl v Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola SpA (AFS) Opinion of AG Fennelly ECLI:EU:C:1998:378, para 24 
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that the Preussen Elektra rationale is limited by the facts of the case, as can be seen 
in subsequent case law, like Essent Netwerk.54  
A number of AGs have argued that measures by which the State can impose 
favourable conditions for the benefit of certain undertakings or products without 
having to spend any money should be deemed to be granted through State 
resources,55 even in the lack of actual expenditure. This represents an argument for 
a wide interpretation of the sub-criterion, as opposed to the narrow one that the 
Court ended up adopting in Sloman Neptun and the subsequent case law. This 
more expansive approach is based on the notion that requiring an actual 
expenditure is needlessly stiff and formalistic,56 and does not focus on the effects of 
the measure, but on the origin of the aid.57 The argument ran that the narrower 
construct could, as the limits of the notion of State resources were not clear, lead to 
situations where State aid control cannot intervene in clearly problematic situations 
that would not be covered under other Treaty provisions.58 Countering those 
arguments, AG Jacobs in Preussen Elektra explained that the narrower approach 
was more consistent with the wording and purpose of Article 107(1), with a 
systematic reading of State aid law which necessarily includes Article 108 TFEU, and 
with the structure of EU law in general.59 More importantly however, he explained 
that measures having equivalent effect to State aid should not be within the scope 
of the prohibition, as such an approach would be an improper widening of the 
concept of State aid.60  
It is submitted that a wide interpretation, such as the one suggested by AG 
Darmon,61 Slotboom,62 or Ross63 is problematic. For one, it removes a necessary link 
 
54 Case C-206/06 Essent Netwerk Noord BV supported by Nederlands Elektriciteit 
Administratiekantoor BV v Aluminium Delfzijl BV, and in the indemnification proceedings Aluminium 
Delfzijl BV v Staat der Nederlanden and in the indemnification proceedings Essent Netwerk Noord 
BV v Nederlands Elektriciteit Administratiekantoor BV and Saranne BV ECLI:EU:C:2008:413, para 74 
55 Sloman Neptun Opinion of AG Darmon (n 47), paras 40-41, 47; Case C-57/86 Greece v 
Commission Opinion of AG Slynn ECLI:EU:C:1988:104, 2866-2867; Joined cases 213/81, 214/81, 
and 215/81 Norddeutsches Vieh- und Fleischkontor Herbert Will, Trawako, Transit-Warenhandels-
Kontor GmbH & Co., and Gedelfi, Großeinkauf GmbH & Co., v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche 
Marktordnung Opinion of AG van Themaat ECLI:EU:C:1982:218, 3617 
56 Julio Baquero Cruz and Fernando Castillo De La Torre, ‘A note on PreussenElektra’ (2001) 26 
European Law Review 489, 492 
57 Slotboom (n 39), 296 
58 Ibidem, 298; See also: Malcom Ross, ‘State Aids: Maturing into a Constitutional Problem’ (1995) 
15 Yearbook of European Law 79 
59 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, in the presence of Windpark Reußenköge 
III GmbH and Land Schleswig-Holstein Opinion of AG Jacobs ECLI:EU:C:2000:585, paras 151-153, 
155-156, 158 
60 Ibidem, paras 183-185. See also: Viscido Opinion of AG Jacobs (n 48), para 17; Case 290/83 
Commission v France Opinion of AG Mancini ECLI:EU:C:1984:379, para 2 
61 Sloman Neptun Opinion of AG Darmon (n 47), paras 40-41 
62 Slotboom (n 39), 289-301 
63 Ross (n 58) 
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in the chain of what constitutes a State aid; in the absence of a requirement of (some) 
burden on the State’s resources, any State intervention in the economy, any 
regulatory act that has intended or unintended consequences could fall within the 
scope of State aid, if it satisfies the criterion of selectivity. The proposition that 
selectivity can effectively shift through essentially all regulations introduced by all 
Member States to ensure that they do not favour certain undertakings or sectors of 
economic activity is problematic, as selectivity would be satisfied for example by 
any intervention that favours a company of a certain size,64 or type65 more than 
others, or undertakings producing goods as opposed to those providing services.66 
If we follow the rationale of the wider interpretation, keeping in mind that selectivity 
is preoccupied with the effects of a given measure,67 we end up in a situation where, 
for example, a regulatory measure providing for a simpler tax form to be filled in for 
undertakings with a turnover under a specified amount (which could lead to lower 
compliance costs for the undertakings that fall within the threshold therefore 
benefitting them as opposed to larger undertakings by mitigating charges normally 
borne) would be classed as aid, despite having no effect on the State’s resources.68 
Additionally, such a wide interpretation would result in significant overlap between 
State aid, and the Treaty provisions on fundamental freedoms and harmonisation,69 
which arguably would be better suited to deal with the problematic elements of 
regulatory measures.70 An argument based on safeguarding the effectiveness of 
Articles 107 and 108 when read in conjunction with the duty of sincere 
cooperation,71 in light of the objective of preventing distortions of competition,72 
was squarely rejected by the Court, which argued that the notion of sincere 
cooperation cannot be used to extend the scope of the State aid prohibition.73 This 
showcases that the Court did not deem the issue posed by cases like Sloman 
Neptun or Preussen Elektra, where an advantage was recognised but found to be 
outside the scope of State aid control, as a systemic one.74 As will be discussed in 
 
64 Case C‑409/00 Spain v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2003:92, para 50 
65 Case C-233/16 Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Generalitat 
de Catalunya ECLI:EU:C:2018:280, para 61 
66 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten ECLI:EU:C:2001:598, para 52 
67 Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:311 para 25 
68 This is not to say that selectivity is not extremely useful in determining the aid character of a given 
measure; for example in the absence of selectivity and with the State resources criterion assuming 
its central analytical role, a lowering of the corporate tax rate could be seen as State Aid, despite 
being universal. 
69 Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, Schwab (n 9), para 303. See also: Commission v 
France Opinion of AG Mancini (n 60), para 2 
70 Piet Jan Slot, ‘Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts AG v. Seebetriebsrat 
Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffahrts A.G.’ (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review 137, 
143-144  
71 Then encompassed in Article 10 E.C.; its surviving elements can now be found in Article 3(3) TEU. 
72 Then encompassed in Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome (E.E.C.) 
73 PreussenElektra (n 50), para 65 
74 Baquero Cruz and Castillo De La Torre (n 56), 496 
106 
 
the following section, the (valid) fears expressed at the time that certain measures 
could escape effective State aid control because of the narrowness of this construct, 
have not been vindicated. 
In brief, the sub-criterion of State resources has been interpreted in a way 
that necessitates an expenditure of State resources, or at the very least a burden 
being placed on those resources. There needs to be a link between the advantage 
and State resources, direct or indirect.75 Additionally, it is established that an 
incidental loss of revenue will not meet the threshold of burdening a State’s 
resources. To fully assess the arguments put forward for either interpretation, and 
to determine the function of the sub-criterion, it is now necessary to examine the 
limits of the notion of a burden on State resources. 
ii. Limits of the notion of a burden on State Resources 
First of all, it is worth noting that a measure can be financed through Union 
resources, if it stems from Union legislation.76 Similarly, measures financed through 
member contributions are not seen as placing a burden on the State’s budget.77 
However, if the “burden” is on the State’s resources, the Court has held, especially 
in relation to taxation, that a transfer of State resources is not necessary for the sub-
criterion to be satisfied.78 The width of the concept of aid, as defined in 
Steenkolenmijnen,79 means that it necessarily must encompass interventions that 
mitigate the charges normally included in the budgets of undertakings. A tax break, 
which represents such a mitigation of charges, does not, strictly speaking, create an 
additional expenditure of State resources; it does however create a burden, in the 
sense that it represents funds not collected and therefore effectively removed from 
the State’s budget. The Court has held that if an advantage exists, it is not always 
necessary to show that a transfer of State resources took place.80 However, given 
that not every advantage is granted by State resources, further analysis is 
necessary.81 
 
75 Viscido (n 49), para 15 
76 Joined Cases 213/81, 214/81, and 215/81 Norddeutsches Vieh- und Fleischkontor Herbert Will, 
Trawako, Transit-Warenhandels-Kontor GmbH & Co., and Gedelfi, Großeinkauf GmbH & Co., v 
Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung ECLI:EU:C:1982:351, para 22 
77 Doux Élevage (n 25), paras 36-37 
78 Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España v Ayuntamiento de Valencia ECLI:EU:C:1994:100, para 
14; Case C-6/97 Italy v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1999:251, para 16; France v Commission (n 2), para 
36 
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ECLI:EU:C:2000:467, para 25 
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There needs to be a “sufficiently direct link” between a burden on State 
resources, actual or “sufficiently likely”, and the advantage conferred, without the 
need for the two to correspond or be equivalent.82 For example, offering something 
on the market for less than it is actually worth represents a loss of revenue, and 
allowing for a conditional partial exemption from a compulsory charge, also 
represents a loss of revenue.83 This holds true even if the State does not lose money, 
as it still earns less that it should; the mere deprivation of sources of liquidity can 
reduce the State’s budget.84 In effect, foregoing revenue which could have been 
collected represents a “burden” on State resources.85 Similarly, a “sufficiently 
concrete risk” of imposing additional burdens on the State in the future, like a 
guarantee, can be classified as a burden on the State’s budget.86 Arguably, properly 
compensating that risk in line with the MEOP would mean that no additional 
burdens would arise.87 In effect, if a State engages in economic activity and does 
not act in conformity with the MEOP, it is foregoing revenues, thus placing a burden 
on its resources.88 However, this does not apply in the reverse, meaning that fiscal 
measures which provide for exemptions but whose result, via tax competition, is the 
increase of the State’s tax revenues are still deemed to place a burden on State 
resources.89 This follows from the fact that “granted through State resources” is a 
qualification of the advantage, which has to be judged on its own merits and not as 
part of the enacting State’s general economic or fiscal policy.  
Additionally, where the resources of a body administering aid are held by the 
government, or are at least under its control, those resources can be categorised as 
State resources,90 meaning that spending them would result in a burden to the 
State’s budget. This approach of examining the effective control over the funds 
arguably represents a middle ground between the narrow and expansive 
interpretations of the State resources criterion. However, even under this middle 
 
82 Joined Cases C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P Bouygues SA and Bouygues Télécom SA v Commission 
and Others and Commission v France and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:175, paras 109-110 
83 Case C- 279/08 P Commission v The Netherlands (NOx) ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, paras 102, 106-108 
84 Case C-690/13 Trapeza Eurobank Ergasias AE v Agrotiki Trapeza tis Ellados AE (ATE) and Pavlos 
Sidiropoulos ECLI:EU:C:2015:235, paras 28-29 
85 Ibidem, paras 111-112 
86 Bouygues (n 82), paras 96-97, 101-107, 109. See also: Case C-559/12 P France v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:217, para 95 
87 Ecotrade (n 49), paras 43-44; Arhold, Kreuschitz, Säcker, Soltesz, Shuette, Schwab (n 9), para 332; 
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paras 93-102, 149-150. See also: Case C-518/13 Eventech Ltd v The Parking Adjudicator 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, para 47; Case 52/76 Luigi Benedetti v Munari F.lli s.a.s. Opinion of AG Reischl 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:184 
89 Joined cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, 
paras 127-129; Commission Decision 2003/515/EC of 17 February 2003 on the State Aid 
implemented by the Netherlands for international financing activities [2003] OJ L 180/52, recital 84 
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ground, the potential financial consequences of regulatory measures do not create 
a burden on State resources, as long as they are inherent parts of the statutory 
system in question.91 This for example applies to the loss of debts owed to public 
authorities, if their non-repayment is in line with national insolvency laws.92 
Regardless, the State needs to actually have effective control over the monies for 
their expenditure to become a burden on State resources.93 If funds are earmarked 
to finance the measure in question, then they are at no point made available to the 
State to dispose of as them pleases, and therefore are not under its effective 
control.94 In this context, the mere passing of the funds through the State’s budget 
seems to be sufficient to taint them in the eyes of the law.95 Essentially, if the State 
could have allocated the funds to its own budget,96 by not doing so it is foregoing 
potential revenue, negatively impacting its own budget.97 The element of State 
control can be used to examine both the origin and destination of the funds,98 as 
the State does not need to own the resources, as indicated by the case law, as long 
as it “constantly” has control over them, even if the resources themselves are private 
in their origin.99 
In summary, the limits of exactly what can potentially fall within the scope of 
State resources are still not crystal clear, as evidenced by some fringe cases.100 It is 
clear that the Union’s judicature has applied the Sloman Neptun line of case law in 
a way that circumvents its apparent formalism. “Effective control”, “foregone 
revenues”, and “concrete risk” within the notion of a burden on State resources can 
generally be argued to represent legal fictions which have created a regime where, 
despite the establishment of a narrow interpretation of the State resources sub-
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criterion, State measures cannot easily avoid State aid control. Arguably, the 
introduction and application of those fictions bridges the gap between an overly 
narrow, formalist approach, and an overly wide one, by creating a satisfactory 
middle ground. 
c. Conclusion 
In summary, the criterion of State resources as a whole will revolve around 
the facts of the case at hand. This is obvious with the imputability limb of the notion, 
as the indicators-based rationale signifies by its very nature the need for case-by-
case analysis. Similarly, the burden on State resources limb of the notion will also 
necessitate a factual analysis, especially in relation to the approaches developed to 
bridge the gap between the narrow and wide interpretations presented above. In 
essence, the analysis of notions like effective State control shows the conceptual 
closeness of the two sub-criteria, especially given the influence of the financing 
method over an aid measure’s imputability. In relation to the burden on State 
resources sub-criterion, an approach based on a narrow interpretation but devoid 
of Sloman Neptun’s apparent formalism has been developed. It is submitted that 
this approach is well developed, and well suited to analyse a measure’s actual 
effects, without being so wide as to make the sub-criterion functionally irrelevant.  
It is worth noting that purely fiscal cases will satisfy both sub-criteria almost 
by definition; a piece of fiscal legislation or any other direct fiscal measure will be 
automatically attributable to the State that introduced it, while the granting of a fiscal 
advantage means that the State has foregone revenue, effectively placing a burden 
on its resources. Parafiscal cases on the other hand are slightly more complex, but 
as detailed above due to their nature they will in most instances satisfy the 
imputability sub-criterion, and it is likely, due to the often close relationship 
between such bodies and the State, that the resources financing the parafiscal 
advantage will be deemed to be under effective State control at some point in their 
journey to their eventual recipients. This conclusion, obvious as it may be, should 
be read in light of the debate about the width of the criterion of State resources. 
Effectively, the wider interpretation of this criterion placed selectivity at the centre 
of the State aid analysis, arguing that any intervention of the State in the economy 
which produces an advantage should be examined, in light of a derogation from 
the general system,101 as the State resources criterion would be easily satisfied. The 
inherent logic of the State resources criterion means that this is the situation 
applicable to fiscal aids; selectivity is quite clearly the main deciding factor,102 but, 
as detailed in the relevant Chapter, fiscal selectivity can be satisfied by some general 
 
101 Sloman Neptun Opinion of AG Darmon (n 47), paras 53, 55, 61. In para 61, AG Darmon specifically 
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102 Case C-66/14 Finanzamt Linz v Bundesfinanzgericht, Außenstelle Linz Opinion of AG Kokott 
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measures as well, and does not always necessitate a derogation. Based on this, the 
scope of fiscal State aid is in practice wider than that of non-fiscal or even parafiscal 
aids, as purely fiscal aids are essentially assessed (solely) on the basis of an 
increasingly wide criterion of selectivity.  
III. Effect on Trade & Distortion of Competition 
a. Introduction 
As briefly discussed above, and as evidenced by the wording of Article 107(1) 
TFEU, the two twin criteria of effect on trade and distortion of competition inform 
the jurisdictional limits of the State aid prohibition.103 If an aid does not have an 
effect on trade or does not distort competition, then it will be outside the scope of 
Article 107(1).104 However, it is not necessary to positively prove that trade has been 
affected, or that competition has been distorted by the measure in question, but 
merely to “examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort 
competition”,105 which means that the material scope of State aid is not in fact 
limited in a meaningful way by the existence of those two criteria. This is backed up 
by the wording of Article 107(1), where aids that “distort or threaten to distort” 
competition are prohibited “in so far as they affect trade” between Member States. 
As Soltesz points out, those two criteria are not applied in the same way they are in 
relation to Article 101(1) TFEU.106  
b. Effect on Trade and Distortion of Competition in Practice 
The CJEU has held that when State aid confers a competitive advantage 
which strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other 
undertakings competing in intra-Union trade, those undertakings must be deemed 
as being affected by that aid.107 In such situations, the two criteria will be satisfied, 
even if a distortion of competition or an effect on trade are merely “likely”.108 The 
competitive position of an undertaking is the result of numerous factors, and a 
unilateral modification of any one of those factors will disturb the competitive 
equilibrium.109 The two criteria are deeply interlinked, as they can both essentially 
be satisfied if the competitive position of the recipient undertaking changes as a 
result of the aid. That improvement distorts the conditions of competition in the 
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given market,110 and the strengthening of the recipient undertaking as a result of 
that will affect trade between Member States.111 
The effect on trade criterion can be satisfied if the recipient of the aid is 
economically active in other Member States, especially if the market in question is 
highly competitive.112 However, this is not a necessary condition for the criterion to 
be satisfied, as the Court has explained that the mere strengthening of domestic 
operators has the potential to reduce the opportunities for market penetration.113 
Additionally, an undertaking competing in its domestic market with imported 
products can, upon receiving aid, affect trade and distort competition.114 Similarly, 
it is possible that an undertaking not participating in intra-Union trade may become 
able to do so as a result of the aid.115 As a consequence of the wide interpretation 
of the effect on trade criterion, even aids with a local or regional character and 
impact can satisfy it.116 Such a rigid approach can lead to resources being spent on 
small cases with no economic significance.117 This results from the fact that the law 
has to walk a fine line between overreaching and underreaching.118 
Overall, the two criteria are considered relatively easy to satisfy,119 as it is 
sufficient to show that a given measure is liable to affect trade or distort 
competition.120 This low threshold partly results from the minimal amount of market 
analysis and definition required.121 Nonetheless, the circumstances and ways in 
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which the aid at hand is “capable” of affecting trade and of distorting competition 
ought to be set out.122 This is part of the Commission’s obligation to state reasons, 
meaning that some analysis must be undertaken.123 In other words, the relevant 
market provides the (limited) context necessary for the admittedly terse analysis 
required to satisfy the two criteria.124 Additionally, because of the structure of the 
State aid monitoring regime, Member States are supposed to notify aid prior to 
implementing it, meaning that from an ex ante perspective it would be functionally 
impossible to conclusively prove either a potential for competition to be distorted, 
or that trade is actually affected. In effect, the lack of market definition shows that 
the Court has embraced an approach more consistent with the analysis of the two 
criteria in internal market law than competition law.125 However, this does not mean 
that free movement law forms, or that it can even form, the basis of analysis of the 
effect on trade criterion, due to clear definitional asymmetries.126 
c. Presumptions, Exceptions, and De Minims 
Despite the relative ease of satisfaction of the effect on trade and distortion 
of competition criteria discussed in the previous section, over the years, the Courts 
have established numerous presumptions applicable to the two criteria. First of all, 
the two criteria will be satisfied if the aid in question is operating, as operating aid 
is recognised as being the more harmful type of aid when it comes to market 
impact.127 This is corroborated by the fact that operating aid is, in principle,128 
outside the scope of the legal exemption provided for by Article 107(3) TFEU.129 The 
Court has clarified that this presumption extends to the criterion of distortion of 
 
122 Joined cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:1985:113, para 24. See also: Joined cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands 
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814 
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paras 70-73 
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competition.130 The same presumption has been applied to aids granted to 
operators active in markets suffering from redundancies131 or overcapacities,132 and 
generally markets in difficulty.133 It can also be argued that a presumption extends 
to undertakings operating in close proximity to the borders between two Member 
States.134 Additionally, such a presumption can be extended to aid granted in 
markets that have been liberalised at the Union level,135 but it appears that the 
presumption is reversed in non-liberalised markets.136 Aids whose recipients are 
mainly multinational groups can also trigger such a presumption.137  
Most importantly for the purposes of this Chapter, a presumption exists that 
fiscal aid will distort competition and affect trade.138 The presumption against 
operating aid is also relevant to fiscal cases, as the vast majority of fiscal aids are 
operating in nature.139 Beyond this, the ECJ has held that the grant of fiscal aid that 
takes the form of a tax relief must be regarded meeting the effect on trade 
condition.140 Arguably, this means that the importance placed on a presumption, 
such as the one against operating aid, will somewhat differ based on the 
circumstances under which the aid in question is granted,141 meaning that fiscal aid 
is deemed as being particularly damaging to competition and trade. As Farley 
suggests, the existence and application of so many presumptions showcases that 
the logic of the two criteria remains “fundamentally legal, rather than economic”.142 
In effect, the presumptions mean that the already low burden of proof is lowered 
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even further when it comes to fiscal aid, with the Commission merely needing to 
prove the existence of aid which satisfies them.143 
The 2016 Notice contains some minor exceptions to the wide interpretation 
of the two criteria, focusing on the distortion of competition caused by legal 
monopolies, and the potentially “marginal effect” on trade of aid aimed at 
undertaking providing goods or services in a limited (and local) area.144 However, 
those exceptions are limited by their specificity.145 Additionally, a concept of de 
minimis aid has been introduced.146 Essentially, this notion means that certain aid 
fails to meet all the criteria of Article 107(1).147 The criteria that are not met in this 
case are clearly effect on trade and distortion of competition, as the amount of the 
aid cannot possibly have any bearing in relation to the other three criteria – a 
selective advantage granted through State resources maintains that character 
regardless of the actual sum granted. The Court accepted this new introduction, 
and has confirmed that de minims aid is excluded from the concept of aid.148 
However, despite the introduction of de minimis as a concept, for aid outside its 
scope, the wide, catch-all interpretation of the criteria of effect on trade and 
distortion of competition remains, as the threshold exists only by virtue of the de 
minimis rules.149 The notion of de minimis is of limited use in fiscal cases, as under 
Article 4(1) of Regulation 1407/2013, only transparent aid can benefit from the 
exemption. In this context, transparent aid means aid where it is possible to 
calculate the gross amount of the aid ex ante,150 which can become difficult in fiscal 
cases. Fiscal measures usually do not grant aid directly in cash but take a form that 
makes the exact amount of the grant depend on the recipients’ turnover or actions, 
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meaning that the aid will not be transparent, and therefore not exemptible. Outside 
the safe harbour of de minimis exemption, the operating and fiscal nature of fiscal 
aid creates a presumption that means that even if the aid granted is below the de 
minimis threshold, trade will be affected and competition distorted for the purposes 
of Article 107(1).  
In summary, it is clear that the effect on trade and distortion of competition 
criteria are generally easy to satisfy. This is especially true in relation to fiscal aid, 
which falls into two of the presumptions developed by the Court. In effect, this 
means that in fiscal cases the two criteria are almost automatically satisfied. Those 
presumptions reduce the Commission’s obligation to State reasons to the bare 
minimum of establishing that the measure in question actually meets one of those 
presumptions, without needing to further analyse the two criteria. At the same time, 
those presumptions create particular problems for fiscal measures, as most fiscal 
aid will be operating, and thus presumed to affect trade and distort competition. 
d. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the criteria of effect on trade and distortion of competition are 
conceptually very closely linked, and this carries into their application. In order to 
satisfy the distortion of competition criterion what matters is whether the aid is likely 
to strengthen the competitive position of the recipient vis-à-vis its competitors.151 At 
the same time, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that when aid strengthens 
the position of an undertaking in relation to other undertakings competing in intra-
Union trade, that aid affects trade between Member States for the purposes of 
Article 107(1).152 In essence, if one criterion is satisfied, so will be the other. The 
extent of the Commission’s analysis of those two criteria will greatly depend on 
several presumptions that have developed through the case law, while de minimis 
aid exists in practice, but not necessarily in theory. Most fiscal aid, due to its nature 
and administration, will almost certainly fall within one of the presumptions 
established by the Courts, while at the same time not necessarily being able to 
benefit from de minimis exemption. The satisfaction of the criteria of effect on trade 
and distortion of competition is generally straightforward,153 but this is even more 
pronounced in fiscal cases.  
IV. Conclusion 
 This Chapter has looked at three of the five cumulative criteria of State aid, 
focusing on how they apply to fiscal cases, and how that application differs from 
their application to non-fiscal cases. The criterion of State resources, with two sub-
criteria contained within it, can be particularly complex at times, but given its 
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internal logic, in principle, fiscal State aid will satisfy it very easily. Beyond this, the 
treatment of foregone revenues or revenues not collected as State resources also 
points to its limited relevance in fiscal cases. However, the non-creation of new 
revenue, or lost revenue not closely linked to an advantage, do not fall within the 
scope of the criterion. In relation to the application of the criteria of effect on trade 
and distortion of competition, the various presumptions and formulae used by the 
Courts and the Commission mean that the evidential burden is often significantly 
lowered. This makes the application of the two criteria very straight forward in 
(almost) all State aid cases, showing that they are in principle and in general easy to 
satisfy. However, this is especially true of fiscal aid and operating aid, which are 
caught by these presumptions, meaning that fiscal measures will be presumed to 
meet those two criteria.  
It is therefore clear from the analysis in this Chapter that not all the criteria of 
Article 107(1) TFEU are created equal. In relation to the effect on trade and 
distortion of competition criteria, fiscal measures are particularly affected by the 
presumptions developed in the case law, some of which specifically target tax 
schemes or tax measures. Thus, under the current conceptual framework applicable 
to the two criteria, fiscal State aid will in most circumstances be presumed to satisfy 
them for the purposes of Article 107(1), while being unable to benefit from the more 
useful limitations of the scope of the criteria. This is highly unfortunate, as it has been 
shown that the mere logic of the State resources criterion suggests that purely fiscal 
cases will, almost by definition, satisfy it. This is in line with the purpose and logic of 
the criterion, as any fiscal measure will result from legislation, and thus be by 
definition imputable to the State,154 even if an indicators-based approach is used. 
At the same time, the flexibility with which the second limb of the criterion, namely 
placing a burden on State resources, has been applied means that foregone 
revenue, for example in the form of a tax exemption, will be deemed to be such a 
burden.155 In other words, the internal logic of the State resources criterion clashes 
with the concept of taxation, making its application functionally limited in relation to 
fiscal cases. It is a criterion that, despite having a significant influence on the scope 
of aid, cannot be fruitfully applied to fiscal cases. Thus, the two quasi-jurisdictional 
criteria presume that fiscal aid satisfies them, while the logic and application of the 
State resources criterion means it plays no part in defining the scope of fiscal aid. In 
brief, this Chapter has shown that the three criteria discussed, despite their potential 
intricacies, will be very easily, if not automatically, satisfied in the vast majority of 
fiscal cases.  
 What becomes apparent from the foregoing is that the existence fiscal aid is 
significantly easier to prove when compared to non-fiscal or even parafiscal aid. This 
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results from the rigid formulae and presumptions employed by the CJEU in its 
analysis of the criteria of effect on trade and distortion of competition, and from the 
internal logic and structure of the State resources criterion. Thus, the analysis of a 
fiscal measure will hinge on the selectivity of the measure, as well as the existence 
of an advantage. This conclusion is however somewhat worrying, as the notion of 
fiscal selectivity has been stretched by recent trends in the case law, documented 
and analysed in the Selectivity Chapter. In effect, the constituent elements of the 
fiscal selectivity analysis have been defined and applied in an increasingly wide 
manner. At the same time, the notion of fiscal advantage is, in general, subject to an 
analysis that is eerily similar to the one employed for the notion of selectivity. In 
cases of individual fiscal aid, the ECJ has accepted that if an advantage exists, then 
selectivity can be (rebuttably) presumed.156 The notion of advantage, as discussed 
in the relevant Chapter, gains relevance in fiscal cases due to the burden and 
standard of proof attached to it, rather its conceptual structure or limits. This all 
underscores the importance of selectivity as the criterion of fiscal aid, since “the 
other conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU are almost always satisfied”, as 
observed by AG Kokott.157 In effect, the consistent widening of the notion of fiscal 
selectivity becomes particularly worrying, given that the (partially) scope-defining 
purpose of the State resources criterion cannot be fulfilled in fiscal cases and that 
the notion of advantage does not contain any theoretical limitations to the scope of 
fiscal aid. This is because the scope of the entirety of fiscal aid becomes dependent 
on the scope of selectivity, with no other potential limitations, and with the quasi-
jurisdictional criteria of effect on trade and distortion of competition being 
automatically satisfied. Thus, the existence of fiscal aid is not only easier to prove, 
but the very scope of fiscal aid is wider than that of non-fiscal aid. This exceedingly 
wide scope of selectivity and therefore fiscal aid must also be placed in the context 
of the significant hurdles and limited possibilities for such aid to be deemed 
compatible with the internal market. On the one hand, this conclusion demonstrates 
that the constituent elements of the notion of aid as well the compatibility regime 
struggle with fiscal cases, which results in fiscal aid being different from non-fiscal 
aid and having a wider scope. On the other hand, the effect of the wider, and 
widening, scope of fiscal aid, especially in the context of the limitations of the 
compatibility regime, is a limitation of Member States’ fiscal sovereignty and their 
ability to pursue policy objectives through their tax systems. In summary, Part I has 
shown that the system applicable to fiscal aid is problematic, due to the very wide 
scope of the notion of fiscal aid. This results from the increasing width of the notion 
of selectivity, when read in conjunction with the fact that due to the inherent logical 
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limitations of the State resources criterion and the nature of taxation selectivity is the 










This Part primarily examines the Commission’s tax ruling State aid Decisions. It 
begins with a brief analysis of the fiscal context in which the Decisions were 
adopted, examining tax rulings, hybrid mismatches, and the arm’s length principle 
(ALP) on which the analysis focuses. It is shown that the application of the ALP is 
extremely complex, relies on numerous case-specific elements, and is by 
definition approximate.  
This Part moves on to critically discuss the Decisions and the Court’s response to 
them, where available at the time of writing. The analysis of the tax ruling 
Decisions clearly shows that the reasoning employed is highly problematic. 
However, even the novel problems, such as the invention of an EU ALP, can to an 
extent be traced back to the problems analysed in Part I, especially in relation to 
the width of the notion of selectivity. Thus, the tax ruling Decisions on the one 
hand present a new threat to fiscal sovereignty in the form of a supranational fiscal 
principle being inferred into primary Union law, while at the same time serving as 
cautionary tales about the potential dangers and problems lurking in the shadows 
of an excessively wide concept of fiscal aid. 
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Tax Rulings, the Arm’s Length Principle, and the Commission’s 
Decisions 
I. Introduction 
 This thesis has thus far analysed the notion of fiscal State aid. Through the 
discussion in the previous Chapters, it becomes clear that the application of the 
criteria of aid to fiscal cases differs from their application to non-fiscal ones, as a 
result of the peculiarities of taxation and of the inherent logic of certain criteria. This 
difference in application in effect ends up placing a significant weight on the 
selectivity analysis. However, the notion of fiscal selectivity was shown to have been 
significantly widened, in practice meaning that the scope of fiscal aid has itself been 
widened. Thus, this thesis has already demonstrated the widening of the notion of 
fiscal aid. This development should be considered in the context of the 
compatibility regime, whose application was shown to be somewhat narrower when 
it comes to fiscal cases. In practical terms therefore, it is somewhat easier to prove 
the aid character of a fiscal measure, while it is harder for such a measure to be 
deemed compatible. In the context of the findings of the analysis already 
undertaken in this thesis, it becomes necessary to examine a series of recent 
Commission Decisions looking into tax rulings granted by Member States to 
(primarily) MNEs under the lens of State aid law. Those Decisions, which were in 
effect launched in 2014 under Commissioner Almunia, who described the tax 
rulings as “sweetheart tax deals”, were geared towards utilising State aid law to 
examine tax law frameworks and administrative practices as they pertained to the 
taxation of MNEs – in other words, the policy implications and background of the 
Decisions was clear.1 The Decisions focused on large MNEs, such as Apple or 
Amazon, and a number of investigations into companies like Nike and IKEA are still 
ongoing. The Decisions however were not particularly well-received, and contained 
questionable elements in their reasoning. The rationale of the Decisions and its 
problematic elements will be discussed in detail in the following Chapter. However, 
before moving to that analysis, it is important to contextualise the Decisions, in order 
to allow for a complete and thorough discussion of their content.  
This Chapter will provide the necessary context for the discussion of the 
Commission’s recent fiscal State aid Decisions examining tax rulings. Those 
Decisions deal with highly complex fiscal arrangements and revolve around well-
established but still heavily debated fiscal practices. First, this Chapter will briefly 
set out the international taxation context surrounding those Decisions. It will look at 
tax rulings, hybrid mismatches, Transfer Pricing (TP), and the arm’s length principle 
 
1 Commissioner Almunia, Speech ‘Fighting for the Single Market’, European Competition Forum, 
Brussels, 11 February 2014; Commissioner Almunia, Speech ‘Trends and Milestones in Competition 
Policy Since 2010’, EU's 31st annual Competition Policy Conference, Brussels, 14 October 2014  
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(ALP), and explain how those elements of the international tax regime operate. 
Then, this Chapter will briefly outline the factual patterns and reasoning of the tax 
ruling Decisions. This contextualisation of the discussion is particularly useful, as the 
international tax environment, the nature of the ALP, and the reasoning of the 
Decisions inform the critique of the Decisions and the implications of their rationale. 
Thus, in order to analyse the content of the tax ruling Decisions, we must first 
consider their context. 
II. Tax Rulings 
a. Tax Rulings in General 
As a term, “tax rulings” can conjure some negative connotations, especially 
when qualified by the adjective “sweetheart”. However, in principle, tax rulings are 
merely requests from taxpayers to national tax authorities to issue rulings 
concerning the application of domestic tax legislation to specific corporate 
structures and transactions,2 and can be seen as an example of taxpayers and fiscal 
authorities working together.3 “Tax rulings” is an umbrella term, covering several 
types of arrangements between tax authorities and taxpayers,4 and they can take 
many forms as they are based on the tax systems of individual Member States.5 
Essentially, tax rulings, create legal certainty,6 and can reduce double taxation.7 
Beyond this, they are also particularly useful in the application of the arm’s length 
principle.8 Additionally, as tax rulings can lead to a better working relationship 
between tax authorities and taxpayers, it has been suggested that they can increase 
compliance by making the tax administration more transparent.9 As such, tax rulings 
are not seen as inherently problematic, despite the fact that, as a practice, they can 
be ripe for abuse, and can confer competitive advantages to recipients.10  
 
2 See for example: Commission, Technical Analysis of focus and scope of the legal proposal – 
Accompanying the document “Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as 
regards the exchange of information in the field of taxation {COM(2015) 135 final}, Staff Working 
Document, SWD(2015) 60 final, 5 
3 Elly Van de Velde, ‘Tax Rulings’ in the EU Member States (Directorate General for Internal Policies 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Study prepared for the European Parliament’s 
ECON Committee IP/A/ECON/2015, 2015), 8 
4 Ibidem, 26-28 
5 For a brief analysis see Ibidem, 28-33 
6 Ibidem, 9 
7 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the field of 
dispute avoidance and resolution procedures and on Guidelines for Advance Pricing Agreements 
within the EU, (EU APA Guidelines), COM (2007/0071 final), points 4-6 
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In the context of the EU, tax rulings need to be issued in line with EU law and 
policy.11 There is a framework for the exchange of information,12 and the Joint 
Transfer Pricing Forum, under the auspices of the Commission, has produced a 
Communication relating to advanced pricing agreements (APAs),13 attempting to 
establish a set of “best practices”,14 as a supplement to the Arbitration Convention.15 
The Code of Conduct as well as the Code of Conduct Group, have also been 
somewhat involved with tax rulings, but they have not produced general guidance, 
only attempting to rectify specific problems in specific countries.16  
APAs are essentially akin to a dispute resolution mechanism between MNEs 
and tax authorities, which carries with it the benefits of tax rulings discussed above.17 
As they can reduce compliance costs and risks, APAs have become increasingly 
popular tools for MNEs.18 The JTPF Guidelines recognise that an APA does not have 
to include all transactions between all entities in a given group, but only those the 
taxpayer applies for.19 Importantly, it is suggested in the Guidelines that the 
potential situations covered by an APA should be as wide as feasible, and the critical 
assumptions should be tailor-made, based on the individual taxpayer’s situation.20 
The rationale behind that is that otherwise the APA will simply provide certainty for 
one specific situation, meaning that certainty would overall be jeopardised.21 Thus, 
it is clear that there is no concrete set of rules or guidance at the Union level dealing 
with tax rulings in general or APAs specifically, and the ruling regime’s 
administration.  
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2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic 
exchange of information in the field of taxation [2015] OJ L 332/1, Article 8a 
13 APAs are tax rulings specifically dealing with transactions between related enterprises. 
14 Commission (n 7), points 13-15, Annex 
15 90/436/EEC, Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment 
of profits of associated enterprises - Final Act - Joint Declarations - Unilateral Declarations [1990] OJ 
L 225/10. The Arbitration Convention aims to eliminate double taxation in relation to adjusted profits 
of associated enterprises, by providing for a framework for contracting states to eliminate such 
instances of double taxation. The Convention only sets minimum standards, and is not EU law. As a 
result, this means that it lacks primacy over domestic tax law, and that the CJEU has no jurisdiction 
over its interpretation. See also: Georg Kofler, ‘Tax Disputes and the EU Arbitration Convention’ in 
Eduardo Baistrocchi (ed) A Global Analysis of Tax Treaty Disputes (Cambridge University Press 
2017), Parts 1, 2.1 
16 Van de Velde (n 3), 18-22; Commission (n 3), 8-9 
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America (University of Toronto Press 1998), 469-476 
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b. Tax Rulings and State aid Law 
Tax rulings, especially those relating to issues such as TP, can create 
problems when examined through the lens of State aid law. In an attempt to provide 
guidance via a working paper, the Commission merely states that tax rulings do not 
raise issues under State aid law, “provided they do not grant a selective 
advantage”.22 However, as pointed out by Nicolaides, this statement is more 
tautological than explanatory;23 any measure that is not selective or does not confer 
an advantage would be absolutely legal under the State aid regime.24 
As Gunn and Luts explain, a tax ruling can in principle give rise to aid in two 
distinct scenarios: when the underlying legislation which the ruling interprets is 
problematic from an aid perspective, or when a sound underlying fiscal regime is 
interpreted by the tax authorities in an unsound manner.25 In the first scenario, the 
ruling is simply an interpretation of “bad” law, and therefore not per se the problem 
– the underlying law is.26 In the latter scenario however, more questions can arise. A 
tax ruling will create an advantage if the taxpayer’s liability is reduced when 
compared to a hypothetical counterfactual in which no such ruling exists. In relation 
to the notion of advantage, and bearing in mind the standard of proof required, this 
means that an advantage needs to be positively proven,27 otherwise the erstwhile 
recipient is not actually better off, for the purposes of State aid law. In this context, 
it is clear that a tax ruling does not necessarily or automatically lead to an overall 
reduction of an undertaking’s tax liability when compared to the actual application 
of the ordinary tax system.28 In other words, bearing in mind the complexities 
inherent in applying any ordinary fiscal regime to a large integrated group, for a tax 
ruling to actually confer an advantage, the ruling must place the recipient in a better 
position when compared to the application of the ordinary regime, not in 
comparison to the statutory rate – the fiscal context must be taken into account. This 
would meet the standard of proof requiring an advantage to be actually proven. 
This difficulty is compounded by the margins of appreciation necessary in the 
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25 Anna Gunn, and Joris Luts, ‘Tax Rulings, APAs and State Aid: Legal Issues’ [2015] EC Tax Review 
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modern fiscal environment,29 and the limitations of TP methodology which will be 
discussed below.  
Selectivity also poses problems in the context of tax rulings. In relation to an 
advantageous tax ruling it is important to determine whether such a ruling results 
from the normal, non-selective application of the tax ruling regime.30 In the context 
of APAs for example, given the acceptance and prevalence of wide ALP ranges,31 it 
is possible that a taxpayer who agreed to an APA granted in line with the national 
tax system and in line with internationally accepted ALP practices would in effect be 
better off than in the absence of that APA, simply as a result of the application of the 
ALP rules. A regime allowing for APAs and setting out how transfer prices are to be 
calculated could confer an advantage, but it would do so through the application of 
objective criteria, with uncertainties stemming from the nature of the ALP, as 
opposed to being selectively granted by the State.  
It is also worth noting that problems relating to the reference framework can 
arise, as it is unlikely that the reference framework could exclude the tax ruling 
regime.32 If the tax ruling regime in and of itself is taken to be the reference 
framework, the undertakings that have not sought to obtain a tax ruling would not 
be comparable to those that did,33 meaning that selectivity would have to be 
assessed on the basis of inherently individual tax rulings. If alternatively the 
reference framework is taken to be the ordinary tax system combined with the tax 
ruling regime, then only group companies would be in a comparable legal and 
factual situation, as they would be the only ones subject to the tax ruling regime.34 
Thus, the application of the ruling regime becomes the focal point of the selectivity 
comparability analysis. A further problem would be that tax rulings are available to 
all taxpayers who may be inclined to seek one – meaning that if tax rulings 
systematically deviate from the national tax rules, they are not actually selective, as 
the advantage stemming from the rulings would be open to all undertakings in a 
comparable situation.35 In brief, the selectivity of a tax ruling is neither automatic nor 
a given. 
 
29 Gunn and Luts (n 25), 120 
30 Raymond Luja, ‘State Aid Benchmarking and Tax Rulings: Can We Keep It Simple’ in I Richelle, W 
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Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD 2010), paras 3.55-3.62  
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In summary, any arrangement between taxpayers and tax authorities is a tax 
ruling. Despite the multiple benefits they can offer if deployed properly, they can 
easily be abused. It is also clear that as they are mere expressions of the Member 
States’ tax systems, they cannot be harmonised – only guidance can be provided at 
a systemic level by the Union. In terms of State aid law, it is clear that they can give 
rise to measures that can be qualified as aid, but despite their apparent simplicity, 
they can be highly problematic in relation to the selectivity and advantage criteria, 
especially given that in practical terms such rulings will only be sought when the 
application of national rules is far from obvious, meaning that it becomes very hard 
to examine whether the tax ruling actually interprets the law, or whether it deviates, 
and to what extent, from it.36 The evidential burden attached to the notion of 
advantage, as well as the (correct) definition of the reference framework and 
subsequently the delimitation of the comparable situation for the purposes of 
selectivity, can be particularly tricky in the context of tax rulings and tax ruling 
regimes.  
III. Hybrid Mismatches 
Another fiscal issue that plays a role in the Commission’s recent Decisions is 
hybrid mismatches. Hybrid mismatches are in principle easy to understand, but at 
the same time are immensely complicated in practice. Simply put, hybrid 
mismatches are arrangements which are treated differently for tax purposes by two 
or more jurisdictions.37 Such arrangements can take multiple forms, such as hybrid 
entities,38 dual residence entities,39 hybrid instruments,40 and hybrid transfers.41 
Such arrangements are not per se illegal, and often simply reflect the differences in 
the legal regime of the jurisdictions involved, which is a reasonable outcome given 
the lack of harmonisation and coordination between multiple tax regimes.42 
However, hybrid mismatch arrangements can be used to exploit that differential 
treatment, and obtain fiscally beneficial outcomes.43 As such, they have made their 
way on the Commission’s and the OECD’s “naughty list”.44 
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Through the exploitation of systemic mismatches, taxpayers can be granted 
a deduction in one country while avoiding the corresponding inclusion in their tax 
base in another country (D/NI).45 Furthermore, double deductions (DD) can be 
achieved,46 and multiple foreign tax credits can be generated out of a single 
payment of foreign tax.47 It is clear that the abusive potential of hybrid mismatches 
is huge,48 but at the same time they can simply result from the natural interaction of 
different legal and fiscal systems.49 They are clearly two-country problems, 
necessitating a solution through positive harmonisation.50 Bad as double non-
taxation may be, it is not (necessarily) discriminatory or selective, very much like 
double taxation is not – both result from disparities stemming from the exercise in 
parallel of taxing powers.51 Both are two-country problems, incapable of occurring 
within a single jurisdiction, as there would be no disparity to suffer or mismatch to 
exploit. This makes their classification as State aid difficult. 
IV. Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s Length Principle 
a. The ALP 
The ALP is an essential tool to avoid TP misapplication situations. TP is one of 
the most important issues in international taxation and has been described as the 
lynchpin around which all the maladies of international taxation exist.52 TP occurs 
whenever two companies that are part of the same group trade with each other. 
Essentially, TP rules aim to ensure a fair allocation of the tax base,53 by ensuring that 
the prices charged reflect reality. As such, TP rules apply primarily to international 
transactions. It is worth noting that TP is not illegal, it is in fact in most cases a fact of 
life, something with which MNEs and integrated firms in general have to deal on a 
regular basis. TP in general serves an important purpose in an increasingly complex 
and interconnected global economy,54 especially if the extent of intrafirm trading is 
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taken into consideration.55 However, it is a practice ripe for abuse.56 As such TP rules 
have an anti-avoidance function, even if that is not their primary purpose.57 It is 
however worth noting that estimates of avoidance are likely overstated by a wide 
margin, as they do not take into consideration certain features of the tax systems 
under examination.58 It has for example been suggested, based on empirical data, 
that even though MNEs use TP to minimise their tax exposure, they tend to prefer 
“reasonable” transfer prices to avoid potential penalties.59 
The authoritative statement of the ALP can be found in Article 9(1) of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, while further analysis on the specifics of it can be 
found in the OECD TP Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations.60 The ALP dictates that the amount charged by one related party 
to another for a given product must be the same as if the parties were not related 
and were acting in their own best interests. In practice, this can be seen as a double 
allocation – the allocation of profits to members of an integrated group, and by 
extension, if that group is multinational, the allocation of taxable income to States.61 
The notion of the ALP is based on the price two unrelated parties would agree upon 
through bargaining in the market,62 meaning that there is a multitude of factors that 
need to be taken into consideration. This is far from being an exact science, and this 
can make the application of the ALP problematic.  
 
55 Jinyan Li, ‘Soft Law, Hard Realities and Pragmatic Suggestions: Critiquing the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines’ in Wolfgang Schön and Kai A Konrad (eds) Fundamentals of International 
Transfer Pricing in Law and Economics (Springer 2012), 81; Theresa Lohse, Nadine Riedel, and 
Christoph Spengel, ‘The Increasing Importance of Transfer Pricing Regulations – a Worldwide 
Overview’ (2012) Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 12/27, 2, 4 
56 This can be evidenced by the fact that three BEPS Actions (8-10) were dedicated to Transfer 
Pricing. See: OECD, OECD/G20 BEPS Project: Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value 
Creation, Actions 8-10 - 2015 Final Reports (OECD, 2015) 
57 Ruiz Almendral (n 53), 149, 160 
58 Vella (n 49), 24 
59 Hagen Luckhaupt, Michael Overesch, and Ulrich Schreiber, ‘The OECD Approach to Transfer 
Pricing: A Critical Assessment and Proposal’ in Wolfgang Schön and Kai A Konrad (eds) 
Fundamentals of International Transfer Pricing in Law and Economics (Springer 2012), 97 
60 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD 2017), Article 9; OECD, Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD 2014), Article 9; OECD, Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (OECD 2010), Article 9; OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD 2010). It is worth noting that there are more recent 
versions of the Guidelines, dating from 2017, but the Commission has based its analysis of the State 
Aid cases on the 2010 version, meaning that those Guidelines are more relevant in the discussion of 
its Decisions. See to that effect: Saturnina Moreno Gonzalez, ‘State Aid and Tax Competition: 
Comments on the European Commission's Decisions on Transfer Pricing Rulings’ (2016) 15 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 556, 570. 
61 Wolfgang Schön, ‘Transfer Pricing, the Arm’s Length Standard and European Union Law’ in I 
Richelle, W Schön, E Traversa (eds) Allocating Taxing Powers within the European Union (Springer 
2013), 80, 89. It should however be noted that the ALP does not allocate taxing rights to a State – it 
rather protects the application of those taxing rights.  
62 Eden (n 18), 602 
128 
 
The Guidelines are a soft law instrument and thus not binding unless enacted 
into national law, but can still be highly influential.63 The OECD Convention, and the 
Guidelines, have not been put into application by all EU Member States, and those 
that draw from those Guidelines do not do so in a uniform manner,64 and are under 
no obligation to do so. Since the Guidelines can only take effect via their 
incorporation into national law, it is natural that even when those Guidelines and the 
ALP are fully accepted, there will be actual divergences in their application, and in 
the content of the relevant national laws.65 This follows from the general lack of 
direct tax harmonisation, and can also be evidenced by the content of the JTPF’s 
APA Guidelines.  
b. The Problems with the ALP 
Despite its prevalence, the ALP is not a perfect tool. Importantly, the OECD 
Guidelines specify that TP and the calculation of the ALP is not an “exact science”.66 
This is reasonable, given that operating within a group yields positive economic 
results,67 meaning that the foundational hypothetical of the ALP, namely at what 
price would the related parties have agreed upon had they been unrelated, cannot 
have an absolutely correct answer.68 Groups tend, from an economic perspective, 
to have higher profits and face lower risks when compared to standalones, thus 
affecting prices in controlled transactions.69 This is compounded, as those positive 
economic effects are, by definition, available only within a group.70 This becomes a 
problem, as the very idea of comparability, which sits at the centre of the ALP, does 
not take into consideration the nature of a MNE.71 The commercial rationality of a 
decision of an integrated firm engaging in intrafirm transactions is not the same of 
that of an independent firm.72 For example, the ALP struggles with taking into 
consideration economies of scale,73 or network and synergy effects which exist 
solely as a result of the group’s functions.74 In practice, the members of a group 
structured on hierarchies can (and often do) have monopsonistic or monopolistic 
relations between one another. Additionally, integrated firms tend to operate as a 
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single organisation, meaning that the parent entity directs the activities of its 
subsidiaries to maximise profits and mitigate tax liability,75 creating further 
complications for the unrelated parties hypothetical. Groups, as the OECD 
acknowledges, may be involved in transactions that independent enterprises would 
not undertake, due to the differing economic realities.76 Those issues, especially in 
relation to the nature and benefits of MNEs, have been carried into the CJEU’s 
fundamental freedoms and direct taxation jurisprudence in relation to the ALP.77  
The methodological and practical limitations of the ALP are also evident in 
relation to valuable intangibles, which can create significant hurdles for the 
calculation of an arm’s length price, and can be easily offshored.78 Additionally, it is 
very hard, if not impossible, to properly allocate profits to each individual step of an 
integrated production chain.79 Substantial differences can also exist in relation to 
vertically integrated groups, which can avoid pitfalls such as double 
marginalisation,80 and in relation to domestic and multinational groups.81 
Furthermore, large scale deviations from the ALP can be based on sound and 
reasonable economic considerations,82 creating substantial problems for the 
perception of the ALP as an anti-abuse mechanism. Finally, the nature of the ALP 
necessitates that an arm’s length price be expressed in an often very wide range.83 
In short, there are inherent limitations in the methodology and rationale of the ALP.84 
As a result of those practical and theoretical limitations, there is a vivid debate on 
the merits of the OECD model as a whole.85 Despite those limitations, the OECD 
model does not recognise or allow for alternatives.86 In turn this means that the ALP 
remains prevalent, and widely used. For the purposes of the discussion of the tax 
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ruling Decisions, the ALP as expressed in the OECD model remains the most 
relevant part of the TP international practice. 
c. Methodology and Comparable Transactions 
According to the OECD Guidelines, there are five main ways of determining 
and calculating the prices equivalent to those which would prevail on the market 
(arm’s length prices). All of the methods rely, to an extent, on the notions of 
“controlled transactions” and “uncontrolled transactions”. Controlled transactions 
are transactions between enterprises that are associated to each other, while 
uncontrolled transactions are transactions between unrelated, independent parties. 
The uncontrolled transactions need to be comparable to the controlled transactions 
examined in each case, meaning that their “economically relevant characteristics” 
must be sufficiently close to compare.87 When assessing a TP situation to establish 
an arm’s length price, the actual transactions undertaken must, in principle, be the 
ones examined, unless those transactions clearly do not follow an economic 
rationale and therefore do not remotely reflect economic reality.88  
Comparable uncontrolled transactions can take place between one of the 
parties taking part in the controlled transaction (internal comparable), or between 
two parties neither of which is involved in the controlled transaction being 
scrutinised (external comparable).89 Comparability is established when, if there are 
any differences between the situations being compared, those differences do not 
materially affect the specific condition being examined in any given method, or 
alternatively if accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effects of any and 
all differences.90 The principles underpinning “comparability” can complicate 
things, as they illustrate the nature of the ALP as an approximation, rather than a 
concrete set of rules. The ALP is primarily concerned with the effects of the analysis 
(i.e. the identification of reliable comparables and the actual comparison) rather 
than its form – thus following an authorised process does not in and of itself 
guarantee an arm’s length outcome.91 However, such comparables may not be 
available in a large number of cases, as uncontrolled transactions are very rarely if 
ever the same as controlled ones.92 This situation can be compounded by the 
different economic realities between groups and independent enterprises.93 
The process of the comparability analysis itself is not linear, meaning that 
elements of the analysis may need to be repeated, potentially necessitating the 
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selection of a different method.94 This analysis needs to take into consideration 
specific circumstances, including the evaluation of potential transactions by 
independent enterprises.95 Additionally, the specific attributes of both the 
transaction and the entities involved, namely the functions performed by the 
entities, the characteristics of the relevant property or service, the relevant 
contractual terms, the broad economic circumstances, and the business strategies 
pursued by the entities must be taken into account to establish comparability.96 
Some of the comparability factors, such as risk, which is encompassed in the analysis 
of the functions,97 can be particularly hard to ascertain and can give rise to issues 
relating to comparability itself.98 A particular problem with the comparability 
analysis is the absence or scarcity of reliable and sufficient information,99 which can 
be exacerbated, as Durst suggests, by the fact that there is a number of industries 
where only integrated firms operate.100 Particularly, in relation to intangibles the 
identification of proper comparables can be especially challenging.101 In short, it is 
clear that a great range of elements needs to be examined, and deviations that 
cannot be accurately remedied and eliminated render the transactions 
incomparable. Equally, it is clear that comparability can be limited as a result of 
imperfect information on comparables. Overall, the number of moving parts in the 
TP analysis, combined with the inherent limitations of the comparability analysis 
shows that determining what constitutes an arm’s length price is far from easy. 
d. Accepted Methods & the Most Appropriate One 
The OECD Guidelines recognise five main methods for calculating an arm’s 
length price. Those methods are split into the “traditional” and “transactional profit” 
methods. The three traditional methods are Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP), 
Resale Price, and Cost Plus.102 Each of those has a different focal point,103 and as 
such is relevant and useful in different contexts. All three methods can only be used 
where the controlled and uncontrolled transactions are actually comparable.104 
Those three methods are relatively simple and intuitive, but they come with the 
requirement of finding an actually comparable transaction. The traditional methods 
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tend to be the preferred ones, due to their conceptual simplicity.105As Avi-Yonah 
points out however, despite the fact that the three aforementioned methods have 
been hailed as a “gold standard”, they do not apply to the vast majority of cases, 
due to their inherent methodological limitations,106 including the necessity for often 
non-existent comparables. This is especially true in relation to transactions that 
involve assets such as valuable intangibles, which are not traded on markets, 
meaning that price comparability is virtually impossible to establish.107 
The Transactional Profit methods are based on the examination of the profits 
that stem from specific controlled transactions of the associated enterprises 
participating in those transactions.108 The first of those is the Transactional Net 
Margin Method (TNMM), which is based upon the examination of the net profit that 
a taxpayer realises from a controlled transaction or aggregated transactions, 
relative to an “appropriate” base which includes, inter alia, costs and assets.109 The 
final method endorsed in the Guidelines is the Transactional Profit Split method, 
under which the combined profits are divided between the associated enterprises 
in an economically valid and rational way that is intended to approximate the 
division of profits in an arm’s length, uncontrolled transaction.110 Both methods have 
specific advantages and disadvantages, meaning that they apply to different 
situations.111 The transactional profit methods are more complex than the traditional 
ones, and despite the fact they are generally not favoured by tax authorities,112 they 
have been more successful in judicial solutions to TP problems,113 and are the most 
commonly used ones.114 In part, this is due to the fact that the transactional profit 
methods are better suited to taking into account the structural economic benefits 
that MNEs enjoy, as well as the residual value of intangibles.115 
The OECD suggests that each of those methods, traditional or transactional 
profit, should apply to a different kind of transaction. Thus, the most appropriate 
method for a particular case must be identified. This means that in any given TP 
situation any method may be the most appropriate,116 allowing tax authorities and 
MNEs a substantial level of freedom.117 The choice of the most appropriate method 
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will to an extent depend on the search for reliable comparables.118 Under the OECD 
regime, MNEs (and tax authorities) retain the freedom to apply methods not 
described in the Guidelines, if such methods are deemed to be more appropriate 
than the OECD prescribed ones for the facts and circumstances of the individual 
case.119 This is especially relevant in relation to modern MNEs whose primary value-
creation stems from valuable intangibles and organisational capital, neither of 
which can be easily allocated to specific jurisdictions.120 
Thus, beyond a stated preference for the “traditional methods” there is not 
much guidance as to which method ought to be used in a given TP situation. 
However, the limitations of the traditional methods mean that they cannot be 
applied in a number of cases,121 while the use of the transactional profit methods 
can be highly situational. The Guidelines suggest that the appropriateness of a 
method should be determined based on a functional analysis, the availability of 
reliable and adequate information, specifically in relation to uncontrolled 
comparables, and the degree of comparability between the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions under each method.122 However, it is impossible to 
provide specific rules to cover every case.123 There is also a divergence between EU 
Member States as to which method is to be employed – some States for example 
allow the taxpayer to pick the method,124 and others prefer the CUP method if 
applicable,125 while some prefer the TNMM.126 There are also Member States that 
stick to the OECD’s preference for traditional methods over the other methods,127 
while some accept any OECD approved method as equally applicable.128 In effect, 
it is clear that the method that ought to be used is the so-called “most appropriate” 
one, which will heavily depend on the specifics of each case. However, despite the 
differing focal points of each method, reliable comparables need to be identified, 
and, as per the requirements of the comparability analysis, the differences between 
the comparables must not affect the conditions being examined in any given 
method in a material way. 
e. TP and the ALP in the EU 
It is clear that the application of the OCED ALP, even based solely on the 
Guidelines, can be tricky. In a national context, this is exacerbated, as the OECD 
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Guidelines merely provide for a model, designed to facilitate the administration of 
an ALP-based TP regime.129 Therefore, even if the ALP were, in principle, universally 
present in the tax systems of Member States, its application is not uniform.130 
Additionally, the manner and extent to which a Member State implements TP 
regulations and the ALP can greatly affect its fiscal competitiveness.131 As such, 
Member States can use the margin of discretion afforded by the ALP to improve 
their fiscal competitiveness,132 further showcasing the difficulties inherent in a 
uniform application of the principle. It has also been suggested that, beyond issues 
of systemic competitiveness, governments can compete to maximise their own 
returns from specific TP situations.133 It is also worth noting that not all Member 
States rely on the same calculation methods.134 Furthermore, not all Member States 
apply TP rules on the same classes of transactions.135 Thus, the level and means of 
compliance with the Guidelines and the ALP in general will be dependent on the 
domestic tax legislation and administrative practices of individual States,136 and 
there is no general agreement or convergence of practices in relation to 
enforcement or penalties.137 To further illustrate the differential application, even in 
the case of anti-abuse measures like the ones contained in the Anti Tax Avoidance 
Directives (ATADs),138 the introduction of those measures in national tax systems has 
not been uniform,139 as the anti-abuse measures have to make sense in the context 
of individual tax systems.  
TP rules, given that they tend to apply primarily to international transactions 
can in principle fall foul of the fundamental freedoms, as they can be discriminatory 
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to cross-border activities.140 This follows from the fact that TP rules applicable to 
international transactions could create hurdles for multinational undertakings 
operating across borders when compared to the wholly internal activities of such 
undertakings based in the Member State where the TP rules are applicable, by 
potentially treating cross-border transactions differently to domestic ones. Clearly, 
this creates a situation where the non-domestic MNE is to an extent restricted, or at 
least placed at a disadvantage, in relation to the exercise of its free movement rights 
in the pursuit of economic activity. This situation in turn can result in a violation of 
the fundamental freedoms.141 At the same time, the ALP can be used as part of the 
analysis of abuse of (indirect) tax measures, in the sense that if a transaction is 
established to conform to arm’s length terms, then the transaction will not be 
deemed to be abusive and therefore contrary to the VAT Directive,142 which 
however contains a specific reference to the ALP;143 albeit without providing a 
definition. The arm’s length principle also features in the ATAD I,144 and is 
recognised in the Arbitration Convention.145 However, no actual definition of the 
ALP exists in EU primary or secondary law.146  
As mentioned above, the ALP allocates profits and by doing so arguably 
allocates the power to tax a fragment of those profits to the States involved in a 
multinational transaction.147 However, national ALP rules do not create taxing rights, 
but rather protect the allocation of those rights, meaning that they relate to the 
exercise of taxing powers, falling within the purview of the fundamental freedoms.148 
Even though the Court did not refer to the ALP by name, it recognised its rationale 
in SGI.149 The Court explained that a rule taking the form of the ALP allows for the 
Member State to exercise its taxing jurisdiction to activities carried out in its territory, 
or in other words safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing powers.150 This links 
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the ALP to the notion of territoriality,151 as the ECJ seems to confirm.152 The Court 
has tied the application of the balanced allocation of taxing powers justification to 
that of abuse,153 arguably meaning that under the fundamental freedom rules the 
ALP can only apply to actually abusive measures.  
In the case law, the ALP can also be used to showcase the proportionality of 
a national anti-avoidance tax measure,154 and as a rule of thumb to distinguish 
between artificial arrangements and genuine economic transactions.155 The same 
rationale can be found in a Council Resolution on CFCs and Thin Cap rules.156 
However, this does not hold true in relation to a generally discriminatory rule – 
compliance with the Model Convention and the OCED Guidelines does not mean 
that such a national rule is not discriminatory.157 The Court has also recognised that 
deviating from nationally mandated arm’s length pricing can be justified, if it makes 
commercial sense.158 This commercial justification for an ALP deviation can be 
based solely on an economic interest in the “financial success” of group companies 
and subsidiaries.159 The fact that the ECJ’s jurisprudence on TP rules and the 
fundamental freedoms has consistently linked the ALP to the prevention of abuse 
means that economically rational decisions will have to be accepted in national 
applications of the ALP, even if they do not represent an arm’s length outcome, as 
they are not wholly artificial and therefore do not threaten the balanced allocation 
of taxing powers.160  
In essence, bearing in mind the definition of wholly artificial arrangements,161 
only transactions whose sole purpose is the mitigation of tax exposure could 
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conceivably be caught by ALP provisions in the internal market, as an economically 
sound arrangement would also be in line with the goal of efficiently allocating 
resources. The overall case law on the ALP and the internal market clearly relates to 
the application of Member States’ ALP, which may or may be derived, and may be 
informed to a differing degree, from the OECD’s formulation. In effect therefore, it 
is clear that TP rules and the ALP can be scrutinised under the lens of the 
fundamental freedoms, but at the same time, if they fall foul of those rules, they can 
potentially be justified. This is because the Court has tied the ALP to the prevention 
of abuse and the protection of the balanced allocation of taxing powers. However, 
the ECJ recognises that restrictions placed outside the scope of those justifications, 
for example by restricting an arrangement which is underpinned by economic 
rationality, would not be justifiable under the scheme of fundamental freedoms law. 
Simply put therefore, national ALP laws can only catch genuinely abusive 
arrangements, and must accept economically reasonable non-arm’s length 
outcomes. It is clear in this context that fundamental freedoms law can have an 
influence on the application of national ALP rules, necessitating to an extent a light 
touch, but does not affect the content of those rules. Such rules are neither made 
compulsory nor prohibited, as free movement law examines the application of the 
national rules. 
f. Conclusion 
It becomes apparent that ascertaining whether a transaction was carried out 
in accordance with the ALP is not easy. It is clear that the ALP and the OECD TP 
regime, on top of not being legally binding or uniformly applied, are extremely 
complex and rely on a multifaceted comparative analysis. The vast amount and 
width of information required to carry out the comparison required by the nature of 
the ALP mean that in some cases, especially when dealing with complex corporate 
structures and intangibles, the identification, and subsequent use of reliable 
comparables can be extremely hard,162 which neuters the effectiveness of the 
analysis. Additionally, the ALP conceptually struggles to take into account some of 
the economic benefits associated with being part of an integrated group. Beyond 
this, despite its wide recognition as a useful tool to prevent TP abuses, the ALP 
 
efficient allocation of resources, as per Article 120 TFEU, cannot be deemed to be artificial. See: 
Case C-201/05 Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue ECLI:EU:C:2008:239, paras 75-76; Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue ECLI:EU:C:2006:544, paras 51, 55-56; 
Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas ECLI:EU:C:2000:695, para 
51; Schön, ‘Transfer Pricing’ (n 61), 94. See also: Pasquale Pistone, ‘European Direct Tax Law: Quo 
Vadis?’ in L Hinnekens and P Hinnekens (eds) A Vision of Taxes Within and Outside European 
Borders: Festschrift in Honor of Prof. Dr. Frans Vanistendael (Wolters Kluwer 2008), 718 
162 See for example: William H Byrnes, ‘Boiling Starbucks’ Roasting Down to the Essence of its 




cannot be said to be uniformly applied – the same holds true of the TP Guidelines, 
as they are a soft law instrument, designed to fit in with vastly different national tax 
systems and approaches to TP. 
It is clear that the ALP is not a clear-cut or legal test, but rather a test based 
on complex economic factors, often mired by information asymmetry. It is also 
important to note that the OECD is not too restrictive on its approach, allowing for 
deviations, and recognising that TP is not an exact science, requiring the exercise of 
a wide margin of discretion on behalf of both the taxpayer and the tax authorities.163 
This allows for considerable leeway,164 while even the choice of the most 
appropriate method is not clear.165 In brief, the ALP as it exists in the OECD TP 
Guidelines is far from being uniform in its application, while also suffering from clear 
practical and theoretical limitations. The comparability analysis that sits at the core 
of the ALP is itself limited due to the common lack of reliable and adequate 
comparables.166 Beyond this, there is no uniformity in enforcement rules or 
penalties, or even documentation requirements.167 Finally, the width of the 
acceptable arm’s length ranges showcases that even within one of the approved 
methods, and even if the comparability assessment is carried out in the best way 
possible, the actual arm’s length outcome can vary wildly.168 Arguably, those issues 
and limitations make the ALP, as encoded in the OECD Guidelines and as accepted 
by the ECJ, a problematic benchmark upon which the existence of an advantage, 
for the purposes of State aid law, is to be assessed. 
V. The Tax Ruling Decisions 
 Thus far, this Chapter has, albeit briefly, provided some necessary context on 
some of the fiscal elements that feature heavily in the factual patterns and the 
reasoning employed in the Commission’s tax ruling and transfer pricing State aid 
Decisions. This Part will first briefly set out the factual patterns and then outline the 
rationale of the recent Decisions. The most headline-grabbing Decisions were the 
ones aimed at Starbucks, Fiat Finance and Trading (FFT), Apple, and Amazon. 
However, there are many more Decisions that need to be discussed. A common 
theme with almost all the Decisions is that they target (usually very large) MNEs, and 
tend to have a tax ruling as their starting point. The Commission has also 
investigated McDonald’s, and ENGIE (formerly GDF Suez), while also looking into a 
Belgian Excess Profit Scheme. Additionally, the Commission examined Gibraltar’s 
tax ruling regime, and certain tax exemptions. The following section will briefly 
outline the facts and reasoning employed in those Decisions. In discussing the facts, 
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this section will provide a brief analysis, while the discussion of the rationale will 
focus on the notions of advantage and selectivity. This is because the nature of the 
alleged aid as fiscal and operating, and the sums involved, mean that the twin 
criteria of effect on trade and distortion of competition are almost certainly met. In 
relation to the State resources criterion, the measures will be imputable to the State, 
while if an advantage is indeed present there is no doubt that the monies that 
financed it represent lost revenue or at the very least foregone resources. 
a. Factual Patterns 
From the outset, it is worth noting that all individual Decisions deal with 
complex factual patterns, usually involving a number of affiliated enterprises, and 
not necessarily orthodox accounting practices. As such, as thorough review of the 
facts of each and every case is outside the scope of this thesis. Rather, this part will 
focus on some common elements and sketch the outline of the facts.  
The final Decisions in Starbucks, Fiat, Apple, Amazon, the Belgian Excess 
Profit Scheme, ENGIE, and McDonald’s all revolve around MNEs and the existence 
of tax rulings. In all instances, the party who received the tax ruling was a subsidiary, 
or a branch of a subsidiary, within a larger group.169 The tax rulings in effect 
confirmed the tax treatment of those entities, in the context of the group in which 
they operate. Those tax rulings fixed the basis for the entities’ remuneration,170 fixed 
the amount of licence and royalty fees,171 confirmed the tax residency of the entities 
involved,172 accepted combinations of transactions between affiliated entities,173 or 
deemed certain types of profit exempt following from somewhat artificial 
calculations.174 In all instances, the alleged advantage stemmed, primarily, from the 
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content of those tax rulings and the calculations inherent in them. Those issues are 
not necessarily of the same magnitude. For example, in ENGIE the structure 
endorsed by the tax rulings combined a deduction at subsidiary level with an 
exemption at holding company level, engineering an internal D/NI situation, which 
meant that effectively no tax was paid,175 while in McDonald’s the ruling simply 
recognised that the subsidiary was tax resident in Luxembourg, and could thus 
benefit from the network of DTCs – the actual benefit merely came from the 
application of those DTCs.176 
The Commission also issued a “systemic” Decision relating to Gibraltar’s tax 
ruling regime alongside exemptions for passive interest and royalties.177 This 
Decision relates to tax rulings, but does not delve into transfer pricing or 
mismatches, and as such is different from the ones discussed above. This is because 
the Commission examined over 160 tax rulings to ensure they had correctly applied 
national tax law,178 as opposed to conducting a thorough analysis of the arm’s length 
character of tax rulings relating to one group of undertakings.  
The problems with the tax rulings, and the calculations and profit allocations 
they confirmed and endorsed, partly relate to the fact that in most cases a 
transactional profit method, usually TNMM, was employed.179 As mentioned above 
those methods have some distinct advantages, but are also much more complex 
and less intuitive when compared to the traditional methods. Another complicating 
factor in several Decisions was the existence and licencing of valuable and unique 
IP. In Starbucks those rights were held by a UK limited partnership and licenced to 
the subsidiary,180 while in Apple they were assigned to the central offices of the 
subsidiaries instead of their Irish branches.181 In Amazon, the IP was held by a tax 
transparent and non-taxable resident entity and licenced to the primary European 
operator for a fee,182 and finally in McDonald’s the IP rights were held by the 
subsidiary, but assigned to its US branch which collected royalties, while a Swiss 
branch was in charge of licencing the IP to franchisors.183 
There were also some problems specific to individual cases, like the fact that 
Apple’s subsidiaries were technically stateless,184 or the diverging definitions and 
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practices between the US and Luxembourg in relation to permanent 
establishments, which allowed the US branch and IP holder to be taxable neither in 
Luxembourg nor the US, under the DTC between the two countries.185 Another 
example is the creation of an internal mismatch in ENGIE.186 However, it is clear that 
the common threads of the majority of those Decisions relate to the arm’s length 
character of the arrangements stemming from the contested tax rulings,187 with 
McDonald’s being the sole case where the core of the problem was the application 
of the US-Luxembourg DTC,188 rather than transfer pricing.  
In brief, the facts that gave rise to the Commission’s tax ruling Decisions are 
in themselves rather complex, as can be evidenced by the length of those Decisions. 
However, with the exception of Gibraltar which revolved, in part, around the entire 
tax ruling practice of the tax jurisdiction, it is clear that there are some basic common 
threads in the factual patterns. Despite the fact that each case deals with different 
facts which can add layers of complexity, it is clear that all the Decisions deal with 
MNEs and tax rulings, in most instances APAs. In this context, and bearing in mind 
the complexities inherent in TP especially in relation to unique intangibles, the main 
issue in the Decisions in the application of the ALP in the tax rulings concerned. 
Under this prism, to scrutinise the application of the ALP or other TP rules in the 
context of each individual Decision would require a thorough economic analysis of 
the facts, which is outside the scope of this thesis. The context provided in relation 
to the subject-matter of the Decisions, and the general structure of the facts is 
sufficient to allow for an examination of the Commission’s and the Court’s rationale.  
b. Reasoning 
The Commission employs a very similar reasoning in almost all of the tax 
ruling Decisions it has issued thus far. To an extent, this follows from the similar 
subject-matter of the cases, and the factual similarities outlined above. There are of 
course cases, specifically Gibraltar and McDonald’s, where the reasoning does not 
follow the structure and rationale that informs the other Decisions. This is because 
on the one hand Gibraltar is a “systemic” case, while in McDonald’s despite the 
existence of a tax ruling, the core issue was the application of web of DTCs, 
especially in relation to the US-based branch.  
First of all, as it has been explained in the previous Chapters, three of the five 
criteria of State aid are generally easy to satisfy in relation to fiscal cases. Namely, 
the effect on trade and distortion of competition criteria are effectively automatically 
satisfied in relation to operating and fiscal aid, especially considering the sums 
 
185 McDonald’s Decision (n 169), recitals 39-46 
186 ENGIE Decision (n 169), recitals 23-26, 35-42, 62-69 
187 See for example: Starbucks Decision (n 169), recitals 155-160; Fiat Decision (n 169), recital 147; 
ENGIE Decision (n 169), recitals 92-96 
188 McDonald’s Decision (n 169), recital 66 
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involved in the recent Decisions.189 The inherent purpose and internal logic of the 
State resources criterion also mean that both limbs of it, imputability and placing a 
burden on State resources, will be satisfied if an advantage is present. A tax ruling 
is imputable to the tax authorities, and thus the State, while even if the Member 
States can claim that the tax rulings allowed them to increase their tax revenue due 
to the incentivising effects of the aid on the MNE’s location, the difference between 
the taxes collected and those that ought to have been collected represents at the 
very least foregone revenue.190 Thus, it is clear that the criteria on which the analysis 
should be focused in the tax ruling Decisions are selectivity and advantage.  
In this regard, the Commission does not do a great job at keeping the two 
criteria, or their respective analyses, separate. Instead, in all but one of the relevant 
Decisions,191 the two notions are collapsed under one heading and analysed in 
tandem as a “super-criterion” of selective advantage.192 In the context of this 
analytical approach, the Commission argues that the derogation from the reference 
framework, in the second step of the three-step selectivity test, and the identification 
of the advantage coincide.193 The Commission’s analysis, in effect, starts as a typical 
fiscal selectivity analysis by identifying the reference framework, and then examines 
the advantage as a derogation from that framework. In effect, it splices the 
advantage analysis into that of selectivity. 
The Commission argued first of all that in instances where the aid was 
individual, the existence of the advantage could establish a presumption that said 
advantage was granted selectively.194 However, the Commission also examined 
selectivity by applying the three-step test. In that analysis, the Commission 
determines the reference framework to be the general system of corporate taxation 
whose objective is the taxation of corporate profits, which in effect makes all 
undertakings comparable.195 In a number of Decisions, the Commission also offered 
 
189 Case C-301/87 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:67, para 44; Case C-88/03 Portugal v 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, para 91; Case C-496/06 P Commission v Italy and Wam SpA 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:272, para 51 
190 Joined cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, paras 127-129; Case C- 279/08 P Commission v The Netherlands (NOx) 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:551, para 104 
191 Amazon Decision (n 169), recitals 401 et seq., 580 et seq. 
192 Starbucks Decision (n 169), recital 229; Fiat Decision (n 169), recital 191; Apple Decision (n 169), 
recital 225; Belgium Decision (n 169), recital 118; ENGIE Decision (n 169), recital 161 
193 Starbucks Decision (n 169), recitals 253-254; Fiat Decision (n 169), recitals 217-218; Apple 
Decision (n 169), recital 245; Belgium Decision (n 169), recitals 131-134; ENGIE Decision (n 169), 
recitals 193, 198. See also: McDonald’s Decision (n 169), recitals 111-117; Gibraltar Decision (n 26) 
recitals 184-187 
194 See for example: Fiat Decision (n 169), recital 218; Apple Decision (n 169), recital 224; Amazon 
Decision (n 169), recitals 582-584. See also: Case C-15/14 P Commission v MOL Magyar Olaj- és 
Gázipari Nyrt ECLI:EU:C:2015:362, para 60 
195 Starbucks Decision (n 169), recitals 232, 251; Fiat Decision (n 169), recitals 194, 209; Apple 




a subsidiary line of reasoning, where it determined the reference framework to be 
narrower, and comprised of the relevant national laws applicable to the situations 
examined.196 Nonetheless, it is clear that the core analysis of selectivity, or rather of 
“selective advantage” is undertaken under the much wider, general reference 
framework. 
In the context of this reference framework, it is assumed, as a result of the 
wide comparability that follows from the framework’s objective, that if the 
methodology endorsed in the contested tax ruling deviates from a reliable 
“approximation of market-based outcomes”, then it derogates from the reference 
framework, meaning that a selective advantage will be present.197 This reasoning is 
facilitated by the fact that, as will be discussed at length in the following Chapter, 
the Commission argues that there is an ALP inherent in the application of Article 
107(1) TFEU, as a result of a principle of equality.198 This ALP is thus different and 
independent from either national ALP rules, or the OECD’s approach.199 Practically, 
this means that a deviation from the ALP in a tax ruling confers an advantage, as a 
deviation from the ALP is construed as a departure from a reliable “approximation 
of market-based outcomes”.200  
Following from this, the bulk of the Commission’s reasoning is a thorough 
examination of the arm’s length character of the outcomes endorsed in the 
contested tax rulings. Effectively, the Commission conducts a TP analysis, looking at 
all the relevant factors, in order to establish a deviation from the ALP.201 In all the 
Decisions examining the ALP, the Commission concluded that there had indeed 
been a deviation from it, establishing the existence of an advantage as a deviation 
from the ALP, and as a derogation from the reference framework.202 Even under the 
 
Decision (n 169), recitals 121-129, 135-141; ENGIE Decision (n 169), recitals 171-176; McDonald’s 
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199 See for example: Fiat Decision (n 169), recital 228 
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narrower, subsidiary, reference framework, the same approach was utilised, and the 
same conclusion was reached.203  
Thus, in all the Decisions, bar McDonald’s, the Commission reached the 
conclusion that a selective advantage was present, meaning in effect, in the context 
of the relative lack of substance of the remaining three criteria, that the contested 
tax rulings did in fact constitute State aid. In the context of McDonald’s, the tax 
benefit was simply the result of an entity mismatch, and thus not problematic from 
a State aid perspective.204 In Gibraltar, where the Commission examined more the 
160 tax rulings, most of them, even those correctly applying problematic tax laws, 
were not found to confer aid in and of themselves, the exception being a handful of 
rulings which for a period of time (clearly) departed from national tax laws.205 Those 
two Decisions show that tax rulings, and tax ruling practices in general, are not per 
se problematic. However, the Commission’s reasoning in relation to the APAs, as 
opposed to the straight tax rulings, raises significant issues, centred around the 
existence and utilisation of an ALP inherent in EU law. In effect, even if tax rulings 
are legally acceptable, the same cannot readily be said of rulings dealing with TP 
and the application of the ALP. 
VI. Conclusion 
This Chapter has discussed some elements of international taxation that are 
relevant to any discussion of the Commission’s approach in the recent tax ruling 
Decisions. First of all, tax rulings, despite being potentially abusable, are generally 
recognised as being fiscally beneficial for tax authorities and taxpayers, and are 
generally not problematic from a State aid perspective. In fact, it has been shown 
that their nature and logic make the application of State aid rules to them far from 
obvious. Mismatches were also shown to be highly abusable, but more often than 
not simply result from the exercise in parallel of taxing powers by two or more 
States, in the context of an unharmonised global tax environment.  
The ALP, even though it is a staple of international tax practice, is far from 
clear in its application. The non-binding nature of the TP Guidelines, combined with 
the foundational hypothetical of the ALP, namely the evaluation of controlled 
transactions as if they had occurred on the free market, make practical divergences 
unavoidable. It is also unclear which methodology should be utilised, while limited 
comparability data, and the prevalence of (wide) ALP ranges make it clear that 
applying this principle is more of an art than a science. The whole ALP regime is 
mired in uncertainty and approximations, meaning that a clear-cut answer to 
whether a given APA is in line with the ALP, especially an ALP external to the system 
 
203 See for example: Starbucks Decision (n 169), recitals 422-423; Amazon Decision (n 169) recitals 
600-602; ENGIE Decision (n 169), recitals 204-215 
204 McDonald’s Decision (n 169), recital 126 
205 Gibraltar Decision (n 26), recitals 128-187 
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in which the APA was concluded, is not always possible.206 This inherent flexibility 
and uncertainty can arguably be problematic in the context of the (objectively 
defined) notion of an advantage for the purposes of State aid. 
Those elements of international taxation provide the context in which the 
recent Decisions ought to be analysed. It has been shown that despite their complex 
facts, most of the Decisions revolve around similar patterns, and employ a very 
similar, for the most part, rationale. This albeit brief breakdown of the facts and 
reasoning of the tax ruling Decisions allows for a critical evaluation of that rationale 
in a more abstract way, and in the context of the notion of fiscal State aid, as it 
emerges from the previous Chapters. 
 
206 Kyle Richard, ‘Are All Tax Rulings State Aid: Examining the European Commission’s Recent State 
Aid Decisions’ (2018) 18 Houston Business and Tax Law Journal 1, 43; Werner Haslehner, ‘Double 
Taxation Relief, Transfer Pricing Adjustments and State Aid Law’ in I Richelle, W Schön, E Traversa 
(eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 2016), 148; Gunn and Luts (n 25), 121, 124-125 
146 
 
Critical Analysis of the Tax Ruling Decisions 
I. Introduction 
 This Chapter will build on the summary of the complex factual patterns that 
gave rise to the Commission’s recent tax rulings and fiscal aid Decisions, and the 
outline of the reasoning employed in those Decisions in relation to the notions of 
selectivity and advantage discussed in the previous Chapter. This Chapter will 
critically evaluate and analyse the notion of fiscal State aid as it emerges from those 
Decisions. In doing so, it will focus on the arguments raised by the Commission, and 
where available, the response of the General Court.1 This Chapter will use the 
discussion of tax rulings and the ALP in the previous Chapter as a springboard for 
some elements of the discussion.  
 First of all, the major problematic element of the Commission’s reasoning is 
the claim that Article 107(1) TFEU contains an autonomous EU ALP. This Chapter 
will evaluate the case law foundations of this claim, and will discuss the rationale 
based on which the Commission made it. Additionally, the content and nature of an 
EU ALP will be analysed, based on the Decisions and the available judgments. 
Following from this, issues of tax policy and the potential infringement of fiscal 
sovereignty stemming from an EU ALP will be discussed. Second, given the use of 
the EU ALP primarily as part of the advantage analysis, this Chapter will discuss the 
burden and standard of proof attached to it, in an attempt to find the practical limits 
of the Commission’s review of tax rulings under the lens of this newly minted 
principle. Third, the reference framework employed for the purposes of the 
selectivity analysis will be criticised, both in relation to its width and in relation to its 
content. Finally, the combined criterion of “selective advantage”, employed by the 
Commission, will be discussed. As a whole, this Chapter will aim to showcase the 
more problematic elements of the Commission’s reasoning both on a case-by-case 
basis and in general terms as they relate to the notion of fiscal aid. Such a discussion 
is important and relevant, as the recent Decisions and their reasoning are bound to 
test the limits of the application of the State aid rules in relation to taxation.2 
II. An EU ALP? 
One of the most striking features of the 2016 Notice on the Notion of Aid, 
and of the recent Decisions, is the fact that the Commission seemingly discovered 
an EU arm’s length principle, hiding in plain sight for almost sixty years, embedded 
in Article 107(1) TFEU. As is evident from the discussion of the Commission’s 
arguments in Decisions,3 the use of the ALP is pivotal to their success. Specifically, 
 
1 At the time of writing, no Case stemming from the Decisions discussed has reached the ECJ, and 
only four have been decided by the EGC. 
2 Conor Quigley, European State Aid Law and Policy (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2015), 10 
3 See Part V of the Tax Rulings, the Arm’s Length Principle, and the Commission’s Decisions Chapter. 
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in most of the Decisions, the crux of the Commission’s assessment of the existence 
of aid revolves around the non-arm’s length character of the arrangements 
endorsed by the contested tax rulings. Interestingly, the Commission relies to an 
extent on an ALP which forms, and presumably has always formed, part of the State 
aid apparatus. It is therefore necessary to examine the existence of such an EU ALP. 
In this context, it is important first to clarify what the Commission refers to when 
asserting the existence of such a principle and analyse the basis for this assertion. 
The 2016 Notice states, quite bluntly, that the ALP “necessarily” is part of the 
Commission’s assessment of tax measures relating to group companies, regardless 
of whether or how a Member State has actually implemented it in its national 
legislation.4 The Commission argues that it is used to assess whether tax liabilities 
produce a “reliable approximation of a market-based outcome”.5 However, what 
makes this passage remarkable is the assertion that this ALP is merely an application 
of Article 107(1) TFEU, based on the prohibition of unequal fiscal treatment of 
undertakings in a comparable legal and factual situation.6 This approach is 
reiterated in the recent Decisions,7 and has grosso modo been accepted by the 
General Court in relation to those Decisions.8 For example, the Commission states 
in the Fiat Decision that the ALP applied in “State aid assessment is not derived from 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention […] but is a general principle of equal 
treatment in taxation falling within the application of Article 107(1)”.9 Accordingly, 
this Treaty-derived ALP supposedly binds the Member States.10 The same exact 
reasoning can be found in the Starbucks,11 Apple,12 and Belgian Excess Profits 
Decisions.13 More importantly however, the Commission argues that a deviation 
 
4 Commission Notice on the notion of State Aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C 262/01, para 172 
5 Ibidem 
6 Ibidem 
7 Commission Decision (EU) 2016/2326 of 21 October 2015 on State Aid SA.38375 (2014/C ex 
2014/NN) which Luxembourg granted to Fiat [2016] OJ L 351/1, recital 228; Commission Decision 
(EU) 2017/502 of 21 October 2015 on State Aid SA.38374 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) implemented by 
the Netherlands to Starbucks [2017] OJ L 83/38, recital 264; Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1283 
of 30 August 2016 on State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by 
Ireland to Apple [2017] OJ L 187/1, recitals 255-257; Commission Decision (EU) 2016/1699 of 11 
January 2016 on the excess profit exemption State Aid scheme SA.37667 (2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) 
implemented by Belgium, [2016] OJ L 260/61, recital 150. See also: Fausta Todhe, ‘The Rise of an 
(Autonomous) Arm's Length Principle in EU State Aid Rules’ (2019) 18 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 249, 251-256 
8 Joined Cases T-760/15 and T-636/16 The Netherlands and Starbucks Corp. v Commission 
ECLI:EU:T:2019:669, paras 162, 168-169; Joined Cases T-755/15 and T-759/15 Luxembourg and 
Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2019:670, paras 150, 161-162; Joined Cases 
T-778/16 and T-892/16 Ireland and Apple Sales International and Apple Operation Europe v 
Commission ECLI:EU:T:2020:338, paras 214-215, 221 
9 Fiat Decision (n 7), recital 228 
10 Ibidem 
11 Starbucks Decision (n 7), recital 264 
12 Apple Decision (n 7), recitals 255-257 
13 Belgium Decision (n 7), recital 150 
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from the arm’s length principle confers a selective advantage.14 This arguably can 
be taken to mean, as the Commission,15 and to a lesser extent the General Court,16 
seem to confirm, that this new ALP forms part of the reference framework under 
which a measure is to be assessed. The sole foundation for this approach is, 
according to the Commission, the Forum 187 judgment.17 However, this foundation 
is quite shaky. 
a. Forum 187 
Forum 187 is an interesting case, even though nobody really knew it when it 
was first decided18 – its potential laid dormant until the Commission discovered it. 
However, as will be discussed, it is unclear that the judgment actually says what the 
Commission has extrapolated from it. It is not a very explicit judgment.19 The case 
concerned a Belgian tax regime aimed at coordination centres, which provided that 
those centres would be taxed at a standard rate determined by the cost-plus 
method, representing a percentage of their operating costs, excluding certain 
costs. Additionally, the centres were exempted from property taxes on professional 
buildings, and most dividends were exempted from withholding taxes.20 In order 
for a company to qualify as a coordination centre it had to receive individual 
authorisation by royal decree, and that authorisation was conditional on it being 
part of a multinational group, with large capital and reserves, and an even larger 
annual consolidated turnover.21 Additionally, the centres could only carry out 
certain types of activities, not be in the financial sector, and employ at least ten full-
time employees in Belgium.22 The ECJ argued that the tax liability normally borne 
would be based on the “ordinary tax system based on the difference between 
profits and outgoings of an undertaking carrying on its activities in conditions of free 
competition”.23 As such, the Court found that the cost-plus calculations, as well as 
the numerous exemptions, did indeed confer an advantage,24 as under normal 
market conditions the fiscal liability would cover all of those costs.25 In other words, 
“normal” taxation did not exclude the exempted charges. In terms of selectivity, the 
 
14 2016 Notice (n 4), recital 171 
15 Ibidem, recital 172; Starbucks Decision (n 7), recital 258; Fiat Decision (n 7), recital 222 
16 Starbucks (n 8), paras 149-151; Fiat (n 8), paras 141-143; Apple (n 8), paras 206-208, 212-214 
17 Tony Joris and Wout De Cock, ‘Is Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission a Suitable Legal Source 
for an EU At Arm's Length Principle’ (2017) 16 European State Aid Law Quarterly 607, 613 
18 Ibidem, 608, 615; Jayant Mehta, ‘Case Report Joined Cases C-182/03 (Belgium) and C-217/03 
(Forum 187) v. Commission’ (2007) 6 European State Aid Law Quarterly 732 
19 Peter J Wattel, ‘Stateless Income, State Aid and the (Which?) Arm’s Length Principle’ (2016) 44 
INTERTAX 791, 793 
20 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:416, paras 9-13 
21 Ibidem, para 6 
22 Ibidem 
23 Ibidem, para 95 
24 Ibidem, paras 95-97, 101-117 
25 Juris and De Cock (n 17), 610 
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scheme clearly deviated from the reference framework, as the numerous 
exemptions were derogations from the “ordinary Belgian tax regime”.26 
Additionally, the Court held that the regime was also selective in relation to MNEs, 
as only those active in four or more countries and those with significant capital, 
reserves, and annual turnover could benefit from it.27 Thus, selectivity existed on 
multiple levels, but the finding of selectivity did not relate to the tax liability normally 
borne. 
All in all, Forum 187 appears to be a relatively straightforward judgment: the 
recipients’ tax burden was clearly reduced, and there was a difference in the 
treatment of undertakings in a similar legal and factual situation, for example a MNE 
which did not have the required annual turnover would still risk suffering double 
taxation.28 Oddly enough, given the Commission’s reliance on the case,29 the term 
“arm’s length” does not appear in the text of the judgment.30 Instead, the part of the 
judgment the Commission relies on simply mentions “conditions of free 
competition”, and their consistent application to all.31 Belgium had after all included 
the ALP in the form the cost-plus method, as recommended by the OECD, in the 
contested measure – the Court merely examined its application,32 and found it 
problematic due to deviations from the cost-plus methodology, and the further 
exemptions.33 This is obvious due to the ECJ’s explicit reference to the contested 
Decision, where the Commission criticised the application of the specific, OECD-
derived TP methodology which was provided for by the national law.34 
As such, it is submitted that the Court merely said that the ordinary fiscal 
regime should be applied correctly, and not what it should include.35 In other words, 
in a different national legislative and fiscal context, the conditions of free 
competition referred to would be different. The Commission appears therefore to 
be rather creative in its interpretation of the Court’s wording, as it clearly derives the 
existence of an arm’s length principle from the term “conditions of free 
 
26 Forum 187 (n 20), paras 120-121 
27 Ibidem, paras 122-123 
28 Ibidem, para 125 
29 In fact, the Commission cites it as the sole basis, save for its own recent tax ruling Decisions, to 
assert that a deviation from the arm’s length principle confers a selective advantage See to that effect 
2016 Notice (n 4), para 171 
30 Raymond H C Luja, ‘Do State Aid Rules Still Allow European Union Member States to Claim Fiscal 
Sovereignty?’ (2016) 25 EC Tax Review 312, 323 
31 Forum 187 (n 20), paras 96-97 
32 Ibidem, paras 94-95 
33 Juris and De Cock (n 17), 614; Saturnina Moreno Gonzalez, ‘State Aid and Tax Competition: 
Comments on the European Commission's Decisions on Transfer Pricing Rulings’ (2016) 15 
European State Aid Law Quarterly 556, 564 
34 Forum 187 (n 20), paras 94-96, with reference to recital 95 of Commission Decision 2003/755/EC 
of 17 February 2003 on the aid scheme implemented by Belgium for coordination centres 
established in Belgium [2003] OJ L 282/25. See also recital 15 of the Decision. 
35 Wattel, ‘Stateless Income’ (n 19), 794 
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competition”,36 even though the term is not clarified or expanded upon at all.37 As 
Kyriazis points out, even if we were to accept that the Court was indeed proposing 
the use of the ALP as a benchmark in general, the context of judgment suggests that 
it was referring to the OECD one, as it discussed the application of the cost-plus 
method, and referred approvingly to the Commission’s Decision, which also 
discussed and applied the OECD-derived ALP.38 In brief, it is unlikely that the Court 
made the statement the Commission thinks it did in relation to the application of 
the ALP as a tool to ensure adherence to conditions of free competition in general, 
and even if it did, it made that pronouncement not in relation to an ALP derived 
from Article 107(1) TFEU, but in relation to the OECD one.39 
Another element that merits some attention, especially in relation to the tax 
ruling Decisions, is that the Commission suggests that Forum 187 can be used to 
determine the existence of a selective advantage.40 The Commission even included 
its thoughts on the ALP on the section of the 2016 Notice dealing with selectivity, 
making it hard to argue that the terms “selective” is merely an adjective used in 
relation to the advantage allegedly conferred. Instead, it appears that the 
Commission further extrapolated from Forum 187 a relationship between selectivity 
and the ALP.41 However, as discussed above, the contested measure’s selectivity in 
Forum 187 did not stem from a departure from conditions of free competition, but 
from some clear-cut and obvious exemptions, and mainly from the fact that only 
coordination centres, a status reserved for MNEs with certain characteristics, could 
benefit from the advantages.42 Accordingly, the ECJ compared MNEs to MNEs. This 
is important, as, for the purposes of the contested regime, only MNEs could benefit 
from the advantages. Additionally, the comparison of MNEs to MNEs reaffirms the 
point that domestic and multinational groups, and MNEs and standalone 
companies are not, or at the very least should not be, in principle comparable in 
relation to the application of the ALP.43 The selectivity of the measure therefore had 
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nothing to do with the ALP, either as applied by the Court in the context of Belgian 
law, or as a general principle.44 Even if it is accepted that a general statement as to 
the use of the ALP was made by the Court, this statement would relate exclusively 
to the notion of advantage, it would have nothing to do with the notion of 
selectivity.45 As a final point, it is worth mentioning that in support of the most 
controversial aspect of its reasoning, namely claiming the existence of an 
autonomous EU Treaty-derived ALP, the Commission relies again solely on Forum 
187, citing a completely banal statement, namely that rules relating to tax are not 
excluded from the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.46 It provides no other authority to 
substantiate this claim.  
It is therefore clear that the authority relied on by the Commission, in both its 
Decisions, and the 2016 Notice in relation to the nature of the ALP as a general 
principle of State aid law, and as an autonomous principle flowing directly from 
Article 107(1) TFEU, is far from explicit. In fact, it is arguable that the Commission’s 
reading of Forum 187 is flawed, given the national fiscal context surrounding the 
contested measure. Additionally, the Court never utilised the term “arm’s length”, 
meaning that the Commission took great liberties in its extrapolation of not only a 
term but a general principle from the judgment. Finally, even if the Commission’s 
reading regarding the ALP is correct, this ALP would be the OECD one, and most 
importantly would have nothing to do with the notion of selectivity. In brief, the 
reliance on this judgment for so many elements of the Notice and the recent 
Decisions is problematic.47 
b. The EU ALP in the Commission’s Decisions and the General Court’s 
Judgments 
Interestingly, both the ALP and any mention of Forum 187 were absent from 
the 2014 Draft Notice – in fact they seemingly only became relevant after the 
investigations that materialised into the recent Decisions were launched.48 The tax 
ruling Decisions clearly rely on the ALP, with it being a fundamental part of the 
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Commission’s analysis. More importantly the Decisions claim that this ALP is derived 
directly from Article 107(1) TFEU.49 As discussed, and as Moreno Gonzalez explains, 
the utilisation of the ALP in fiscal State aid cases is nothing new – in fact it is quite 
reasonable if the ALP, any ALP for that matter, is part of the domestic tax system.50 
This was the case with the previous uses of the ALP in the Commission’s decisional 
practice,51 and the Forum 187 judgment. If TP rules exist within the domestic fiscal 
regime, a deviation from them could after all give rise to a finding of aid, if selectivity 
is established. In the context of those older Decisions, the Commission utilised 
primarily the OECD Guidelines to assess the ALP methodologies put in place by the 
Member States in question.52 Essentially, the Commission seems to have 
recognised, in those older Decisions, that for the ALP to be used in the realm of 
State aid, it should first have been introduced in the offending Member States’ fiscal 
landscape, and that even in those cases the peculiarities of the tax systems and the 
approximate nature of the OECD Guidelines-derived ALP should be taken into 
account.53 As such, the Commission’s pronouncements in the tax ruling Decisions, 
and in the 2016 Notice, are far from being a clarification or codification of 
established legal norms and practices. Indeed, they represent something wholly 
new.54  
The General Court, at the time of writing, has delivered four judgments 
related to those Decisions, three of which actually discuss the ALP,55 namely 
Starbucks, Fiat, and Apple. In those three judgments, the EGC somewhat confirmed 
the Commission’s approach, but not necessarily the implications of it.56 First of all, 
the Court noted that the ALP, as used by the Commission in the contested 
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Decisions, is a “tool”,57 a “benchmark”,58 or a “methodology”.59 Essentially, the Court 
explained that since tax authorities accepted, in the contested rulings, certain levels 
of pricing in Starbucks and Fiat,60 and of profit attribution in Apple,61 Article 107(1) 
allows the Commission to determine whether those levels correspond to those that 
would have been obtained under market conditions, using the ALP as tool for that 
determination.62 Thus, the ALP was used by the Commission, in the General Court’s 
eyes, as a benchmark to establish whether an advantage was granted.63 It is 
therefore clear that the EU ALP relates to the notion of advantage, and is to be used 
as a “tool” or “benchmark” for its identification. However, the Court explicitly stated 
that the ALP can only be used to identify an advantage if the variation between the 
two compared outcomes goes beyond any inaccuracies inherent in the 
methodology used to obtain the approximation in question,64 stressing that the 
mere identification of methodological errors in the arrangements in not sufficient to 
prove their advantageous nature.65 Thus, the Court recognised the approximate 
nature of the ALP, without however providing any guidance, either as to what 
constitutes going “beyond” the inaccuracies, or as to what can be considered to be 
an inherent inaccuracy in this context.  
It is important to note that even though the Court accepted the use of the 
ALP as a “tool”, it explicitly rejected the notion that there is a general principle of 
equal treatment in taxation stemming from Article 107(1), as such an interpretation 
would give the State aid prohibition “too broad a scope”.66 This approach is 
reasonable in its conception of equality, as it is worth noting that fiscal norms, such 
as progressivity of tax or ability to pay, differentiate in the distribution of fiscal 
burdens regularly, but it is clear from the case law discussed in previous Chapters 
that not all unequal outcomes flowing from a fiscal norm are, or can be considered 
to be, State aid.67 However, in those pronouncements, the Court arguably looked 
past the very explicit wording of the contested Decisions,68 which it recognised,69 
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and accepted the approach the Commission proposed during the hearing.70 The 
bolder version of the Commission’s approach survives in the 2016 Notice,71 which 
however does not mean it has the judicature’s blessing,72 as evidenced by the 
careful language of the Court in this instance. However, on the basis of Apple, it 
appears that the Court has recognised that this “tool” is indeed a singular one, 
describing it as “the arm’s length principle arising from Article 107 TFEU”.73 As such, 
even though the Commission’s ALP seems to have been somewhat relegated from 
an expression of a general principle to a tool, it still “necessarily” forms part of the 
Commission’s analysis.74 Thus, based on the Court’s approach, it seems that the 
Commission’s ALP itself is a general principle of equal treatment in taxation, which 
falls within the scope of application of the State aid prohibition – as opposed to an 
expression of a general principle of equality stemming directly from the wording of 
Article 107(1).75  
In brief, the EU ALP was accepted by the General Court, although not 
necessarily in the form the Commission originally proposed it. The Court, in this 
context, seems to have tempered the Commission’s blunt language. Nonetheless, 
a singular EU ALP stemming from Article 107 was explicitly recognised as a tool 
relevant for the application of State aid rules in TP situations, although its 
provenance and exact form are not clear. Overall, however, the Court’s ambivalent 
language does not help in painting a clear picture, and as a result the nature of the 
Commission’s ALP remains murky. In this context, before analysing the nature and 
content of the EU ALP, it is worth examining the Court’s approach in more detail. 
c. The Court’s Rationale in Relation to the EU ALP 
The EU ALP was in effect recognised by the Court. However, even though it 
grosso modo accepted the Commission’s approach, it did not fully endorse it. In 
order to be able to assess both the assertions over the existence of the EU ALP, and 
to examine its content and nature, it is important to first examine the Court’s 
rationale. In relation to Starbucks and Fiat the Court essentially reasoned that where 
national law makes no distinction between standalone and integrated undertakings, 
then the profits of integrated undertakings are intended to be taxed as if they had 
arisen from transactions carried out at market prices.76 In Apple, the same reasoning 
was applied, in relation to the attribution of profits between the branch of a non-
 
70 Ibidem, para 138; para 130, respectively  
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resident undertaking and a standalone one operating in market conditions.77 
Essentially, the Court argued that since the relevant domestic tax systems made no 
(formal) distinction between groups and standalones or residents and non-
residents in relation to taxation, the Commission was entitled to use the ALP as tool 
stemming from a general principle of equal treatment to examine the outcomes 
endorsed in the tax rulings. This would explain why the EU ALP applies not simply 
to transfer prices, but also to taxable profits, which arguably somewhat 
differentiates it from the OECD, fiscal ALP.  
In effect, the Court introduced the rationale of the ALP into the logic of the 
national tax systems, regardless of whether it formed part of said systems. In Apple 
for example, the Court (and the Commission) “discovered” the Authorised OCED 
Approach in the logic of the national tax regime, based on some “overlap”, despite 
the OECD ALP not being introduced into Irish law until after the contested rulings 
were granted.78 This reasoning is based on Forum 187, as the Court states,79 which 
is arguably problematic, as in Forum 187 the ECJ applied the ALP already present 
in the contested Belgian tax measure,80 whereas in the cases at hand the ALP in 
question is one stemming from Article 107(1), and its application disregards, or at 
the very least departs from national law.81 Thus, the reasoning clearly departs from 
Forum 187. 
This reasoning sits uncomfortably next to the explicit statements of the Court 
that the Commission cannot determine what constitutes “‘normal’ taxation while 
disregarding national rules of taxation”.82 This is because “normal” taxation, which 
defines the fiscal burdens normally borne and as such is the basis of the existence 
of an advantage,83 needs to be determined based on national tax laws, as they are 
the base of comparison. As the Court recognises, the existence of an advantage can 
only ever by established by reference to national laws.84 To reconcile this well-
established line of case law with the Commission’s approach, the Court at this point 
essentially claimed that national tax law, by not formally distinguishing between the 
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compared groups of undertakings, implicitly recognises that “normal” taxation is 
taxation in line with market conditions, or in other words the Article 107(1)-derived 
ALP.85 In effect therefore, under that reasoning, the Court endorses the view that the 
ALP implicitly is part of the national tax system, and therefore binding on the 
Member States concerned, meaning that the Commission can lawfully apply it, and 
use it to determine the existence of an advantage. In doing so, however, the Court 
seems to not be relying solely on national law in relation to which ALP is to be used.86 
This is particularly important, as the ALP is supposed to be used as the benchmark 
to compare the factual with the counterfactual (the “normal” application of tax 
rules).87 This means that the benchmark used to define “normal” taxation is external 
to the tax system.  
Additionally, the line of reasoning finding that the ALP is implicitly part of the 
national tax system is based on the determination of the objectives of the systems 
under investigation, which the Commission, and the Court, interpret not necessarily 
in reference to the systems themselves. Rather, in effect they discover an objective 
which is not explicitly part of the system, but implicitly based on a lack of formal 
differentiation,88 or on overlap and similarities with an ALP analysis.89 In practical 
terms therefore, once the ALP has been assumed into the national tax system it is 
deemed to be part of what makes up “normal” taxation in line and by reference to 
the national tax system.90 The Court’s reasoning, as well as that of the Commission 
in the Decisions discussed above, mean that the ALP derived from Article 107(1) 
can be applied into national tax systems, subject to it being in line with the systems’ 
implicit logic. Therefore, the Commission, with the blessings of the General Court, 
develops an abstract understanding of the given national system, possibly 
detached from the logics of the system, in which an equally abstract ALP, detached 
from international practice, is applied.91 
It is submitted that based on this assumptive determination of systemic 
objectives, this reasoning can easily be circumvented by “regulatory technique”, as 
all it would take for it to collapse would be a formal distinction in national tax law 
between the compared groups of undertakings, which in relation to residents and 
non-residents, as in the case of Apple, would not be alien to the logic of tax law.92 
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The resolution proposed by the Court also leaves unanswered the question of 
potential friction or even conflict between national TP rules and ALP approaches, 
and the Commission’s one, especially given the lack of guidance on the contents of 
the latter. Equally, it is unclear whether the Commission’s ALP would still apply if a 
Member State opts for another method to determine the profit allocation of MNEs, 
or explicitly chooses to not have a profit allocation method at all. That choice would 
constitute “normal” taxation, meaning that if the ALP is explicitly not part of it, the 
Court’s reasoning would preclude the Commission’s ALP from applying. This 
outlook is reinforced by the Apple judgment, where the Court rejected the notion 
that there is an obligation on Member States to apply the Article 107(1)-derived ALP 
“horizontally and in all areas of their national tax law”,93 in effect meaning that there 
needs to be an at least implicit logical connection between the ALP and the 
examined reference framework.  
This reading is in line with the allocation of competences in direct taxation 
and with the right of Member States to designate the bases of assessment and tax 
burdens applicable,94 and determine what constitutes “normal” taxation, based on 
which the existence of an advantage is to be ascertained.95 In effect therefore, the 
Court’s “nationalisation” of the Commission’s ALP, by identifying its existence in the 
lack of a formal distinction as a means to infer its applicability in national law, must 
by extension mean that a formal distinction, or any explicit reference to other profit 
allocation methods, make the ALP non-existent, even implicitly, in the tax system, 
and therefore not applicable. In this context, it could even be claimed that it is the 
regulatory technique, or lack thereof, of the systems and TP regimes examined that 
makes the ALP the appropriate benchmark applicable. Given that the EU ALP 
appears to at least implicitly form part of the reference framework, arguably the 
inherent logic of this approach contradicts Gibraltar,96 and Dirk Andres.97 
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It is also arguable that the Court’s reasoning is in effect circular, or “assuming 
the conclusion”. This is because the Court in essence argues that the ALP necessarily 
forms part of the Commission’s analysis because of the system’s objective of taxing 
standalone and integrated undertakings, or resident and non-resident ones, in a 
similar manner. At the same time, this objective is formulated based on an ALP logic 
of taxing profits as if they had arisen in market conditions. In other words, according 
to the Court, the Commission’s ALP applies, independently of whether it exists in 
national law, because an ALP logic implicitly exists, and is therefore applicable, in 
national tax law. Assuming that the system’s objective requires an approximation of 
“market-based outcomes” in terms of chargeable income,98 in effect translates into 
an assumption that the ALP applies to ensure that such outcomes are possible and 
that the objective is met, which in turn means that the Commission can apply its own 
ALP to verify the application of the implied ALP. In one sentence therefore, the ALP 
applies because it has to for the system’s objective to make sense, and that objective 
is what it is because the ALP is implicitly part of the system. 
It is clear, in brief, that the Court’s rationalisation of the EU ALP is not very 
straightforward. Essentially, it relies on the lack of formal distinctions in the national 
systems, in order to imply the EU ALP into those systems. In doing so however, the 
Court in effect interferes, and allows the Commission’s EU ALP to interfere, with the 
definition of “normal” taxation. By extension, this rationale also means that the 
reference framework is, in part at least, extra-systemic. Beyond those issues, the 
implicit assumption of the EU ALP into national tax law can be circumvented by 
regulatory technique. Overall, the reasoning is problematic in multiple ways. 
d. The Material Content of the EU ALP 
The previous two sections discussed the Court’s reasoning in the Starbucks, 
Fiat, and Apple judgments, as well as that of the Commission in relation to the 
Decisions, and argued that the authority relied upon and the reasoning employed 
are far from rock solid. In the context of this discussion it is nonetheless possible to 
conclude that the ALP arising from Article 107(1) exists in and of itself, and can be 
applied in State aid cases. This section will discuss the content of the EU ALP. 
Both the nature and the material content of the ALP remain unclear, which is 
problematic given the approximate nature of the ALP,99 and, as will be discussed 
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below, the burden and standard of proof attached to its analysis. In terms of the 
ALP’s content, the Court is happy to merely state that the ALP is a “tool for checking 
that intra-group transactions are remunerated as though they had been negotiated 
between independent undertakings”.100 In other words, the EU ALP is merely the 
base conceptual idea of an ALP, without any further guidance, and without being 
endowed with any specific content. As discussed above, even the terminology 
employed by the Court in relation to the nature of the EU ALP is not clear,101 making 
the determination of its content exceedingly difficult. The Court recognises the 
approximate nature of the ALP, by accepting that an advantage can only arise if the 
variation between the comparables goes beyond any inaccuracies inherent in the 
methodology used,102 or in other words beyond acceptable differences inherent in 
the approximate nature of the ALP. At the same time, the Court’s reasoning 
suggests that a TP arrangement will be valid only if it leads to a “reliable 
approximation of a market-based outcome”,103 which is in effect equated to an arm’s 
length outcome.104 However, neither the Court nor the Commission provide a 
definition of those terms, or even any guidance as to what constitutes such a reliable 
approximation.  
The identification of any objective criteria from the Commission’s practice or 
the Court’s case law is practically impossible, given the former’s case-by-case 
approach.105 Given the lack of consistency inherent in the ALP methodologies 
discussed in Part IV of the Tax Rulings, the Arm’s Length Principle, and the 
Commission’s Decisions Chapter, and the differences between national TP regimes, 
this creates a significant issue in relation to the nature and content of the 
arrangements which can be caught by the EU’s ALP. It is unclear therefore whether 
a national approach is actually in line with the EU’s approach, since we are dealing 
with an independent EU ALP and the associated “market-based outcome” standard, 
neither of which have material content, despite appearing to be autonomous. This 
outlook is also supported by the 2016 Notice.106 A further problem in this context is 
that the ALP is in effect part of the reference framework, meaning that without a 
defined content it becomes nigh impossible to evaluate what the standard rules, 
and by extension any derogations from them, actually are.  
 
100 Starbucks (n 8), para 157; Fiat (n 8), para 155  
101 Ibidem, paras 138, 151-152, 154, 157, 163; paras 143-144, 146, 151, 155, 261, respectively; Apple 
(n 8), paras 194-195, 214-216, 225 
102 Ibidem, paras 152, 196, 199; paras 144, 149, 204; para 216, respectively 
103 Ibidem, paras 193, 196; paras 176, 204; paras 198, 315, 319, respectively 
104 Ibidem, paras 201-202, 213; paras 218, 292; paras 354, 486, respectively  
105 Jaeger, ‘Tax Concessions’ (n 43), 229 
106 2016 Notice (n 4), paras 171-174 
160 
 
The Notice,107 Decisions,108 and the judgments suggest that the OECD’s ALP 
approach, as it emerges from the Guidelines, can be used as guidance, but is not in 
and of itself binding.109 The Commission can however choose to rely on the OECD 
approach.110 In fact, the Commission still seems to base its understanding of its 
brand new ALP on the OECD’s outlook, stating that in the assessment of the ALP 
“inherent in Article 107(1)”, guidance can be derived from the OECD Guidelines,111 
complicating the distinction, maintained by both the Commission112 and the 
Court,113 between the two ALPs. Adding to the confusion between the two, in name 
at least, different ALPs, the Commission further states that if the Guidelines are 
followed in full, it is “unlikely” that a measure will be found to confer State aid.114 
Despite the similarities, de facto, of the Commission’s approach and that contained 
in the OECD Guidelines,115 as per the Court, those Guidelines can only have 
“practical significance” in the interpretation of TP issues, and are not binding.116 For 
example, in the Starbucks judgment, when discussing the choice of the tested party 
for the purposes of the ALP analysis, the Court explained that the Guidelines are 
merely a guidance document which do not in and of themselves create obligations, 
as they “do not lay down a strict rule”.117 At the same time, the Court argued against 
the Commission’s insistence on employing the CUP method instead of the TNMM 
based, inter alia, on the OECD approach.118 However, neither the Commission’s 
OECD-centric analysis,119 nor the Court’s observation of the potential significance 
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of the OECD Guidelines in its own analysis,120 can be seen as endowing the EU ALP 
with material content, due to the separation and explicit distinction between the two 
ALPs, and the fact that the OECD Guidelines are explicitly non-binding. 
Equally, the Commission’s ALP analysis was either not conducted based on 
the national TP framework and rules at all,121 or it only looked at the base elements 
of the national law and practice, transposing, based on conceptual overlaps, onto 
national law the OECD approach, while still maintaining its distinction from its own 
ALP.122 In other words, the EU ALP, and its content, supersede those of national TP 
rules. For example, in the Starbucks judgment, the Court stressed the difference 
between a purely fiscal ALP (which would be the one enacted under national law, 
as part of the tax regime), and the one employed by the Commission for State aid 
assessment.123 The Court also recognised that the Commission may choose any 
methodology it deems appropriate, which can include methodologies external to 
the tax system.124 Therefore, based on the Commission’s analysis, and the Court’s 
acceptance of it, the EU ALP can analytically “borrow” from the OECD approach, but 
the OECD approach does not give it material content – it can merely provide 
guidance, but no certainty. In the same vein, it would be conceptually hard to infer 
the OECD ALP into Article 107(1), given that the latter significantly predates the 
former.125 Additionally, even if the OECD Guidelines could be taken as a source of 
content for the EU ALP, it is unclear which version of them ought to be used as a 
point of reference,126 and whether those Guidelines acting as a source are to be 
conceived of as static or dynamic.127 At the same time, national rules and 
frameworks appear to be irrelevant in endowing the EU ALP with content, both 
based on the Court’s approach, and on the inherent logic of the EU ALP as a 
necessarily applicable element of the Commission’s assessment which can go 
beyond the intricacies and limitations of any domestic TP rules. In effect therefore, 
the ALP assessment in the Decisions and the judgments is detached from the 
rationale of national law, and not grounded in international practice.128 
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The EU ALP therefore lacks substance. It is clear that the OECD’s approach 
cannot bind the Commission, and the domestic approaches are superseded by the 
EU ALP, meaning that neither can act as a source of material content for the EU ALP, 
leaving us with an abstract ALP, not moored in any concrete, objective criteria. The 
lack of material content can lead to significant legal uncertainty, as it is in effect 
impossible for taxpayers and tax authorities to know ex ante which fiscal 
arrangements will be in line with the EU ALP, and which ones will invite the 
Commission’s scrutiny. At the same time, the notification by tax authorities of tax 
rulings that may potentially confer aid, which due to the lack of legal certainty is 
arguably most of them, can stretch the Commission’s resources to a breaking point, 
due to a combination of the sheer number of potentially problematic arrangements 
and the intensity of the required review.129  
e. The Nature of the EU ALP 
It is clear that the EU ALP is nominally autonomous. As such, it supersedes 
national rules, and is separate and different in content from the OECD approach. 
This means that in terms of its content it is not based on either national rules or the 
OECD TP Guidelines. As a result, it lacks any clearly defined content, making its 
consistent application tricky if not impossible. To further complicate matters, the EU 
ALP’s nature is also shrouded in mystery. If the Commission’s claim of the nature of 
its newly discovered ALP as a general principle of equal treatment in taxation, which 
falls within the scope of application of the State aid prohibition, is to be accepted, 
this ALP is not fiscal, but rather rooted in competition law,130 or internal market law. 
This is because the notion of equality of treatment, or maintaining a level playing 
field can be seen as an imperative to protect free competition and ensure non-
discrimination in the internal market.131 Such a reading of it would explain to an 
extent the similar approach in relation to comparability between State aid law and 
the fundamental freedoms, as they would be based on a similar consideration of 
equal treatment.132  
It is important to bear in mind that the equality principle inherent in Article 
107(1) TEFU refers to equality of treatment, not outcomes.133 This is because not all 
differential fiscal outcomes stemming from the application of general tax rules are 
discriminatory or selective,134 and because State aid is not concerned with 
 
129 Luja, ‘Just a Notion of Aid’ (n 43), 790 
130 Todhe (n 7), 258; Wattel, ‘Stateless Income’ (n 19), 792 
131 Wattel, ‘Stateless Income’ (n 19), 792 
132 Rita Szudoczky, ‘Convergence of the Analysis of National Tax Measures under the EU State Aid 
Rules and the Fundamental Freedoms’ (2016) 15 European State Aid Law Quarterly 357, 363–364. 
See also: Cristina Romariz, ‘Revisiting Material Selectivity in EU State Aid Law Or “The Ghost of Yet-
To-Come’ (2014) 13 European State Aid Law Quarterly 39, 48 
133 Michael Lang, ‘State Aid and Taxation: Selectivity and Comparability Analysis’ in I Richelle, W 
Schön, E Traversa (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 2016) 27, 36 
134 Jaeger, ‘Tax Incentives’ (n 67), 45 
163 
 
secondary selective effects.135 The discrimination-linked approach to State aid 
discussed in the Selectivity Chapter also supports this conclusion, as does the very 
notion of “discrimination”, especially if we consider that State aid is a prohibition of, 
inter alia, unequal treatment, and not a requirement for equal treatment.136 It is 
obvious for example that the effect an undertaking’s size has on its effective tax 
rate,137 even though it produces different outcomes flowing from the application of 
the general tax regime, cannot be deemed to be either selective, or discriminatory. 
This interpretation in relation to the limits of the notion of equality is corroborated 
by the Court’s rejection of the existence of a general principle of equality in taxation 
stemming from Article 107(1) TFEU.138 It is therefore clear that the rationale and 
scope of fiscal State aid do not prohibit unequal or different outcomes, but prohibit 
unequal treatment. Transposing an equality of outcome principle on fiscal aid 
would therefore be contrary to the base concepts of maintaining a level playing field 
and normal conditions of competition, and would go far beyond the limits of the 
scope of the State aid prohibition.  
As is clear from the discussion of the Court’s interpretation of the EU ALP, its 
function is linked with the notion of advantage. In effect, therefore this goal can 
arguably be linked to the insistence on systemically achieving the best possible 
approximation of market-based outcomes, in a similar manner to the MEOP. It is 
worth noting that in the first round of opening Decisions, a logic inspired by the 
MEOP was used in relation to the ALP,139 arguably as a way to introduce the latter in 
the logic of State aid.140 In fact, the logic of the ALP is closely linked to that the 
 
135 2016 Notice (n 4), paras 115-116; Joined cases C-52/97, C-53/97 and C-54/97 Epifanio Viscido, 
Mauro Scandella and Others and Massimiliano Terragnolo and Others v Ente Poste Italiane Opinion 
of AG Jacobs ECLI:EU:C:1998:78, para 16 
136 Lang (n 133), 36 
137 Francisco J. Delgado, Elena Fernández-Rodríguez, Antonio Martínez-Arias, ‘Corporation Effective 
Tax Rates and Company Size: Evidence from Germany’ (2018) 31 Economic Research 2081, 2096; 
Francisco J. Delgado, Elena Fernandez-Rodriguez, Antonio Martinez-Arias, ‘Effective Tax Rates in 
Corporate Taxation: A Quantile Regression for the EU’ (2014) 25 Engineering Economics 487, 489- 
492; Anastasia Kraft, ‘What Really Affects German Firms' Effective Tax Rate?’ (2014) 5 International 
Journal of Financial Research 1, 16-17 
138 Starbucks (n 8), paras 168; Fiat (n 8), para 161 
139 State Aid — Luxembourg — State Aid SA.38944 (2014/C) (2014/NN) — Alleged aid to Amazon — 
Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [2015] OJ C 44/13, recitals 53, 55, 61-63; State Aid — Ireland — State Aid SA.38373 
(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) — Alleged aid to Apple — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 
108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2014] OJ C 369/22, recitals 53-58; 
State Aid — Netherlands State Aid SA.38374 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) — Alleged aid to 
Starbucks — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union [2014] OJ C 460/11, recitals 74-77; State Aid — Luxembourg — State Aid 
SA.38375 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) — Alleged aid to FFT — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to 
Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2014] OJ C 369/37, recitals 
60-62  
140 Gunn and Luts (n 47), 123; Moreno Gonzalez (n 33), 562. See also: Werner Haslehner, ‘Double 
Taxation Relief, Transfer Pricing Adjustments and State Aid Law’ in I Richelle, W Schön, E Traversa 
(eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 2016) 133, 154-155 
164 
 
MEOP,141 especially in relation to approximating market prices. In this context, it 
could be argued that the competition nature of the EU ALP relates to its function as 
a tool which oversees the application of national and international tax norms. In 
other words, it can add substance to the advantage criterion in relation to TP cases, 
again in a similar manner to the MEOP’s function, as discussed in the Advantage 
Chapter. However, even though the MEOP can arguably be understood as a 
requirement to keep undertakings at arm’s length, its application in this context 
does not make sense, due to the character of taxation.142 
Additionally, the explicit lack of clarity on the EU ALP’s substantive material 
content, which at the same time supersedes national rules and is not bound by the 
OECD approach, means that such a reading of its function would be incomplete. It 
is certainly a tool which can oversee the application of national and international 
rules in the context of TP, but at the same time it is the benchmark upon which the 
advantage analysis is to be conducted, going beyond national and international 
rules, and implying ill-defined content in them. It is therefore at the same time both 
a competition tool, and a fiscal one. In the same vein, it is important to note that the 
logic of the notion of advantage, which is objective and unambiguous, does not sit 
comfortably alongside the concept of the ALP, which is necessarily subjective and 
approximate.143 This could explain why the ALP is yielded in a manner similar to the 
MEOP, especially in its early conception.144 Arguably, some of the other issues, 
which will be further discussed below, stemming from the Decisions and the 
judgments, such as the merging of selectivity and advantage, and the high burden 
and standard of proof relate to the need for the EU ALP to fit into the rationale of 
the notion of advantage. 
It is worth noting that in the recent ALP Decisions where the independence 
of the EU’s ALP was asserted, the Commission acknowledged that the “authoritative 
statement” of the ALP is to be found in the OECD Convention,145 which contains a 
fiscal ALP – not a competition law one.146 It is clear therefore that even as the 
Commission asserts the existence of an equality-oriented ALP inherent in the logic 
of Article 107(1), it still heavily relies on the OECD formulation and methodology to 
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provide content to its analysis.147 Therefore, the EU ALP would seem to have a dual 
nature. Essentially, by creating an independent EU principle and then tying it to the 
OECD methodology, the Commission in effect creates a tacit obligation for Member 
States to fully introduce and apply the Guidelines to their domestic system.148 This 
is somewhat reasonable from a practical standpoint, given the lack of any guidance 
or material content on this EU ALP concept, especially in light of the substantial 
difficulties in trying to allocate the correct amount of profit to related entities 
operating in a globally unharmonised fiscal environment.149 At the same time 
however it exposes significant logical problems both in relation to the claim of 
independence from the OECD, and in relation to the nature of the ALP as a 
competition tool. This raises the valid question of whether we are dealing with a 
fiscal tool geared to apply to competition law cases, or a competition law tool 
geared to apply to tax law cases.  
The dual nature of the ALP is also problematic due to the apparently different 
effects the two readings, fiscal and competition, would have – the former, under EU 
direct tax law, essentially prohibits Member States from reallocating profits in their 
own jurisdiction, while the latter prevents underallocation in their own 
jurisdiction.150 Additionally, if this duality is accepted, the strictness and at the same 
time non-committal151 nature of the Notice’s language suggests that the 
Commission can invoke this principle to scrutinise a fiscally appropriate 
approximation on competition law grounds.152 This results from the different focus 
and nature of the two ALPs.153 This would in effect mean that the Commission would 
be in charge of interpreting its own creation in any way it sees fit. Thus, beyond the 
tacit obligation to adopt the OECD Guidelines, the Member States would have to 
interpret and apply those rules in a particular way, as endorsed by the Commission, 
or fall foul of the State aid prohibition.154 This is reinforced by the distinction drawn 
by the General Court in Starbucks, between an arrangement being sound under 
competition law but not under tax law.155 Based on the logic of the EU ALP, there is 
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no reason why this reasoning could not apply in reverse.156 This issue is 
compounded by the fact that there is no agreement in any guidance documents 
relating to the well-established international practice as to what constitutes the most 
appropriate point of an arm’s length range,157 meaning that even in the context of 
decades of practice, a “correct” point, or a clear-cut yes or no answer in relation to 
the conferral of an advantage does not necessarily exist.158 This lack of material 
content and guidance, coupled with the fact that the EU ALP supersedes national 
regimes, could arguably make the Commission a Union-wide national TP rule 
supervision authority,159 and significantly blur the lines between tax policy and State 
aid, thus going beyond the limits of its competences, and beyond the objectives of 
State aid.160  
In effect, it is clear that the primary function of the EU ALP, regardless of 
whether it is a competition law or tax law principle, relates to the notion of 
advantage. Beyond this however, its actual nature remains unclear. It is imperative 
that the relationship of the EU ALP to on the one hand national TP or other profit 
allocation regimes, and on the other international practice is clarified. In the same 
vein, the material content of the EU ALP must also be substantiated. As discussed in 
the previous section, the EU ALP is independent from national and (other) 
international ALP models. It supersedes national rules, and is different from the 
OECD practice, meaning it lacks any clearly defined material content. In practical 
terms, the Commission is free to interpret it as it sees fit, due to the lack of any 
substantive guidance on its application. The distinct lack of clarity in relation to both 
its content and nature are problematic, in terms of its application, creating 
significant legal uncertainty. The lack of clearly defined content makes the 
determination of the EU ALP’s nature difficult, and vice versa. Given that it is after all 
a necessary element of the Commission’s assessment and a general principle, this 
lack of legal certainty both for taxpayers and for tax authorities is in itself 
problematic. This can be particularly troublesome for undertakings, as the tax 
environment and fiscal certainty in a given jurisdiction greatly affect their business 
choices. Equally, this lack of clarity and certainty in relation to the EU ALP’s 
characteristics means that its theoretical and practical limits are impossible to divine, 
thus calling into question its very foundational logic and constitutional basis. In this 
context, it is necessary to examine the implications of the ill-defined EU ALP on tax 
policy and fiscal sovereignty. 
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f. The EU ALP, Fiscal Sovereignty, and Tax Policy 
At this point, in order to be able to properly discuss the impact of the EU ALP 
on fiscal sovereignty, it is necessary to very briefly outline the allocation of 
competences within the EU. This allocation is based on the principle of conferral, 
codified in Article 5 TEU. This principle limits the EU’s power, allowing it to act only 
within the limit of the competences the Member States have conferred upon it in 
the Treaties.161 The logical extension of the allocation of competences based on the 
principle of conferral is that competences which are not allocated remain with the 
Member States.162 Competence over direct taxation remains with the Member 
States, which in effect means that they have the competence to design their own 
direct tax system as they please but must consistently exercise such competence in 
line with Union law,163 including any Directives.164 Despite some (limited) positive 
and negative harmonisation, “the tax sovereignty of the Member States lives on”.165 
In essence, it is clear that despite direct taxation’s obvious importance in the 
completion of the internal market, there are explicit limits to what can be achieved 
without clear political consensus and positive harmonisation. The Union can protect 
the integrity of the Treaties and ensure the Member States’ compliance with their 
obligations, but without harmonisation neither the Court nor the Commission can 
take on the burden of filling in the blanks of the internal market without 
overstepping their powers. 
A significant element of fiscal sovereignty is a right not to act – this means that 
where a Member State has, by omission, elected to not enact a specific anti-
avoidance measure, it is not for EU law to step in to cover the gap.166 Member States 
are free to not coordinate their tax systems.167 This arguably means that the top-
down imposition of an EU-wide ALP, which supersedes national TP regimes, would 
in fact interfere with Member States’ fiscal sovereignty,168 as State aid rules do not 
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impose or even imply an obligation to levy taxes.169 The ECJ has explicitly held that 
there is no general obligation under EU law for anti-avoidance rules to exist.170 Even 
if it is accepted that a “regime” of international taxation, as Avi-Yonah calls it,171 
exists, and that the principles underpinning this regime, such as the single-tax 
principle, the non-discrimination principle, and the benefit principle, inform the tax 
systems of Member States,172 this does not mean by any means that there is 
harmonisation of direct tax matters, or that the allocation of competences provided 
by the Treaties in relation to direct taxation is at all affected. The Commission may 
indeed examine the aid character of tax rulings, but it cannot impose its own views 
or ideas as to what a tax system ought to look like.173 This relates to the 
Commission’s assertion that an arm’s length principle indeed exists embedded in 
Article 107(1), which in effect prescribes a specific, if undefined, methodology for 
allocating the profits of MNEs. If this EU ALP is to be yielded in an inflexible manner, 
in effect it could be taken to mean that other methods of profit allocation are not 
allowed. In effect therefore, a wide understanding of the EU ALP and its elevation 
to primary law status would not simply ensure that existing tax rules are enforced in 
an equal manner but would also inform their material content. The EU ALP can thus 
be seen as a harmonised perception of profit allocation rules.174 
State aid has always had a political element in its compatibility analysis, which 
represents State aid policy, as opposed to the State aid control inherent in the 
Article 107(1) prohibition.175 This can also be evidenced by the extraordinary 
measures taken and frameworks adopted in relation to compatibility in the context 
of the 2008 financial crisis,176 or the 2020 coronavirus pandemic.177 The very nature 
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of the compatibility requirements in and of itself showcases at least a degree of 
policymaking and by extension political considerations. State aid policy as such 
goes beyond the control of illegal State aid measures.178 Fiscal aid is a particularly 
sensitive, from a political perspective, issue, requiring balancing the imperative to 
combat aggressive tax planning and harmful tax competition, while also respecting 
the Member States’ fiscal sovereignty.179 There is no doubt that State aid control can 
in itself be a powerful tax policy tool,180 and even a political pressure mechanism.181 
It is also arguable that the Commission’s policy priorities have, to a significant 
degree, influenced the development of the concept of aid, and of its constituent 
parts.182 State aid control can therefore be employed to achieve, or at least push 
towards, policy goals, such as fighting harmful tax competition.183 In this context, it 
is arguable that the Commission’s approach, especially in relation to the first few of 
the recent Decisions, has a certain test character to it.184 Certainly, given the 
innovative nature of the Commission’s approach, and the liberal interpretation of 
the case law that led to it, to an extent this observation rings true. Based on this, it is 
possible to argue that the desired effect, from the Commission’s point of view, of 
this “testing of the waters” is to expand the role of State aid control to achieve a level 
of tax policy convergence.185  
As the case law discussed in the previous Chapters shows, while the Union 
Courts have mostly accepted the Commission’s approach to fiscal State aid, it is 
abundantly clear that the law still matters a lot.186 Nonetheless, this functional 
approach has in effect led to a widening of the notion of fiscal aid, which is arguably 
necessary for the Commission’s effective monopoly on the assessment of State aid 
to be maintained, and primarily for its control over “potentially distortive public 
intervention” to be preserved.187 However, a delicate balance needs to be 
 
178 Juan Jorge Piernas López, The Concept of State Aid Under EU Law: From internal market to 
competition and beyond (OUP 2015), 53 
179 Luja, ‘Just a Notion of Aid’ (n 43), 789 
180 Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and 
United Kingdom Opinion of AG Jääskinen ECLI:EU:C:2011:215, paras 122-130. See also, in general: 
Rossi-Macciano (n 172); Emily Forrester, ‘Is the State Aid Regime a Suitable Instrument to Be Used in 
the Fight Against Harmful Tax Competition’ (2018) 27 EC Tax Review 19 
181 Romero J S Tavares, Bret N Bogenschneider, and Marta Pankiv, ‘The Intersection of EU State Aid 
and U.S. tax Deferral: A Spectacle of Fireworks, Smoke, and Mirrors’ (2016) 19 Florida Tax Review 
121, 144 
182 Piernas López (n 178), 241. See also: Philipp Werner, ‘Article 108 TFEU’ in F J Säcker and F Montag 
(eds) European State Aid Law (Beck Hart Nomos 2016), para 42 
183 Peters (n 167), 14-15 
184 Jaeger, ‘Tax Concessions’ (n 43), 228-229 
185 Peters (n 167), p. 15-16 
186 See also: Piernas López (n 178), 240-254 




maintained, especially in relation to taxation, and tax competition.188 After all, State 
aid control was not designed to curb tax competition between States.189 It is 
therefore clear that State aid policy is to an extent inseparably linked to State aid 
law, and that the evolution of the concept of aid in itself can be used to achieve or 
facilitate policy goals, and has arguably been influenced by such goals. Equally 
however, it is clear that this functional reading of the notion of aid, and of the case 
law, is not in itself absolute – it is in other words clear that the Commission can 
overreach, but also that the development of State aid depends more on the actual 
law, than on any policy considerations.190 
In this instance, it is submitted that the necessary consequences of the 
Commission’s reasoning go well beyond the limits of its powers. As it is conceived 
of by the Commission, and to the extent that this conception has been endorsed by 
the EGC, the ALP is perhaps too blunt an instrument, and definitely too ill-defined, 
to walk the fine line between tax policy and fiscal sovereignty, as it is unclear what 
exactly constitutes illegal aid in its context. This is especially true given the lack of 
objective criteria precisely defining the scope of aid, and by extension the 
delineating the competences of Member States.191 It is possible for example that the 
incorrect application of the Commission’s ALP can confer State aid,192 or that a 
fiscally correct application is problematic from a competition law perspective.193 The 
same approach could arguably be extended to mean that the mistaken but 
ultimately beneficial application of any fiscal rule can confer a selective 
advantage.194 This point seems to be confirmed by the Gibraltar tax rulings 
Decision,195 which in effect showcases that ineffective tax enforcement can in itself 
confer State aid.196 The EU ALP’s disregard for national TP regimes discussed 
above,197 combined with its assumption into national law as part of the reference 
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framework and as the comparative benchmark upon which an advantage is to be 
determined and thus its supersession of national rules, arguably mean that it 
infringes on fiscal sovereignty.198 
Based on the Commission’s and the General Court’s approach of an EU ALP 
existing as a principle of equal treatment, and this prohibition of unequal treatment 
requiring a systemically more robust and equal allocation of MNEs’ profits, the ALP 
is not the only means to achieve this end – let alone a hypothetical, undefined ALP 
contained in a terse paragraph of a soft law instrument with no accompanying 
guidance, save for references to other non-binding instruments. Even if we accept 
that the Treaties provide, albeit stealthily, for such harmonisation as an extension of 
the principle of equality of treatment, they do not provide for a set methodology, 
and the Commission cannot by any means assume the responsibility to fill this gap, 
as it would in effect be defining bases of assessment – and thus overstepping the 
bounds of its position.199 There are more than one ways to achieve the goal 
prescribed to the ALP, and the silence of the Treaties cannot be inferred to translate 
into an acceptance of the ALP as the (only) methodology. In other words, the strict 
imposition of an EU ALP would take away the power of Member States to determine 
and define alternative profit allocation mechanisms. For example, equality of 
treatment as prescribed by the logic of Article 107(1), which is the basis of the EU 
ALP, could for example be achieved, at least to the same extent as by the ALP,200 by 
a method and principle which differs widely from and is incompatible with the ALP, 
such as formulary apportionment. In fact, the Commission itself suggested the 
adoption of formulary apportionment in the 2011 and 2016 iterations of the CCCTB 
proposal.201 If we are to adopt the Commission’s reasoning on the ALP wholesale, 
this would surely mean that the CCCTB proposal would be contrary to a primary 
provision of EU law.202 
Even if a unified, Treaty-derived ALP exists, it would be for the national 
legislator to define and up to the judiciary to apply the arm’s length standards 
applicable in a Member State.203 The imposition of an EU ALP with a set, if currently 
undefined, content would not allow Member States to define specific ALP-style 
mechanisms geared to their fiscal peculiarities, in the context of tax competition. 
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The Court itself has recognised the approximate and inherently somewhat 
inaccurate nature of the ALP,204 and the lack of binding effects stemming from the 
Guidelines.205 This reinforces the conclusion that, as the Guidelines and 
international practice have made abundantly clear,206 the ALP cannot be an exact 
science, and even if the methodological approaches were to be deemed as black 
letter law, the existence of wide ranges make any sort of uniform, Union-level 
application a pipedream, at best,207 thus making the input of national fiscal systems 
essential. Additionally, the supranational nature of the EU’s ALP, and its 
supersession over national TP regimes, mean that a potentially more accurate and 
well-calibrated national regime may have to be set aside for the Article 107(1) ALP 
to apply.208 Under this prism, the EU ALP could end up being self-defeating.  
It is also worth noting that the Commission’s conception of the ALP, which as 
discussed above is separate from the OECD standard, even if analytically very 
similar,209 has the potential to create political and practical frictions in relation to the 
OECD approach in the future.210 This is especially true if we consider for example 
the OECD’s approach to profit allocation rules designed specifically to deal with 
challenges posed by the digitalisation of the economy, which are inherently 
different from the Commission’s ALP by differentiating explicitly and by design 
between MNEs and standalone undertakings.211 This could be problematic for 
Member States that wish to develop their tax system in line with the OECD, or which 
have a “dynamic” TP regime.212 Therefore, a strict reading of the EU ALP, such as the 
one endorsed by the Commission, would in practical terms curtail the powers of 
Member State to determine and define their own tax system. Such an approach 
would also elevate the Commission into a direct taxation policymaker and enforcer, 
and would transform fiscal State aid control into an alternative vehicle for tax 
harmonisation.213 
The choice of fiscal State aid as a policy tool to make any significant progress 
in the fight against aggressive tax planning and harmful tax competition is also 
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questionable. Very much in the same way that the fundamental freedoms 
jurisprudence is limited to fixing one-country problems,214 State aid cannot be used 
to deal with one of the main enabling factors of aggressive tax planning, inter-state 
disparities.215 In part, this inherent limitation stems from the State resources and 
imputability criterion.216 Based on the case law on the fundamental freedoms, it is 
worth considering whether double non-taxation is imputable to any one State. 
Double non-taxation represents an internal market obstacle (in that it distorts 
competition) which arises from the exercise in parallel of taxing powers by more 
than one States. The Court’s jurisprudence in relation to double taxation suggests 
that it, and the Commission, lack the competence to decide who should tax and 
who should refrain from taxing. Arguably, this can be taken to apply in relation to 
double non-taxation in identifying which State actually should have taxed.217 In other 
words, the advantage would stem from (at least) two States, as would be the case 
with all tax-related issues stemming from cross-border situations.218 As such, and as 
illustrated by the McDonald’s Decision,219 the usefulness of State aid in combatting 
harmful tax planning is very much limited.220  
It is arguable that the Commission is hesitant to accept the limits of State aid 
law in this context, as the nature of its ALP as a pan-European supersession of 
national regimes arguably seems to not recognise that distortions of competition 
can, and often do, arise from the lack of harmonisation of aspects of taxation.221 For 
example, the Commission’s approach in regards to Apple seems to suggest that in 
its eyes stateless income cannot exist.222 This is simply not in line with the 
(unfortunate) economic reality. This policy outlook would be highly problematic, as 
 
214 The case law makes clear that in the context of the fundamental freedoms and taxation only one 
country problems can be solved, as otherwise the Court would be interfering with Member States’ 
parallel (but lawful) exercise of their taxing powers. Such disparities, stemming from the interaction 
of different legal systems are not per se problematic. See to that effect: Case C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) ECLI:EU:C:2005:763, para 45; Case C-
240/10 Cathy Schulz-Delzers and Pascal Schulz v Finanzamt Stuttgart III ECLI:EU:C:2011:591, para 
42; Case C- 96/08 CIBA Speciality Chemicals Central and Eastern Europe Szolgáltató, Tanácsadó és 
Keresdedelmi kft v Adó- és Pénzügyi Ellenőrzési Hivatal (APEH) Hatósági Főosztály 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:185, para 29. See also: Peter J Wattel, ‘Forum: Interaction of State Aid, Free 
Movement, Policy Competition and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters’ [2013] World Tax Journal 
128, 142; Peter J Wattel ‘General EU Law Concepts and Tax Law’ in Peter J Wattel, Otto Marres, Hein 
Vermeulen (eds) European Tax Law, Volume I (7th edn, Kluwer Law International 2018), Part 3.2.1.1 
215 Rossi-Macciano (n 172), 67; Lyal (n 173), 1043 
216 Wattel, ‘Stateless Income’ (n 19), 798 
217 Rita Szudoczky, ‘Double Taxation Relief, Transfer Pricing Adjustments and State Aid Law: 
Comments’ in I Richelle, W Schön, E Traversa (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 
2016), 177-178 
218 Lyal (n 168), 1043 
219 Commission Decision (EU) 2019/1252 of 19 September 2018 on tax rulings SA.38945 (2015/C) 
(ex 2015/NN) (ex 2014/CP) granted by Luxembourg in favour of McDonald's Europe [2019] OJ L 
195/20, recitals 109-126 
220 Moreno Gonzalez (n 33), 573 
221 Jaeger, ‘Tax Concessions’ (n 43), 232 
222 Wattel, ‘Stateless Income’ (n 19), 800 
174 
 
the Commission can, and should, wield State aid control to eliminate distortions of 
competition between undertakings, but distortions of competition between 
Member States (and possibly third States) are not within State aid’s purview.223 
Normally, measures that affect the tax competitive position of the introducing 
Member State in relation to other States, cannot be seen as falling within the scope 
of State aid.224 As such, combatting harmful tax competition is not within the scope 
of State aid, and extending the scope of aid to deal with such policy issues would 
distort the applicable legal framework.225  
A final point that ought to be raised in this context concerns the differences 
between the ALP as conceived under State aid law, and as it exists in internal market 
law in relation to the fundamental freedoms. As discussed in the Tax Rulings, the 
Arm’s Length Principle, and the Commission’s Decisions Chapter, a national ALP 
can infringe free movement rules, as it makes cross-border economic activity 
subject to different rules when compared to purely domestic activity. However, the 
rationale of the base notion of the ALP can be justified based on the balanced 
allocation of taxing powers and the prevention of abuse. By extension, this means 
that under fundamental freedom rules an ALP assessment which deviates from 
market-based outcomes can be justified based on commercial considerations.226 
However, this is not allowed under the State aid conception of the principle. This in 
effect means that we are dealing with two expressions on the ALP in the case law of 
the Union’s judicature that are conceptually very hard to reconcile.227 Arguably, this 
means there could also be two separate and vastly different ALPs existing in EU law. 
Based on the analysis of case law relating to both iterations of the ALP, it is 
suggested that the approach employed in relation to fundamental freedoms is 
more flexible than the one used in State aid cases, with the latter being rather wide. 
This is partly due to the fact that in the case of fundamental freedoms law, the ALP 
used and giving rise to the analysis is the domestic one, in the context of its own 
content and objectives. In relation to State aid, the ALP examined and the one under 
which the analysis is to be carried out is the EU one, with no defined material 
content. In relation to internal market law therefore, there are no issues of fiscal 
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sovereignty, as the Court deals with the application of the rules, ensuring in effect 
that the Member States exercise their taxing powers in accordance with EU law.228 
However, if the EU ALP implicitly applies in a national context, and 
supersedes the domestic TP regime it is possible to end up in a situation where both 
sets of rules apply to one and the same ALP, as implied in Article 107(1). The 
unconditional application of the EU ALP can in effect result in breaching 
fundamental freedoms provisions,229 while an approach which accepts 
commercially justifiable deviations from the ALP in line with internal market law risks 
breaching the State aid prohibition. It is obvious that this discrepancy, even in the 
context of two separate ALPs, can cause significant compliance issues for Member 
States, as they would have to simultaneously comply with two very different sets of 
rules in applying their own TP rules.230 It can obviously cause even worse issues if 
the two diverging sets of rules are to be applied in the context of the same ALP. 
Therefore, there are two diverging “pulls”, stemming either from two disparate 
conceptions and sets of rules relating to the same EU-wide principle, or from the 
awkward coexistence of two vastly different principles, one national and one 
supranational, within the same legal order. In either case, the diverging rules would 
have different aims,231 causing further issues in their coherent application.232 In 
practical terms, too restrictive an approach would risk violating fundamental 
freedoms rules, while too permissive an approach would risk conferring State aid.233 
As a result of the diverging “pulls” on the national tax system, the Member States 
are essentially only left with a limited median ground, or Goldilocks zone, in which 
they can safely operate, especially if a unitary, unsubstantiated, and inflexible ALP 
exists in the context of EU law. 
In brief, it is clear that the EU ALP, as construed by the Commission, can pose 
issues in relation to fiscal sovereignty and the allocation of competences under EU 
law. This results to a large extent from the ALP’s confusing nature, and its lack of 
sufficiently defined material content.234 The combination of those two elements not 
only leads to legal uncertainty, but also makes both the practical and theoretical 
limits of the EU ALP very hard to pin down. Additionally, the overall lack of guidance, 
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and the ALP’s linking to a principle of equality of treatment mean that its limits are 
equally ill-defined, exacerbating an overall lack of clarity on the limits of the notion 
of aid. At the same time, even in the context of the policy-influencing potential of 
State aid, the usefulness of it in combatting aggressive tax planning and harmful tax 
competition is questionable. 
g. Conclusions on the EU ALP  
In summary, one of the more striking, and interesting, elements of the tax 
ruling Decisions and the subsequent General Court judgments was the notion of 
the EU ALP. Defined in an extremely wide manner and given questionable doctrinal 
foundations by the Commission, the Court somewhat rolled back some of the more 
innovative elements of its basis. However, grosso modo, the Court accepted the 
notion of an EU ALP, and devised a reasoning inferring the ALP’s existence in 
national tax systems. Despite three lengthy judgments being delivered and several 
long and technical Decisions being issued dealing, at least partially, with it, there is 
still no guidance as to its material content, as it is neither derived from the OECD 
model, nor is it a “chameleon” ALP, adopting elements of the fiscal regime it is 
imposed on, but rather it is, seemingly, autonomous. Equally, the EU ALP’s nature is 
not clear either, straddling somewhere between a fiscal principle and a competition 
law one. The Court’s mixed terminology235 does not help in this context, even if it 
makes it easier to assume the ALP in national tax systems. This overall lack of clarity, 
coupled with occasionally questionable reasoning, is clearly problematic under the 
lens of fiscal and legal certainty (or in this case uncertainty). Those same elements 
can give rise to questions relating to the preservation of fiscal sovereignty. At the 
same time, the logic inherent in the EU ALP as understood in the context of State 
aid is in direct conflict with the ALP as understood in fundamental freedoms law. 
In conclusion, it is clear that Forum 187, the case law basis for the assertion 
of an EU ALP, is not at all explicit, and arguably does not say what the Commission 
read into it, meaning that heavy reliance on it is problematic.236 This is especially 
true given the lack of any other case law basis, and the clear departure from the 
Commission’s own previous approach in cases concerning the ALP. Thus, the notion 
of an EU ALP is completely novel. In this context, the General Court’s acceptance of 
this reasoning is a major coup for the Commission, even if, as shown, the reasoning 
implicitly inferring the EU ALP into national has some problematic elements. 
However, an equally major problem with this EU ALP construct, and a major 
question that remains unanswered, has to do with its content. It is possible to figure 
out what it is not – but that should give scant reassurance to taxpayers and tax 
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authorities alike. In the same vein, its nature remains murky, first due to the Court’s 
ambivalent reasoning partly endorsing the Commission’s approach and partly 
reigning it in, and secondly as a result of its explicit lack of content. Those two 
elements point to the effect the EU ALP could have on legal certainty. 
The Commission’s reasoning, combined with the lack of any real guidance 
and the dual nature of the EU ALP construct, potentially leads to a situation where 
the Commission may act as a fiscal supervisor, imposing a specific reading of a 
specific methodology. This outcome, which follows from both the Commission’s 
and the Court’s approach, is problematic in light of the allocation of competences, 
as there would be an interference not with the exercise of taxing powers, but their 
allocation.237 Fiscal aid, whose limits are already unclear, can be potentially turned 
in a vehicle for tax harmonisation, despite its obvious limitations in combatting 
harmful tax competition and aggressive tax planning. The imposition of an EU ALP, 
which remains for most intents and purposes shrouded in mystery, into national tax 
systems restricts the powers of Member States to define their own tax systems and 
determine their own bases of assessment, thus calling into question fiscal 
sovereignty. Equally, the introduction of the EU ALP can reduce the Member States’ 
ability to formulate tax policy. Overall, on the basis on all those issues, it is submitted 
that the EU ALP is problematic as a concept in EU law, based on its shaky 
foundations, its direct conflict with a well-established line of case law relating to 
fundamental freedoms, and the lack of clarity, substance, and legal certainty that 
surrounds almost every aspect of it. Those significant issues are compounded by 
the ALP’s clear implications for fiscal sovereignty and tax policy. It is, in brief, in many 
ways a problematic tool, arguably employed to fix a problem it is unable to. 
III. Burden and Standard of Proof 
Given the distinct lack of clarity over the characteristics of the EU ALP, it was 
shown in the previous Part that its limits, practically and theoretically, are hard to 
define. In this context, a particularly interesting element of the General Court’s 
judgments in Starbucks, Fiat, and Apple concerns the burden and standard of 
proof. Arguably, the practical analysis of the arm’s length character of the contested 
rulings was the deciding factor, with the Court in effect demanding that the 
advantage be positively proven.238 As discussed above, the existence of the 
advantage in the context of the Decisions, and the judgments they gave rise to, is 
based on the ALP. However, in this context the fact that the EU ALP lacks substantive 
material content becomes even more problematic, as the relevant “benchmark” 
from which a deviation is to be established is not fleshed out. There are no coherent 
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general frameworks or objective criteria which can be used to ascertain the arm’s 
length character of a given arrangement, meaning that even with a stringent and 
intensive level of review, the Commission has a great deal of autonomy in defining 
the characteristics of the benchmark forming the basis of the analysis. 
Given the complex and approximate nature of any ALP, it is reasonable that 
a high burden of proof is placed on the Commission. Recognising those 
characteristics, the Court explained that an advantage can only exist if the variation 
between the two comparables goes beyond the inaccuracies inherent in the 
methodology used, leading to an outcome which cannot correspond to a reliable 
approximation of an arm’s length outcome.239 Those terms however are not defined 
or fleshed out. The Court also held that the mere identification of the 
methodological errors, or inaccuracies in the arrangements endorsed in the rulings 
is not sufficient to prove the existence of an advantage. Instead, the Commission 
must show that those arrangements resulted in a lowering of the recipients’ 
chargeable base, and therefore their tax bill.240 Equally, the Commission must prove 
that the methods relied upon by the national authorities are actually erroneous.241 
The incomplete or inconsistent nature of an endorsed TP arrangement is not 
sufficient proof that said arrangement confers an advantage.242 In a similar vein, due 
to the approximations inherent in any ALP methodology, differences in the 
calculated outcomes between the Commission and the national tax authorities 
which are at different ends of a (wide) ALP range, or even which are close enough 
to the ALP range, cannot be deemed to confer an advantage.243  
In effect, the Court’s reasoning means that the Commission must carry out an 
economic analysis of significant depth, looking at a number of elements of the 
endorsed arrangements in order to prove that they have the actual effect of 
reducing the recipient’s tax burden.244 This points towards a very high standard of 
proof. Equally however, it means that the Commission cannot shift the burden of 
proof to the recipients and the Member States concerned by merely raising doubts 
about the contested arrangements. The Court therefore continues to demand an 
analysis of all relevant economic factors, which is in line with the burden and 
standard of proof discussed in the Advantage Chapter.245 This in effect represents a 
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more fiscal outlook, which takes into consideration the context and application of 
all applicable fiscal rules, ensuring that a fiscal advantage is actually proven by virtue 
of its effects, and not simply assumed as a result of its form. Thus, in all three cases, 
the Court conducted a thorough analysis of both the methodology employed by 
the national authorities, and that employed by the Commission. For example, it 
reviewed and scrutinised functional analyses, and risk analyses, to ascertain the 
correctness of profit level indicators,246 of capital levels,247 and of the pricing of 
royalties and other IP.248 In effect, it is clear that the Court reviewed some of the key 
elements of a typical TP analysis as prescribed by the OECD.249 
Arguably, the high standard of proof is a direct outcome of the EU ALP’s lack 
of substantive content, which in effect necessitates a rigorous case-by-case analysis, 
in order for the benchmark and any deviation from it to be identified. Another root 
cause for the high burden and standard of proof is the internal conflict and 
contradiction between the ALP, or any determination of transfer prices for that 
matter, which is by definition subjective and imprecise, with the need, under the 
case law, to determine the existence of an advantage in an objective and 
unambiguous way.250 This partially results from the fact that any ALP is hypothetical 
– it takes into account situations that may not in reality ever exist between 
independent enterprises, thus being a hypothetical and artificial benchmark and 
making a reliable approximation of market-based outcomes extremely complex. 
The character of the ALP as an imperfect and by definition approximate tool means 
in practical terms that it is extremely complicated, if not impossible, to produce a 
simple yes or no answer to the question of whether a tax ruling confers an 
advantage.251 This lack of certainty is in conflict with the objective nature of the 
concept of advantage.  
An additional factor contributing to the high standard of proof and the 
allocation of its burden are the parallels between the EU ALP and the MEOP. As 
discussed above, the early stages of the development of the EU ALP had strong ties 
to the MEOP, employing very similar language, and a similar rationale.252 The 
utilisation of the EU ALP as a tool to determine the existence of an advantage in a 
manner similar to the MEOP can explain why it is up to the Commission to prove the 
incorrectness of the outcomes it is scrutinising, and why the standard of proof, in 
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effect must take into account all the relevant economic factors.253 Given that finding 
a deviation from the EU ALP means that an advantage is present, it is reasonable 
that an approach similar to the one employed in relation to the MEOP is used in this 
context. Arguably, the high burden of proof also relates to the connection, in fiscal 
cases, between the notions of advantage and State resources – if a measure cannot 
be proven to have led to a reduction in tax liability, it would be hard to argue that 
any revenue was actually foregone, or that there was a transfer of State resources.254 
In effect, the vague nature of the EU ALP and the necessarily approximate character 
of any ALP make a high and stringent burden of proof an essential condition of its 
application. 
The Court’s approach arguably could shed some light on the actual practical 
limits of the EU ALP’s application, which would be particularly valuable, given the 
seeming lack of theoretical limits discussed in the previous Part. In effect, based on 
the Court’s analysis and the outcome of the three cases, in particular Starbucks and 
Fiat, it is possible to suggest that as long as the TP arrangement is justifiable on the 
basis of a reasonable functional analysis or other objective criteria that form part of 
the TP documentation and analysis, the contested ruling cannot be deemed to 
confer an advantage, as the position endorsed in it cannot be proven to be 
erroneous, even if it appears to be. Compare for example the payment of royalties 
from SMBV to Alki, which was included in the TP report and whose residual 
character and level were deemed to be at least not economically unreasonable,255 
with the segmentation of FFT’s capital, which was not in line with the functional 
analysis, thus excluding relevant capital from remuneration calculations.256 In effect, 
it is possible to extrapolate from the Court’s economic analysis that the 
appropriateness or economic rationality of the TP arrangement is paramount.257 
Based on this, it is possible to argue that the notion of advantage in the context of 
the EU ALP can be limited to scrutinising the rationality of the allocation of taxable 
base, and therefore of taxing rights, inherent in transfer pricing. As long as the 
arrangements endorsed in a tax ruling follow reasonably from the TP 
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documentation,258 and especially the functional analysis,259 it is submitted, that 
regardless of the effective tax rates endorsed, it would not be possible for that tax 
ruling to confer an advantage. Such a limit could explain why Fiat and Starbucks, 
which were nearly identical in their reasoning,260 had such different conclusions – 
the latter was based on a reasonable analysis, while the former was not.  
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that the Commission has 
to do a significant amount of heavy lifting to prove the existence of an advantage 
following from the application of the EU ALP. The Court has shown that it does not 
shy away from complex economic assessments, and is not willing to allow the lack 
of content of the EU ALP to turn its application into a mere box-ticking exercise, or 
to allow for the Commission to pass on the burden of proving the appropriateness 
of the arrangement to the parties concerned.261 This unsurprising turn of events puts 
a great deal of pressure on the Commission when placed in the context of what can 
be deemed an advantage under the ALP rationale, as it will have to conduct 
thorough and exhaustive analyses to prove the existence of an advantage to a 
requisite standard, by proving the erroneous nature of the TP arrangement, and by 
proving the correctness of its own assessment. It has to be proven that any 
inaccuracies in the TP arrangements go beyond those inherent in the methodology, 
and that those inaccuracies lead to an actual reduction of the recipient’s tax burden. 
Based on this, it is submitted that an appropriately documented tax ruling whose 
end result reflects, or is close to, economic reality cannot confer an advantage, as 
the Commission will be unable to prove that the arrangement in question cannot 
lead to a reliable approximation of market-based outcomes. This holds true even if 
the effective tax rates that follow from that ruling are very low. This can arguably 
represent a practical limitation to the application of the EU ALP as part of the notion 
of advantage.  
In brief therefore, the inherently approximate nature of the EU ALP comes 
into conflict with the notion of advantage for the purposes of State aid. The lack of 
objective criteria of assessment, a symptom of the overall lack of certainty and clarity 
that has been discussed in this Chapter, plays a role in this. As a result of the 
objective nature of the notion of advantage, the Court, following the case law, 
imposes a high burden and standard of proof on the Commission, recognising in 
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this context the approximate nature of the ALP. This standard of proof, and the way 
in which the burden of proof is structured, mean that the Commission must conduct 
a thorough and in-depth analysis. The standard of proof demanded by the Court is 
particularly relevant, because it means that the Commission’s attempt to base its 
analysis on its own standards, detached from national laws and international 
practice, has somewhat failed, in practice. However, it has only failed because the 
Commission’s economic analysis was wrong, not because of any theoretical errors 
in the Commission’s approach. There is realistically nothing stopping the 
Commission from utilising this approach in the future and correcting its economic 
analysis. In practical terms however, the economic rationality of a TP arrangement 
coupled with the burden and standard of proof, represent a potential limitation to 
the application of the EU ALP. 
IV. The Problematic Conception of the Reference Framework 
 As discussed at length in the Selectivity Chapter, the determination of the 
reference framework is of paramount importance in the analysis of fiscal selectivity. 
It is under this reference framework that selectivity itself is to be evaluated. Errors in 
its determination vitiate the entire selectivity analysis.262 The findings of, and 
inconsistencies in, the first step of the analysis significantly influence the outcome of 
the entire analysis.263 In fact, in light of the well-documented widening of the first 
two steps of the selectivity analysis,264 the reference framework is not necessarily 
distinguishable from the general system. Additionally, the objectives under which 
the comparability analysis will be undertaken increasingly seem to be those of the 
reference framework or general system.265 The reference framework is also a 
particularly relevant part of the advantage analysis as it defines “normal” taxation,266 
and as such its correct determination is a cornerstone of any fiscal aid analysis. There 
are two main issues with the reference framework as conceived in the tax ruling 
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Decisions and the subsequent judgments, namely its width for the purposes of 
comparability, and the partially extra-systemic nature of it. 
The Decisions discussed primarily follow the wide trend, arguing that the 
general tax system is the relevant reference framework, with an exceedingly wide 
objective of taxing corporate profits.267 This can only be a meaningful determination 
if a holistic approach is to be employed,268 meaning that the reference framework is 
not formulaically defined as the “general” system, but rather as the relevant set of 
rules, which include by definition the general system, but also any specific 
applicable rules, thus informing the limits of comparability to those subject to the 
rules. In effect, using the general corporate tax system disregards the national TP 
laws;269 a problem which is exacerbated by the use of a supranational ALP as the 
“normal” taxation benchmark. This is particularly relevant, as by their very nature TP 
rules can only ever apply to integrated undertakings, meaning that the widening of 
the reference framework beyond the TP regime expands the domain of 
comparability to include all undertakings, regardless of whether they can engage in 
TP situations.270 The Court, in all three judgments, spent very little time on the notion 
of selectivity and the determination of the reference framework, instead focusing on 
the notion of advantage and the accompanying economic analysis, mirroring the 
Commission’s Decisions. In its brief analyses, it endorsed the Commission’s outlook 
in relation to the reference framework.271 In Apple, it stated that the tax rulings form 
part of the general Irish corporate tax regime, which it also found to constitute the 
reference framework, whose objective is the taxation of taxable profits.272 
a. The Width of the Reference Framework and its Objectives 
The first issue with the determination of the reference framework in the 
Decisions and the subsequent judgments is its width. As discussed in the Selectivity 
Chapter, it is clear that the width of the reference framework can vary wildly, and 
can indeed be the general tax regime.273 That Chapter also advocates for a more 
consistent definition of the reference framework, partly due to the importance its 
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objectives play in the comparability analysis. That analysis needs to be undertaken 
in the context of the objectives of one of the contested measure, the general system, 
or the reference framework.274 In the tax ruling Decisions, the Commission defined 
the reference framework in the widest possible manner, as discussed above, and 
determined its objective, the taxation of corporate profits, as the relevant one for 
the comparability analysis.275 This has the effect of making standalone undertakings 
and MNEs comparable. The choice of the wider reference framework arguably 
makes the Commission’s work in proving selectivity easier, as the base of 
comparables in effect includes all undertakings liable to pay tax.276 Thus, it arguably 
makes the comparability analysis meaningless, as it disregards the factual and legal 
situation of group undertakings.277 A narrower reference framework made up from 
the relevant national rules would be more appropriate.278  
To illustrate this practical issue, it needs to be stressed that treating 
standalones and MNEs as comparable is theoretically problematic. Such an 
approach disregards economic reality, as it denies the economic gains that arise 
from the nature of the firm.279 Both from an economic and from a fiscal perspective, 
a distinction between the two sets of undertakings is rational.280 As is clear from the 
discussion on the OECD ALP and the criticism of it in this thesis, groups engage in 
activities that standalones cannot, and are governed by a different economic 
rationality.281 The very notion of TP rules, as understood in international practice, is 
based on the fact the integrated firms are different from standalone ones, that is the 
very raison d'être of the ALP. In other words, TP rules exist solely because of 
integrated firms, and reasonably could only ever apply to them. In this context, a 
reference framework which includes both categories, arguably undermines the 
OECD consensus.282  
The nature of a standalone and an integrated firm also differs in relation to 
the obligations they face – the latter have to comply with TP rules, and are subject 
to tax, and therefore tax rules, in multiple jurisdictions.283 MNEs are, in other words, 
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partly taxed on the basis of TP arrangements, being uniquely capable of entering 
such arrangements.284 In effect, TP rules and the international tax regime are 
irrelevant to standalone firms. Thus, since the ALP is a methodology applicable to 
cross-border situations and in the context of integrated groups, the use of a purely 
domestic standalone entity as a basis for comparison seems irrational.285 The ECJ 
has in its jurisprudence on fundamental freedoms, recognised that groups and 
standalones are not comparable, even while domestic and non-resident groups can 
be.286 Given the fiscal and economic (or legal and factual) differences between 
standalones and integrated groups, it stands to reason that the same approach 
should be followed in the context of State aid – for the existence of selectivity and 
of an advantage to be ascertained, the comparison ought to be undertaken 
between integrated firms.287 In other words, the reference framework should only 
include those undertakings which by their nature, and by the nature of their 
activities, are or can be subject to TP rules.288 As Wattel notes this theoretical 
inconsistency can be demonstrated by the Belgian Excess Profit Scheme, where the 
competitive edge afforded to the benefitting MNEs was the fact that they were 
treated as standalone entities.289 
In effect, this discussion suggests that the reference framework should have 
been defined as the national TP rules and tax ruling regimes. Those elements define 
the relevant legal regime in which integrated groups operate. As such, they can 
form a substantive and meaningful basis for comparison. By ignoring those 
elements of the national regime, the Commission commits an error in assessing the 
reference framework.290 A comparison, by definition, requires a benchmark, which 
ought to be based on the context of the examined framework and the features of 
the undertakings subject to it.291 Thus, the objective of the reference framework 
would have been the taxation of the corporate profits of integrated firms, based on 
a profit allocation analysis, designed to approximate market outcomes. Tax rulings 
would have been compared with other tax rulings in the context of the TP regime 
and practice.292 In such a scenario, the Commission would have had to use national 
TP rules in its analysis, and examine the notions of selectivity and advantage in that 
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context. However, by using the wider reference framework, the Commission in 
effect ends up disregarding the structure of the national tax system by deeming the 
scope of the domestic TP regime irrelevant. Thus, by disregarding national rules, it 
is able to rely on the EU ALP.293 This is because in the context of MNEs, a profit 
allocation mechanism is essential for profits to be ascertained and allocated, and 
therefore taxed.294 Thus, with the domestic regimes not applicable, the EU ALP is 
used in this capacity.  
Additionally, the comparison, with its excessively wide scope, cannot be 
undertaken in the context of the relevant national rules. Instead, a principle wider 
than that had to be used. This follows from the Court’s reasoning in the Starbucks, 
Fiat, and Apple judgments, where the EU ALP was implied into the domestic tax 
systems as a “benchmark” to ensure that integrated firms and standalones are taxed 
in the same way.295 In effect, the EGC argues that the lack of formal differentiation in 
the domestic system between integrated and standalone undertakings means the 
profits of the former must be taxed as if they had arisen in normal market conditions. 
However, those conditions are defined based on the EU ALP, which in this context 
is by extension deemed to be the relevant tool for the assessment of an advantage 
under “the normal rules of taxation”.296 Thus, the EU ALP becomes the basis for the 
definition of normality and becomes the benchmark upon which selectivity (and 
advantage) are to be assessed. The equality orientation of the EU ALP allows it to 
exist at a higher level of generality within a tax system than the specific domestic TP 
rules and the tax ruling regime. In a sense, by defining such a wide reference 
framework which includes an external ALP, and which places all taxpayers in a 
comparable situation, the Commission seems to define what it considers to be the 
“normal” taxation of an integrated multinational undertaking, which it does not have 
the power to autonomously do.297  
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that the definition of the reference 
framework as the general tax system is problematic. Such a wide definition 
disregards the structure of the domestic system and its specific provisions for TP 
situations, thus imposing to an extent the EU ALP as the relevant tool for the 
comparability analysis. Additionally, it leads to standalone and integrated 
undertakings being considered to be comparable, which is not in line with 
economic reality or the legal situation of integrated undertakings.  
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b. An Extra-Systemic Reference Framework? 
In this context, it is possible to discuss the extra-systemic nature of the 
reference framework. First, it is worth noting that the objective of taxing corporate 
profits which stems from the general reference framework is not necessarily the 
most relevant one, as the tax rulings do not remove or alter the liability to pay taxes 
on profits, but rather provide for the methods according to which those profits, and 
subsequently the taxes due, ought to be calculated. The objectives of the tax rulings 
therefore are not to tax, but to calculate the amount of tax payable. Tax rulings, and 
the relevant legal regime, provide for the methodology or “benchmark” used to 
determine the tax base. Therefore, the relevant question is not whether the recipient 
undertakings are liable to pay tax, but how much of their profit should be attributed 
to a given tax jurisdiction, and by extension how much tax they are liable to pay.298  
For a standalone company, the tax base calculation is relatively simple, 
meaning that no specific methodology is necessary.299 In effect, the basic, normal 
rules of taxation apply, with no need for TP. For MNEs, and domestic groups, 
however, as the inherent logic of the ALP reveals, this is not the case – as discussed, 
the ALP essentially allocates profits between the members of a group, and by 
extension between jurisdictions,300 by approximating market prices,301 through a 
complex methodology. This methodology, which is by its very nature case-specific, 
is what is contained in a tax ruling and what is provided for in the national TP and 
tax ruling regime. In other words, a tax ruling does not formally provide for a 
departure from statutory tax rates, or provide for specialised exemptions, but rather 
ascertains the tax base to which normal rules shall apply. The objective of a tax ruling 
therefore cannot be said, contrary to the Court’s assertion, to be “to tax chargeable 
profits”,302 but rather it is to calculate those chargeable profits in accordance with 
national law. As such, even if a tax ruling and the relevant regime form part of the 
general corporate tax system, their objectives cannot be equated to those of said 
system. 
Following the Court’s logic in Apple, national TP rules, and the national tax 
ruling and TP regime and practice should be at least part of the reference system, 
as they lay down the regime in the context of which a tax ruling was adopted.303 This 
is especially true given that the legal framework of which the contested measures 
form part, and the objectives of those measures, ought to be taken into account 
when determining the reference framework.304 In casu, the relevant legal framework 
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should be seen as the tax ruling and TP regime, and its objective as the allocation 
of profits for the purposes of corporate taxation. Those regimes contain the rules 
that inform the methodologies used to allocate profits, and therefore calculate the 
taxable base. The chosen national profit allocation methodology (in most cases the 
ALP) is absolutely necessary for the calculation of a MNE’s taxable profits in a given 
jurisdiction, as it is it which enables the system to pursue its objective of taxing 
corporate profits.305 Allocation rules are the legislative means that make the general 
tax system functionally applicable to integrated firms, and as such must be included 
in the reference framework.306  
However, as discussed above, the Commission and the Court use the EU ALP 
as the “tool” or “benchmark” for the profit allocation, which in fact supersedes any 
national rules.307 In effect therefore, the Court’s rationale in relation to the EU ALP 
introduces it as the mechanism by which the objective of the widely construed 
reference framework is to be attained, thus making it part of the relevant applicable 
regulatory framework. Therefore, in the context of the EU ALP’s nature as a principle 
of equal treatment,308 the reference framework is the not made up solely of national 
rules, but also includes the supranational EU ALP as the allocation mechanism of 
choice. As such, the reference framework is apparently external to the system 
examined.309 This would also follow from the notion of advantage, where the 
benchmark (normal taxation) against which an advantage is to be assessed tends to 
be the reference framework.310 As in fiscal cases the determination of the reference 
framework forms part of the analysis of both selectivity and advantage,311 and given 
that relevant benchmark for the purposes of advantage is the EU ALP, it follows that 
the EU ALP is also part of the reference framework. In fact, the very same logic is 
employed: a deviation from the EU ALP confers an advantage and demonstrates 
the measure’s selectivity, by derogating from this benchmark.312 Following this, it is 
submitted that based on the analysis of the Commission, the EU ALP is necessarily 
part of the reference framework, as it is against this benchmark that a derogation, 
in the form of a deviation from it, is to be established.313 
Using an external reference framework is problematic, because the reference 
framework, by its very nature, can only be based on the tax laws of the Member 
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State concerned – fiscal aid exists within the tax system and in relation to it. Fiscal 
aid and tax advantages can only be granted in the context of the tax system to which 
the recipient undertakings are “permanently and inevitably” subject.314 This means 
that the determination of the reference framework is (normally) based solely on the 
laws of the Member State concerned.315 In other words, a reference framework 
cannot be supranational, or derived from EU law;316 such a reference framework 
would represent a major departure from the case law.317  
This issue, combined with the width of the reference framework as employed 
by the Commission in the Decisions, make it apparent that the use of the national 
TP and tax ruling rules as the reference framework would have been far more 
appropriate.318 Such an outcome would be more in line with the notion of a national 
reference framework, as it would have well-defined material content, by relying on 
and including the relevant elements of national law.319 In effect however, under the 
position of the Commission and the Court, the reference framework contains the EU 
ALP, which as discussed above, lacks material content, and disregards elements of 
national law, imposing an external benchmark. As Jaeger notes, this is comparable 
to an extent to the Gibraltar judgment,320 where in effect a comparison was 
undertaken under a “hypothetical” reference framework.321 However, in Gibraltar, 
the ECJ merely went to a higher level of generality, looking at how the system itself 
was ab initio discriminatory, as a result of its (discriminatorily designed) bases of 
assessment.322 It did not introduce a pan-European, supranational element into the 
system, and did not implicitly define the characteristics or the content of the tax 
system. An argument of systemic selectivity, on the basis of Gibraltar, could be 
made,323 but, first, it was not made by the Commission or the Court, second, it would 
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clash with the Commission’s assertion that tax rulings are not per se problematic,324 
and third, it would call into question the very existence of TP rules and thus the 
economic reality of integrated groups. 
An external reference framework has the effect of limiting the Member States’ 
fiscal autonomy, as it imposes an extra-systemic element, based on which the 
domestic tax system is examined.325 It imposes external elements and content into 
the domestic system. In this case, the use of the widest possible reference 
framework facilitates the introduction of the EU ALP, which imposes external 
elements into the system, setting aside national law. Thus, the external 
characteristics of the reference framework are introduced as a result of its width, 
and the concurrent existence of both problematic aspects is necessary for the EU 
ALP to be used as a benchmark. An external reference framework flies in the face of 
the notion that selectivity exists within the tax system. A (partially) extra-territorial 
reference framework in practice has a huge influence on the structure of the 
selectivity test, as it means that a derogation is not necessarily conceived as a 
departure from the relevant national law, but from an (unknown) international 
standard.326  
In effect, the differentiation in treatment is not adjudged in the context of the 
relevant national law, but in that of the supranational standard. Arguably, in this 
context the differentiation analysis would become divorced from the structure of 
the national system, which would normally establish comparability, and the 
potential for justifications. This in effect makes it difficult for a Member State to be 
able to assess ex ante whether a measure it intends to introduce actually derogates 
from the standard, thus affecting legal certainty. More importantly however, it 
makes establishing prima facie selectivity much easier. This follows from the 
combination of the necessary width of the reference framework for an extra-
systemic element to be introduced, and the fact that a derogation from that 
framework is established on the basis of an external benchmark, under the widest 
possible comparability analysis. This can be taken to mean that any deviation from 
the external reference framework would need to be justified, based on the intrinsic 
objectives and guiding principles of the system,327 which arguably includes the EU 
ALP and its equality consideration. Obviously, this would make a justification harder 
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than it already is. In practice, this reasoning would mean that a tax ruling is selective, 
unless it correctly applies the EU ALP.  
In brief, based on the nature of international taxation and the objectives of TP 
as they relate to the taxation of MNEs, it is clear that the relevant benchmark for the 
ALP calculation is part of the reference framework. In the Decisions, and the Court’s 
judgments, this benchmark is the EU ALP – a supranational construct, external to the 
domestic tax system. This is clearly problematic, both in terms of fiscal sovereignty 
and as it relates to the notion of fiscal selectivity and fiscal aid in general. 
c. Conclusion on the Reference Framework 
In conclusion, it is clear from the discussion above that the definition of the 
reference framework in the tax ruling Decisions and the subsequent judgments is 
problematic. It is defined formulaically and in the widest possible manner, as the 
general corporate tax regime. As a result, the economic and legal realities of MNEs 
are disregarded for the purposes of comparability, but most importantly the 
relevant national rules are also disregarded. Given the necessity of a profit 
allocation mechanism for the effective taxation of the corporate profits of integrated 
firms, the EU ALP becomes part of the reference framework, in the same way it 
becomes the benchmark to determine the existence of an advantage. This results 
in a reference framework which is partially external to the system it is applied in, 
which can create further limitations to the Member States’ fiscal sovereignty.328 
Additionally, an extra-systemic reference framework can be problematic for the 
entire notion of selectivity, by disassociating it from the national context in which it 
is to be ascertained. A wide definition of the reference framework is necessary for 
the EU ALP to apply instead of the national rules, meaning that one issue follows on 
from the other. 
To avoid those issues, it is submitted that the reference framework should 
have been defined as the national tax ruling regime and/or the national TP regime, 
where one exists. Alternatively, the reference framework should have been 
determined to be the general corporate tax regime as it applies to integrated 
groups – in other words including, in a substantive manner, the national tax ruling 
and TP regime. Neither of those would impose or need to rely on an external 
benchmark. In effect, the objective of either reference framework would be the 
determination of the taxable profits of integrated firms, and their subsequent 
taxation in line with national law, as the set of rules pertaining to TP situations are a 
necessary mechanism to ensure that the accurate taxation of such profits in 
possible.329 Under either framework, the comparison would necessarily be limited 
to undertakings which are actually in a similar legal and factual situation, as their tax 
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exposure is not obvious and needs to be ascertained based on the provisions of the 
relevant national regimes. In this context, selectivity would be assessed at the level 
of integrated firms, in line with the ALP portion of Forum 187.330 Such an approach 
would also be in line with the perception that tax rulings are not per se 
problematic.331 Additionally, such an approach would exclusively make use of the 
national rules both as the reference framework, and by extension as the benchmark 
used to establish a deviation from market conditions for the purposes of the 
advantage analysis. This by extension would mean that an EU ALP would not be 
necessary for the Commission to carry out its analysis. The domestic regime, and 
the general tax ruling practice could have provided for an equally good benchmark 
to analyse the notions of selectivity and advantage in the context of allegedly 
“sweetheart” deals.332 This is especially true in the context of the practical limitations 
stemming from the standard of proof, discussed in Part III. At the same time, the use 
of national law for those examinations would not have raised any issues relating to 
fiscal sovereignty, as the State aid investigations would be into the application of 
the systems concerned, not their content. Overall, a reference framework 
composed of, or at the very least substantively containing, the national TP and tax 
ruling framework would have been more appropriate.333 
To an extent, all the issues discussed in relation to the EU ALP stem from this 
very wide definition, and the resulting external character of the reference framework 
and the relevant benchmark. Therefore, arguably, the manner in which the 
reference framework is determined in the cases at hand is the bedrock of one of 
their more significant legal and political issues. Based on the analysis of the 
reference framework itself, and that of the imposition of a problematic EU ALP as a 
necessary consequence of the width of the reference framework, it is submitted that 
the Commission, and the General Court, committed an error in relation to the 
reference framework.  
V. The Notion of “Selective Advantage” 
It is clear that beyond the invention of the EU ALP, the rationale of the tax 
ruling Decisions is also problematic in the context of the notion of selectivity, 
especially in relation to the determination of the reference framework. In general, 
Parts III and IV have shown that the introduction and application of the EU ALP does 
not necessarily sit comfortably alongside either the notion of advantage or the 
concept of selectivity. In this context, it is necessary to briefly examine the notion of 
“selective advantage”. 
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One of the common elements to be found in a number of the Decisions 
detailed above is the merging of the criteria of advantage and selectivity under one 
heading, and often under a single analysis.334 Given the similarities, in fiscal cases, 
between the two notions as a result of the interdependence of the reference 
framework and the benchmark, and given that in all Decisions those are the only 
two criteria of the notion of aid that are discussed at any length, analysing them 
under one heading is not per se problematic. It is worth noting that the term 
“selective advantage” is and has been used for a period of time in relation to State 
aid, featuring in soft law documents,335 academic commentaries,336 Commission 
Decisions,337 Opinions of Advocates General,338 and ECJ judgments.339 However, in 
the instances where the term was used, it is clear, especially in the case law, that it 
does not refer to a unified criterion or notion, but rather the term “selective” qualifies 
the term “advantage”.340 The usage and existence of the term cannot be taken to 
mean that a unitary concept of “selective advantage” exists. The term’s usage is 
reasonable, as it is the combination of the two notions of selectivity and advantage 
(and the remaining three) that together showcase a (fiscal) measure’s aid character. 
A non-selective advantage does not raise any issues, and neither does a selective 
measure which does not improve its recipients’ position.  
The General Court, in its Starbucks, Fiat, and Apple judgments recognised 
the distinction between the two criteria, and explained that the two may be 
considered concurrently, but should be analysed separately.341 As a result, 
conducting a single “selective advantage” analysis is arguably problematic. On a 
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very basic level, a joint analysis goes against the jurisprudence of the ECJ which 
states that the two notion must be “clearly distinguished”,342 which is not achieved 
when they are analysed together in a manner that blends them beyond recognition, 
or the possibility of separation. Such a combined methodology, which entangles 
the notion of advantage in the second step of the selectivity analysis by treating it 
as a derogation from the reference framework, and vice versa,343 can create 
analytical problems.  
The combination of selectivity and advantage impacts the notion of 
advantage in relation to the associated burden of proof, as a derogation from a 
reference system, formally understood, does not automatically or necessarily 
translate into favourable treatment.344 In other words, a derogation does not 
automatically equal a differentiation in effective treatment. It is after all possible that 
the beneficiary of a seemingly favourable fiscal provision ends up paying a higher 
effective tax rate than other comparable non-recipient undertakings.345 It is worth 
remembering, as discussed in the Advantage Chapter, and Part III of this Chapter, 
that an advantage needs to be positively proven, and a significant standard and 
burden of proof is attached to it.346 Additionally, the Court’s reasoning in relation to 
the recent Decisions, follows the case law, and requires that a (proven) deviation 
from the (EU) ALP goes beyond the inaccuracies inherent in the system.347 This 
shows that the advantage is not merely a derogation from the reference framework, 
but a deviation which goes beyond any inherent methodological inaccuracies and 
which leads to a lowered chargeable base and therefore tax burden. This means 
that the identification of a derogation cannot in and of itself coincide with the 
identification of an advantage. By extension, and following the General Court’s 
reasoning in Fiat,348 it seems that under the combined approach, the identification 
of an advantage will be deemed to be the derogation from the reference 
framework,349 understood in the context of the three-step selectivity analysis.  
This approach allows for an actual advantage analysis, but in the process 
converts the advantage criterion into a part of the selectivity analysis. In a sense any 
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advantage identified in this manner will be, at least prima facie, selective, as the first 
two steps will be automatically and simultaneously satisfied. In effect, the equation 
of such an advantage with a derogation makes the latter’s existence incumbent on 
that of the former, and essentially removes the second step of the selectivity 
analysis, replacing it with the notion of advantage. In the context of a widely defined 
reference framework, where all undertakings end up being comparable, especially 
when combined with the World Duty Free judgment,350 fiscal selectivity has become 
relatively easy to establish. If the second step is replaced by the notion of advantage 
and a derogation is defined as the existence of a beneficial outcome within the 
system, and the reference framework and its accompanying objective are so wide 
as to make the comparability analysis meaningless, fiscal State aid is effectively 
expanded to encompass the examination of (all) differential outcomes stemming 
from the general system. Under the logic of the tax ruling Decisions, any differential 
outcome can be deemed to be a prima facie selective advantage. In other words, 
the identification of the advantage itself under this approach can be taken to 
confirm its selective nature, subject to any potential justifications.  
Plainly, such a combined test would not allow for the two criteria to be clearly 
distinguished, or even distinguishable, as per the requirements of the case law and 
the very notion of State aid itself.351 Additionally, the combined test would in effect 
discount, prima facie, the possibility of a non-selective advantage, or of a measure 
which while being selective does not in fact confer an advantage. It would conflate 
a departure from the reference framework, which may or may not be beneficial, with 
an actual benefit. In brief, this approach cannot be said to be either analytically 
satisfactory, or in line with the case law of the ECJ. This merged approach arguably 
partly results from the EU ALP, as its foundational logic as a principle of equal 
treatment is more closely aligned with the notion of selectivity, while its main 
function is typically in line with the notion of advantage. Using an EU ALP rooted in 
the principle of equal treatment which doubles as the analytical tool used for the 
determination of the existence of an advantage inevitably merges the rationale of 
the two criteria. 
Additionally, this approach does not need a rule to derogate from the 
system, but merely to create a difference in treatment. It is in effect a wide reading 
of the already wide concept of selectivity expressed in World Duty Free.352 In 
essence, in the Decisions concerned with the ALP and its application, the 
misapplication of the ALP is taken to be the derogation, as it also is the advantage. 
Thus, the combined approach arguably can be taken to mean that any 
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misapplication of TP rules will lead to a selective advantage being present;353 even 
a non-advantageous tax ruling would, in most instances, still derogate from the 
(widely defined) reference framework by providing for a differentiating 
methodology for the tax base calculation. Given the highly imprecise nature of any 
ALP, be it derived from Article 107(1) TFEU, from the OECD, from national law, or a 
combination thereof, this complementary nature of a derogation and an advantage 
advocated in the Decisions,354 and recognised by the Court,355 is obviously 
problematic. Given for example the prevalence and width of ALP ranges,356 and 
their practical uncertainty,357 and given the overall “grey” nature of the ALP,358 what 
would actually constitute a misapplication is unclear. This is exacerbated as a result 
of the EU ALP’s lack of material content and the lack of any guidance on its 
application save for the case-by-case approach used by the Commission.359 In a 
sense, under the OECD approach there is no one and only correct application,360 
and under an EU ALP there is no guidance as to what a reliable approximation of 
market-based outcomes is, meaning that there is no legal certainty whatsoever for 
either taxpayers or tax administrations.361  
Additionally, this approach could, in theory, be taken to mean that the 
mistaken but ultimately beneficial application of any fiscal rule can confer a selective 
advantage.362 This is exacerbated by the inherent complexity of many constituent 
elements of taxation, which makes their correct application more an art than a 
science.363 Simply put, there is no actual limitation to what could be caught under 
this reasoning. Arguably, such an approach can bring general measures within the 
scope of the State aid prohibition, as all that is needed is in effect a different 
outcome stemming from the application of such a measure. By essentially taking 
away the need for an actual derogation, in a manner very different to Gibraltar or 
British Aggregates,364 the combined approach creates a situation where any 
beneficial, when compared to the situation of all taxpayers, outcome can be taken 
to be both a derogation and the advantage, thusly making it a prima facie selective 
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advantage. This is especially true given that the concept of de facto selectivity has 
been eroded by World Duty Free, and that the identification ex ante of a privileged 
category is no longer necessary,365 meaning that any differential outcome can ex 
post facto be evaluated and found to confer a selective advantage. As an illustration 
of this issue, it is worth considering effective tax rates (ETRs). 
ETRs indicate the amount of tax actually paid by undertakings in relation to 
taxable income. A vast body of economic research suggests that several elements 
of an undertaking’s structure, economic situation, business model, and behaviour 
can affect its ETR, either raising it, or more often lowering it. For example, an 
undertaking’s size, overall debt, profitability, cash flow, composition of assets, legal 
form, and multinational presence all affect its ETR.366 Interestingly, even certain 
types of fiscal reform, such as a cut in statutory rates, can greatly affect the ETR of 
equity-financed and debt-financed investment in different ways.367 Beyond this, it 
has been suggested that employing audit firms, and the sectoral expertise of those 
firms, also has the effect of lowering a client firm’s ETR, while the same applies to 
the range of accounting techniques available to an undertaking.368 The existence 
and causes of lower ETRs clearly showcase that the application of general measures 
can lead to advantages (lower tax liabilities) for certain undertakings, based on a 
range of causes. If the reference framework is defined as the general system whose 
objective is the taxation of profits, all undertakings are comparable, and if an 
advantage, which economic research suggests would exist, can be deemed as a 
derogation from the framework, then, in effect, the identification of that 
advantage/derogation would be sufficient to prove the selective nature of the 
advantage.369 Based on the rationale stemming from the notion of “selective 
advantage” and the case law discussed in the Selectivity Chapter, it becomes clear 
that any differentiations in the fiscal outcomes of the benefitting undertakings can 
be seen as a prima facie selective advantage, subject to the, as discussed, limited 
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possibility for justification. Clearly, such an outcome, in light of the limited practical 
significance of the other three criteria in fiscal cases,370 has the effect of further 
widening the scope of fiscal selectivity and therefore fiscal State aid.  
In brief, the Commission’s and the Court’s rationale in the tax ruling cases 
clearly has a tendency to analyse selectivity and advantage in tandem, treating the 
latter as a derogation for the purposes of the three-step selectivity test. However, 
this approach mixes the two notions to a point where they become hard to 
distinguish. This is problematic, as selectivity and advantage are separate notions, 
and criteria of aid. As such they need to be analysed and proven separately, due to 
the cumulative nature of the criteria of aid,371 and because their concurrent 
presence, alongside the other three criteria, is what actually confers a measure its 
State aid character. This is particularly relevant in fiscal cases, due to the limited 
significance of the other three criteria. Additionally, it has been shown that a 
combined analytical approach to selectivity and advantage contributes to the 
further widening of the notion of selectivity, and can actively alter its scope of 
application. As a result, it is submitted that such an approach, which does not allow 
for the two notions to be examined separately but merges the two analyses, is 
problematic in relation to the notion of aid and the cumulative nature of its 
conditions, while also being specifically problematic in the context of the concept 
of selectivity. 
VI. Conclusion 
 This Chapter set out to discuss some of the more problematic and significant 
issues of the Commission’s reasoning in the tax ruling Decisions, utilising the 
judgments of the General Court, where available. This discussion has focused on 
four issues, which despite being separate, are all somewhat interrelated. First, the 
notion of the EU ALP was discussed. Its analysis concluded that beyond the weak 
case law foundations and occasionally questionable reasoning, this notion also 
suffers from a lack of clarity. Its content is not at all defined or based on objective 
criteria, as the EU ALP is derived neither from national law, or international practice 
– the only guidance that exists is the Commission’s (possibly erroneous, as 
demonstrated by Starbucks and Apple372) application of it on a case-by-case 
basis.373 This issue in turn makes it difficult to determine the nature of the EU ALP, 
and the limits of its application. This clearly creates significant issues in relation to 
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legal certainty. This lack of legal certainty, and the unanswered questions over the 
potential effects and administration of the EU ALP as it applies to taxation can be 
problematic for undertakings, as the tax environment is an important element of 
their future business decisions, including the location of their activities.374 In short, 
we know what the EU ALP is not, but we cannot be clear on what it actually is. Given 
the fact that the EU ALP supersedes national TP rules, this is problematic, as it can 
infringe on the Member States’ fiscal sovereignty. On top of this, the EU ALP can 
cause policy-making headaches for Member States, both in the context of OECD 
membership and further developments in the realm of international taxation, and in 
the context of a conceptual clash with the fundamental freedoms case law on the 
application of national ALPs. 
 Second, in the context of the application of the EU ALP, the burden and 
standard of proof inherent in the notion of advantage were discussed. The 
problems relating to the content and nature of the EU ALP necessarily make the 
Court’s review of the Commission’s analysis stringent, as it is examined in a manner 
similar to the MEOP. In effect, both principles are analytical tools used to determine 
the existence of an advantage. Nonetheless, the nature of any ALP, as an 
approximation, does not sit comfortably next to the objective notion of advantage, 
as it cannot conceptually offer a clear-cut answer.375 Thus, the burden and standard 
of proof need to take into consideration the approximate nature of the ALP. This 
reflects possibly the only practical limitation to the application of the EU ALP, namely 
that a well-documented tax ruling is very unlikely to confer an advantage, even if it 
endorses low effective tax rates. 
 Third, the reference framework was discussed. It was found that its width, 
while not contra legem, is arguably problematic, especially to the extent that it 
informs the comparability analysis. This is because it means that practically all 
undertakings are deemed to be comparable, even though only a select few can 
engage in TP situations. More importantly however, it was shown that the EU ALP 
necessarily must form part of the reference framework. This means that the 
reference framework, and by extension the benchmark based on which “normal” 
taxation is to be defined, is partly derived from the EU ALP, and by extension EU 
law. This is problematic both in terms of the rationale of State aid, and in terms of 
fiscal sovereignty.376 It is also suggested in this context that the use of the EU ALP as 
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the relevant tool for the determination of an advantage stems from the width of the 
reference framework, which in effect does not allow national TP rules to apply in the 
context they should. 
 Finally, the combined notion of “selective advantage” was discussed. It was 
shown that the reasoning of the Commission and the Court in relation to it results in 
a merging of the two criteria to the point where they cannot be separated, as the 
advantage analysis, utilising the EU ALP, becomes an integral part of the selectivity 
analysis. This goes against the established practice in the area of fiscal aid, and 
against the cumulative nature of the criteria of aid.377 The merged super-criterion 
partly results from the concept of the EU ALP. Additionally, it was shown that the 
combined criterion of selective advantage has the effect of further widening the 
notion of fiscal selectivity, and therefore fiscal aid.  
 It becomes clear from this Chapter that the reasoning of the tax ruling 
Decisions as endorsed by the General Court is problematic on multiple fronts. It is 
impossible to know whether the ECJ will uphold the EGC’s reasoning in relation to 
the EU ALP, and by extension the (further) blurring of the selectivity and advantage 
criteria in the context of fiscal aid. What is known however is that the (excessive) 
width of the reference framework and by the extension of the scope of the 
comparability analysis follow from the evolution of the case law detailed in the 
Selectivity Chapter. The same can be claimed to an extent in relation to the merging 
of selectivity and advantage, at least notionally, if not to the extent this was carried 
out in the Decisions and judgments at hand. Those two issues in particular can 
change the scope of application of the notion of fiscal aid, as selectivity is by far the 
most relevant criterion in this context.378 Even though the notion of advantage was 
particularly important in the tax ruling cases, as discussed in the Advantage 
Chapter, this is not necessary or usually the case with fiscal measures. The 
expanding width of the notion of fiscal aid can be demonstrated by the World Duty 
Free judgment in relation to general measures.379 
This evolution of the notion of fiscal aid as seen through the cases discussed 
in this Chapter, and to an extent throughout this Thesis, is problematic. This is 
because in relation to fiscal aid we are dealing with what is essentially an incomplete 
doctrinal construct: there is no comprehensive theoretical framework,380 or solid 
enough doctrine381 to delineate the concept of fiscal aid – this to a large extent 
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explains the fluidity of concepts and the lack of clarity within the realm of fiscal aid,382 
and allows for subjective, rather than objective, conceptual developments to 
occur.383 Given this conceptual fluidity, maintaining a scope of application of State 
aid rules to taxation which is functional, meaning neither so narrow so as to be 
irrelevant nor so wide so as to be threatening to fiscal sovereignty, is paramount. 
The rationale of the tax ruling cases jeopardises this distinction. 
On the one hand, this rationale poses threats to the notion of fiscal 
sovereignty in more than one ways, as discussed above. It can extend the reach of 
the State aid prohibition into any “unequal” or differential outcome that exists within 
a tax system. At the same time, a supranational reference framework is used for the 
notion of selectivity, and a supranational benchmark used to determine the 
existence of an advantage. In effect, the reasoning of those cases can allow the 
Commission to infer the EU ALP into national systems, and use it, in lieu of any 
national rules. Those cases endorse the existence of a pan-European standard, 
hidden for almost sixty years in plain sight, in matters of direct taxation and profit 
allocation. The possibility to use an external reference framework arguably changes 
the focus of the State aid prohibition from a prevention of unequal treatment to a 
potential streamlining of fiscal regimes. State aid can by definition only exist within 
the context of one system, following from the rules and logics of that system. The 
externalisation of two significant criteria in effect means that the existence of aid 
follows from the logic of the EU ALP, as opposed to that of the national system. In 
this context, it is hard to see how any tax ruling regime which does not apply the 
external EU ALP to its own system does not invite the scrutiny of the Commission. In 
effect, a tax ruling regime is deemed to be legal, as long as it applies the 
Commission’s ex cathedra universally applicable supranational, yet 
unsubstantiated, EU ALP. And to make matters worse, even if the EU ALP was 
indeed applied, it is far from certain that its incorporation and application into the 
national tax system would actually confer legal certainty, due to the principle’s 
distinct lack of clarity. 
On the other hand, the reasoning of the tax ruling cases causes significant 
problems in relation to the notion of fiscal aid itself. The General Court had a great 
opportunity to discuss comparability, but simply concluded, with scant analysis, that 
in the context of profit allocation and taxation MNEs are somehow comparable to 
domestic standalone entities, despite being subject to different legal rules. The 
formulaic definition of the reference framework which led to this astonishing 
conclusion is also problematic, as it does not take into account level of generality at 
which the system operates, or even the very purpose of relevant national rules. In 
that sense, the new cases represent a missed opportunity, and the confirmation of 
 
382 Peters (n 167), 13 
383 López López (n 381), 812 
202 
 
problematic trends that reduce the complexity and effects-orientation of the notion 
of fiscal aid. Importantly, if the merged notion of selective advantage becomes a 
mainstay of the Commission’s and Court’s approach, State aid will no longer have 
as its starting point the existence of an advantage, changing the structure of the 
system.384 Additionally, such an approach can have the effect of bringing general 
measures, or their aftermath, within the scope of State aid, meaning that the notion 
of selectivity will lose part of its raison d'être. In brief, those cases continue, with a 
vengeance, a trend which was criticised in the Selectivity Chapter and whose effect 
is the widening of the concept of fiscal aid. The dangers inherent in this of course 
can be linked to the threats faced by the Member States’ fiscal sovereignty.  
 The only positive element of the cases, which comes from the judgments of 
the Court and not the reasoning of the Commission, is the confirmation of the 
stringency of the standard of proof, as well as the allocation of the burden of proof. 
The approach endorsed by the Court, which can also be applied in 
“straightforward” fiscal cases,385 means that the notion of advantage in fiscal cases, 
if it can be kept clearly distinguished from selectivity, can gain some heft, and 
become a valuable tool. This would be a welcome development in the 
Commission’s practice – however it does not outweigh the significant systemic 
problems analysed in this Chapter. 
 In light of this, the clear conclusion is that the reasoning of the tax ruling cases 
is rife with novel and unsubstantiated ideas, while also managing to confirm and 
expand upon a host of existing bad ones. Arguably, the Commission started with 
the goal of reigning in the abusive practices of MNEs and certain colluding Member 
States and only then figured out how to get there. The goal may be commendable, 
but the Commission should have taken to heart the lessons of the fundamental 
freedoms case law. Negative harmonisation can only go so far; positive 
harmonisation is necessary to achieve any significant progress.386 In the aftermath 
of this noble but misguided attempt we are left with a number of problems, the 
combined effects of which are threats to fiscal sovereignty and by extension the 
allocation of competences within the EU framework, and an ever wider, and 
arguably (even) less fiscal in its outlook, notion of fiscal State aid. The baffling part 
of this all is that, following the practical limitation stemming from the standard of 
proof, the invention of an EU ALP and the accompanying wide definition of the 
reference framework were not actually necessary. In effect, a domestic reference 
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framework coupled with the economic rationality of the advantage analysis would 




This thesis, in Part I, thoroughly analysed the notion of fiscal State aid and its 
components. Based on that analysis, the tax ruling Decisions, and the subsequent 
EGC judgments to which they gave rise, were critically evaluated in Part II. In brief, 
Part I illustrated that fiscal State aid is different from non-fiscal aid, by virtue of the 
different application of the criteria of State aid to fiscal cases. As a result, it was 
shown that the notions of selectivity and advantage are by far the most relevant 
ones. The consistent widening of the former however has led to the widening of the 
notion and by extension the scope of fiscal aid in general. In Part II, the problems 
identified with the notion of fiscal aid were analysed in light of the Commission’s tax 
ruling Decisions. Utilising the international tax context of the contested rulings, that 
analysis clearly demonstrates that the reasoning employed in those Decisions is 
deeply flawed. In effect, both Parts illustrate how the expansion of the concept and 
of the scope of fiscal aid can significantly limit Member States’ fiscal sovereignty. 
This conclusion will summarise the findings of the thesis, and present the notion and 
scope of fiscal aid as it emerges from the combined analysis of Parts I and II. 
a. The Criteria of Fiscal Aid 
By looking at the five cumulative1 criteria of fiscal aid, it is possible to adduce 
that the most important and relevant one is selectivity.2 This conclusion is 
unsurprising, as the notion of State resources, by its own internal inherent logic, will 
almost always be satisfied in relation to fiscal aid, as such aid is imputable to the 
State, and results in foregone revenue, satisfying both limbs of the criterion.3 At the 
same time, the criteria of effect on trade and distortion of competition are generally 
easy to satisfy.4 On top of this relative ease of satisfaction, due to the classification 
of fiscal aid as operating aid,5 and the generally accepted harmful character of 
operating aid, the CJEU has developed doctrines and presumptions which mean 
that fiscal aid will almost certainly be seen as distorting competition and affecting 
trade.6 Thus, we are left with the criteria of selectivity and advantage.  
As shown in the relevant Chapter, the criterion of advantage contains a 
Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP) which lends the criterion substantial 
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ECLI:EU:C:1994:112, para 33 
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weight, but even though the MEOP is in principle applicable to fiscal cases,7 in 
practice it is unlikely it can apply to such cases. Without the MEOP, the notion of 
fiscal advantage is quite simplistic,8 but despite this, the Commission has to examine 
the applicability of the MEOP in any given case.9 Similarly, it is clear that the 
Commission has to take all available information into account to establish the 
existence of a fiscal advantage,10 even when the MEOP is not applicable. This 
includes the fiscal context of the contested measure. As such, the advantage 
criterion can be relevant in practical terms, due to the burden and standard of proof 
attached to it, as evidenced by the Court’s judgment in Apple.  
As the notion of advantage is preoccupied with economic benefits not 
obtainable on normal market conditions, including the mitigation of applicable 
charges,11 it becomes clear that it is conceptually very close to the typical fiscal 
selectivity analysis. The reference framework represents the normal market 
conditions, those applicable in principle to all, while the benefits or mitigations 
represent the derogation. The difference between what should have been paid 
(counterfactual) and what was paid is the economic advantage, and its selective 
granting is what is deemed problematic under State aid law. In this context, it is 
imperative to stress out that the concepts of selectivity and advantage are separate, 
and should be approached and analysed as such.12 The term “selective advantage” 
refers to the selectivity of a given advantage.13 This follows from the structure of the 
Article 107(1) TFEU prohibition and the cumulative nature of the criteria; a non-
selective advantage will not confer State aid while a selective measure which does 
not grant an advantage will equally not result in a finding of State aid. Thus, it is 
important to analytically distinguish between the two. The notion of advantage, and 
its existence, are after all the starting point of any State aid analysis. 
Selectivity, as an independent criterion, is therefore the crux of fiscal aid, as 
even “normal” taxation and the counterfactual that are relevant for the 
determination of an advantage follow to a large extent from the notion of selectivity. 
This of course does not mean that the remaining criteria should be discounted, both 
from a formalist standpoint as they form part of the Treaty prohibition, and from a 
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functional one as they can be situationally very important, albeit in a limited number 
of cases.  
b. The Problems with Selectivity and the Fiscal Aid Regime 
Fiscal selectivity in itself is far from settled. However, as discussed in the 
relevant Chapter, the structure of the selectivity analysis is settled, and has been 
reiterated consistently by the CJEU. This analysis is based on a three-step test.14 The 
first step is to determine the reference framework, and the second one is to identify 
a derogation or differentiation in treatment between undertakings whose legal and 
factual situation is comparable in light of the objectives of the system or measure. If 
those two steps are satisfied, then a measure will be deemed prima facie selective, 
subject to a potential justification, which is the third step. Out of the three steps, only 
the last is consistent, but still necessitates a case by case analysis.15 At the same time, 
the first two steps were shown to have become increasingly wider,16 and lacking in 
internal consistency.17 This results from the rigidity with which fiscal selectivity has 
on occasion been applied, and from the fact that the case law is incoherent.18 The 
wider interpretation of the fiscal selectivity test in essence means that the selectivity 
criterion is easier to satisfy. In the context of the above discussion, this obviously can 
be problematic, as it has been demonstrated that selectivity is the centrepiece of 
the analysis, meaning that if the criterion of selectivity is met then it is very probable 
that the contested measure will be found to constitute (probably incompatible) 
State aid. Selectivity analyses may have become more intricate, but not necessarily 
more coherent.19  
It is possible to attribute the difficulties of applying the criteria of Article 
107(1) TFEU to fiscal measures to their fiscal nature. The case law on the quasi-
jurisdictional criteria of effect on trade and distortion of competition contains 
presumptions, general and specific, against fiscal aid due to its great distortive 
 
14 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten ECLI:EU:C:2001:598, para 41; Joined Cases C-20/15P and C-
21/15P Commission v World Duty Free Group (formerly Autogrill España), Banco Santander & 
Santusa Holding, ECLI:EU:C:2016:981, paras 57-58 
15 Jaeger, ‘Tax Measures’ (n 5), para 53 
16 A Bartosch, ‘Is There a Need for a Rule of Reason in European State Aid Law? Or How to Arrive at 
a Coherent Concept of Material Selectivity?’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 729, 732; Claire 
Micheau, ‘Tax Selectivity in State Aid Review: A Debatable Case Practice’ (2008) 17 EC Tax Review 
276, 282 
17 Compare the vastly different outcomes between Case C-6/12 P Oy ECLI:EU:C:2013:525, and Case 
C-203/16 P Dirk Andres (faillite Heitkamp BauHolding) v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2018:505, or Case 
C-128/16 P Commission v Spain and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:591, and Case C-100/15 P Netherlands 
Maritime Technology Association v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2016:254. 
18 Massimo Merola, ‘The Rebus of Selectivity in Fiscal Aid: A Nonconformist View on and Beyond 
Case Law’ (2016) 39 World Competition 533, 553 
19 Christoph Arhold, Viktor Kreuschitz, Franz Jürgen Säcker, Ulrich Soltesz, Michael Shuette, Andreas 
Schwab, ‘Article 107 TFEU’ in F J Säcker and F Montag (eds) European State Aid Law (Beck Hart 
Nomos 2016), para 375 
207 
 
potential. Similarly, since taxation results from legislation enacted by the State and 
given that funds not collected and therefore effectively removed from the State’s 
budget are construed as a burden for the purposes of State aid law, the fiscal nature 
of a measure leads it to satisfy the State resources criterion. In relation to the notion 
of advantage, since taxation and fiscal measures in general, are a result of the State 
exercising powers stemming from its role as a public authority, the MEOP’s 
usefulness as an analytic tool is greatly reduced, due to the practical difficulties 
relating to the applicability and application of the MEOP when an indissoluble link 
exists between an act of the State as an economic operator and as a public authority. 
It becomes clear that in most fiscal cases the advantage analysis, devoid of the 
MEOP, will end up being akin to a bare-bones selectivity-style analysis. 
Despite the fact that selectivity is arguably more developed that the other 
four criteria as they apply to fiscal cases, some of the problems identified and 
discussed in the selectivity Chapter also stem from the contested measure’s fiscal 
character, or at the very least from the intricacies and complexity of taxation and the 
concurrent formalism20 in the application of the selectivity test. Taxation is inherently 
top-down, with general rules establishing the system and more specific ones 
qualifying its application,21 and as such fiscal systems are made of many rules, 
operating at differing levels of generality, applying simultaneously. This makes the 
determination of a reference framework considerably more complex. However, the 
reference framework tends to overlook the systemic design of tax systems, focusing 
on specific rules divorced from their logical fiscal context (which arguably results 
from the bottom-up nature of many State aid investigations). At the same time, the 
comparability analysis tends to be undertaken in light of exceedingly wide 
objectives, like the raising of revenue for the State, artificially blinding State aid law 
to the great policy-making power of taxation, and leading to situations where 
economic operators to whom a specific rule, with a differing objective from the 
basic one, applies are deemed comparable with undertakings to whom it does not. 
In essence, the combination of the issues that can be found in the case law of fiscal 
selectivity can render the notion and the test incapable of performing their essential 
part in the State aid analysis, distinguishing between general fiscal measures and 
anticompetitive ones.  
c. The Tax Ruling Decisions in Context 
 The tax ruling Decisions, given the evolution of the notion of fiscal aid, are 
not particularly surprising. The discovery of the ALP and its use as a tool were 
certainly innovative, and as discussed in the relevant Chapter, problematic in a 
variety of ways, but to an extent the use of the ALP resulted from the exceedingly 
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wide reference framework. In this sense, the rationale that underpins the tax ruling 
Decisions, and the first wave of judgments, is arguably problematic on two different 
grounds. 
First, it confirms an effectively substance-free version of the selectivity 
analysis, where the reference framework, and its objectives used to frame the 
comparability analysis, are mere box ticking exercises. The Commission, and the 
General Court, accepted that MNEs and standalone companies are comparable 
with scant analysis, even though the two groups are subject to different legal 
regimes, and differing economic realities and rationalities. The definition of the 
reference framework as the general corporate tax regime overlooks the level of 
generality at which a general system has to operate, and effectively disregards the 
very purpose of national profit allocation rules and practices. This has the effect of 
widening the very notion of fiscal State aid. As a result of this approach, where all 
undertakings are comparable, the distinction between the actual advantage and its 
selective nature breaks down to an extent, as can be evidenced by the effective 
merger of the selectivity and advantage into a single criterion in the tax ruling 
Decisions. This is because any advantage that exists is selective if not available to all 
comparable undertakings – which in turn means all undertakings that are liable to 
pay corporate tax. The rationale of the Decisions, as well as its in principle 
acceptance by the Court (after all, the Court merely disagreed with the 
Commission’s math) is only possible because of the widening of the notion of fiscal 
selectivity. In a sense, the chickens of World Duty Free have come home to roost. 
Secondly, there is the issue of the use of the ALP. The Commission’s discovery 
of a supranational principle, and its assertion that it is the one relevant for 
establishing the existence of an advantage in the context of TP was always bound 
to capture the headlines22 – the choice of the targets also helped in this context.23 
Of course it is true that the foundation and conception of the EU ALP, its 
supersession of national rules, and its nebulous content and nature are significant 
problems in and of themselves. It is clear that beyond the significant legal 
uncertainty created by the Commission’s approach, fiscal sovereignty is also a 
thorny issue. The relationship between State aid and taxation has not always been 
an easy one in this context, but the EU ALP is a different kind of beast. It has the 
potential, as explained in the relevant Chapter, to turn the Commission into a fiscal 
enforcer and to create a significant degree of (backdoor) harmonisation. However, 
despite the attention that those Decisions are getting, we must not assume that all 
was good in the realm of fiscal State aid before they were adopted. Despite the 
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innovativeness of the EU ALP, the flaws in the reasoning and treatment of fiscal aid 
that permeate the Decisions are effectively symptoms of the problems that exist 
within the notion of fiscal aid in general. The Commission is only able to invoke and 
rely on the EU ALP because the reference framework is defined in a formulaic and 
exceedingly wide manner. The serious symptom that is the EU ALP should not mean 
we ignore its root cause. The same applies to the imposition of extra-systemic 
elements to the reference framework – it represents a tangible threat to fiscal 
sovereignty, but it stems from the problems within the notion of fiscal aid itself. The 
supranational EU ALP and the extra-systemic reference framework are, simply put, 
a bold new step down the well-trodden path of generally ignoring the structure, 
rationale and context of national tax rules.  
In other words, the tax ruling Decisions, and subsequent General Court 
judgments, are excellent examples of the tension between the notion of fiscal 
sovereignty, and the role and concept of fiscal State aid. The bluntness of the 
reasoning, as well as the invocation of a novel principle superseding national law 
and being inferred into national law were bound to raise a few eyebrows. The 
problems with those Decisions are significant, even if seen in a vacuum. But they did 
not originate in a vacuum – they followed from a problematic practice of non-
substantive analysis and constant widening of fiscal State aid. The tax ruling saga to 
an extent is the culmination of the evolution of the notion of fiscal aid as has been 
analysed in this thesis. The consistent widening of the scope of fiscal aid, including 
its potential application to general measures and secondary, non-predictable, 
differentiated effects, already represented a significant limitation to Member States’ 
fiscal sovereignty. But the EU ALP goes further than that. It pushes aside national 
rules by introducing an ill-defined EU principle into the reference framework, and 
by using that very same principle as the basis upon which the counterfactual for the 
purposes of the advantage analysis is to be defined. Thus, the introduction of a 
supranational EU ALP, divorced from national rules and international practice, 
represents a much more severe threat to that sovereignty, as it, stealthily but surely, 
pushes towards fiscal harmonisation.24 The obvious problems with the explicitly 
innovative elements of the reasoning, namely and mainly the EU ALP, must not be 
overlooked, but at the same time we must avoid missing the forest for the tree and 
concentrate solely on those issues. The notion of fiscal State aid was in a bad shape 
before those Decisions, and it will remain in such a shape even if, once all the 
appeals are finished and the dust has settled, the Decisions are annulled and their 
reasoning forgotten. In effect, the expansion of the scope of the notion of fiscal aid 
detailed throughout this thesis has changed the norms applicable to the interaction 
of Article 107 TFEU and direct taxation, and has thus, on multiple fronts, allowed for 
 
24 See for example: Dimitrios A Kyriazis, ‘From Soft Law to Soft Law through Hard Law: The 
Commission's Approach to the State Aid Assessment of Tax Rulings’ (2016) 15 European State Aid 
Law Quarterly 428, 436 
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the erosion of fiscal sovereignty, and by extension has limited Member States’ ability 
to use their fiscal regimes as policy tools. 
d. The Notion and Scope of Fiscal Aid 
The notion of fiscal aid is clearly based on the interpretation of its constituent 
elements. It has been shown in Part I of this thesis that fiscal State aid is different 
from “normal” aid. It has, by its very nature, to be different, as the criteria of aid 
struggle with fiscal elements. This, when read in conjunction with the case law on 
the notions of effect on trade and distortion of competition, means that selectivity 
and advantage are the only criteria that end up mattering, generally speaking. And 
even those two are not unaffected by the fiscal nature of their subject matter. It has 
also been shown that the notion of fiscal selectivity, which is the decisive one for the 
scope of the fiscal aid prohibition has been significantly widened and can catch, 
beyond ab initio de facto selective systems, general non-compulsory measures. The 
width of the scope of the prohibition becomes more alarming when placed in the 
context of the compatibility regime, which due to the notion of incentive effect is 
generally predisposed against operating aid – which is the form the majority of fiscal 
aid takes.25 The GBER also imposes different conditions when it comes to fiscal aid, 
making the effective and lawful granting of such aid a difficult task. This is further 
exacerbated as a result of the potential conflict between fiscal aid measures and 
other internal market provisions, which can make the measures, even if they pass 
the incentive effect test, incompatible with the internal market. It is clear that as a 
result of the notion of fiscal selectivity in particular, and the compatibility regime, 
fiscal sovereignty is in fact relatively limited, when it comes to small scale changes. 
Even systemic changes are not immune from State aid control. Thus, in this context, 
the tax ruling Decisions essentially continue a path of State aid being used as a fiscal 
policy convergence tool. The erosion of fiscal sovereignty via slow fiscal 
convergence is a natural by-product of the internal market striving to eliminate 
distortions. This process can be evidenced, beyond State aid control, via the 
interaction of the fundamental freedoms and national tax laws.26 However, the tax 
ruling Decisions take this erosion of fiscal sovereignty to a whole new level, by 
effectively enforcing an extra-systemic reference framework and a Union-wide 
standard for TP situations, where the Commission is in charge of making, 
interpreting, and applying the rules. They are bolder in their assertions, and they 
represent a different type of threat to fiscal sovereignty. One that is far more obvious 
 
25 Jaeger, ‘Tax Measures’ (n 5), para 93 
26 The Court’s jurisprudence has had an effect on Member States’ tax systems, forcing a number of 
changes of domestic law. See, for example J Malherbe, P Malherbe, I Richelle, E Traversa, D De 
Laveleye, The Impact of the Rulings of the European Court of Justice in the Area of Direct Taxation 
2010 (European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic 




and immediate than the slow convergence of typical fiscal aid control, which still 
relies to an extent on the characteristics of the examined system to pass judgment. 
The line of reasoning contained in the Decisions, and its implications, go far beyond 
the long tradition of Member States surrendering some of their sovereignty for the 
success of the Union.27 
Oddly enough, there seem to be opposing movements in the evolution of 
the notions of selectivity and advantage. The notion of fiscal advantage can be 
described as devoid of substance,28 but is becoming increasingly substantive, at 
least in practical terms. The fact that the MEOP is, in principle at least, applicable in 
fiscal cases – and that its applicability must be ascertained by the Commission, 
combined with the high standard of proof evident in the case law show that 
advantages, fiscal or not, must be positively proven. Given the complexities of 
taxation this can be easier said than done – a simple yes or no answer may not always 
be obvious.29 At the same time, this trend in the case law ensures that the fiscal 
environment is taken into consideration at least at some point in the State aid 
analysis, as it is one of the relevant factors that ought to be examined.30  
Selectivity on the other hand, despite the often interesting approaches the 
Court comes up with, seems to be becoming itself a notion devoid of substance. As 
detailed in this thesis, and as discussed above, the three-step test has been 
significantly widened, especially in relation to the determination of the reference 
framework, the notion of a derogation, and the comparability analysis. The test has 
been made so functional it effectively has very few, if any, limits. The widening of 
the fiscal selectivity test means that general measures are within the scope of aid – 
under a wide framework with equally wide objectives, a measure that does not end 
up benefitting all operators can be deemed to be selective.31 It is clear that the 
reference framework sits at the centre of those issues, as it informs the entirety of 
the three-step test.32  
There is no easy or obvious solution to the wide conception of the reference 
framework, but this thesis has advocated for a holistic approach which ought to 
focus on the coherent sum of the applicable fiscal rules, and thus be truly effects-
 
27 Cees Peters, ‘Tax Policy Convergence and EU Fiscal State Aid Control: In search of Rationality’ 
(2019) 28 EC Tax Review 6, 9 
28 Jaeger, ‘Tax Measures’ (n 5), para 75 
29 Werner Haslehner, ‘Double Taxation Relief, Transfer Pricing Adjustments and State Aid Law’ in I 
Richelle, W Schön, E Traversa (eds) State Aid Law and Business Taxation (Springer 2016), 148; Anna 
Gunn, and Joris Luts, ‘Tax Rulings, APAs and State Aid: Legal Issues’ [2015] EC Tax Review 119, 121, 
124-125 
30 See for example: Barcelona (n 10), para 38; Begona Perez Bernabeu, ‘How to Determine the 
Existence of a Tax Advantage: The F.C. Barcelona Case’ (2019) 18 European State Aid Law Quarterly 
377, 380 
31 World Duty Free (n 14), para 76 
32 Case C-270/15 P Belgium v Commission Opinion of AG Bobek ECLI:EU:C:2016:289, para 29 
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oriented. In a similar vein, it is submitted that the justification step should adopt a 
more fiscal outlook, and examine the coherence and internal consistency of a given 
system, alongside the other tax-specific justifications. The combination of those two 
elements would exclude from the scope of selectivity, and therefore State aid, 
differential outcomes stemming from the application of an internally cohesive 
system. A more fiscal outlook, which would mean that tax principles would inform 
and influence the application of the selectivity test, is necessary. Effectively, 
selectivity would be examined in light of a system’s internal coherence.33 This would 
allow for the notion of State aid to consistently and correctly examine the effects of 
a given measure,34 as it would be able to do so through the correct lens, as opposed 
to relying on an increasingly formalistic construct. Arguably, the Court’s approach 
to the notion of advantage, where all elements of the fiscal regime must be taken 
into account, reflects a more fiscal outlook.  
Even with a revised outlook, advantage and selectivity are bound to remain 
the only relevant criteria in the vast majority of fiscal cases, as a result of the 
presumptions against operating aid in general and fiscal aid specifically, and the 
internal logic of the State resources criterion. The limits the remaining criteria 
impose are important, but beyond those, both analytically and practically, they are 
a mere formality in the very vast majority of fiscal cases. Given that advantage is 
primarily a factual exercise, and that the other three criteria have a very limited role 
to play, the widening of fiscal selectivity results in the widening of the notion of fiscal 
aid in general and as a concept. The tax ruling Decisions should be seen as 
cautionary tales of what the exceedingly wide conception of fiscal selectivity entails, 
and how a hugely controversial innovation such as the ALP can follow almost 
seamlessly from the established practice on the reference framework, and on fiscal 
aid in general. In a sense, the Decisions thus showcase why the characteristics of tax 
law should be taken into account in the analysis of fiscal State aid – or in other words 
why a more fiscal outlook is necessary.  
 
33 Roberto Cisotta, ‘Criterion of Selectivity’ in H Hofmann and C Micheau (eds) State Aid Law of the 
European Union (OUP 2016), 133 
34 Thomas Jaeger, ‘Taking Tax Law Seriously: The Opinion of AG Mazak in EDF’ (2012) 11 European 
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